次声波技术与心理战应用

次声波是一种频率变化范围在10?4 Hz～20 Hz之间的声波,它具有穿透力强、传输距离远以及不易被吸收的特点,以此制造的次声波武器伤人但不毁物。近年来,随着高新技术的不断发展,次声波武器在心理战领域得到了广泛应用。本文首先对次声波技术及次声波武器的概念进行了简要介绍;其次,研究了次声波的生物学效应,分析了次声波频率、声压强度以及作用时间与生物学效应的关系,发现三种次声波的作用参数与生物学效应之间的关系虽然错综复杂,但也有一定规律可循;最后,提出了次声波武器在心理战的三个潜在应用前景,即利用次声波穿透力强的特点发展对掩体人员作战的心理战装备、利用次声波的生物学效应发展反恐作战的心理战装备以及利用次声波的生理致伤机理发展心理战防护装备。     

【邀请论文】特朗普政府太空防卫战略调整的动因、特点与影响

面对太空领域变化的安全环境和自身实力的相对衰弱,特朗普政府对美国的太空防卫战略进行了重大调整。相比奥巴马政府的太空防卫战略,特朗普政府明确将太空作为新型作战域,加快天军建设,并以中俄为主要对手,联合盟友构建军民一体、内外联动的太空防卫体系。本文认为,特朗普政府对于太空防卫战略的调整凸显了美国欲加快太空武器化、谋求外空绝对军事力量优势的霸权企图。但这无疑会加剧目前愈演愈烈的太空“安全困境”,将更多国家拉入“太空军备竞赛”的恶性循环中,对国际太空安全和全球战略稳定带来消极影响。展望拜登政府的太空防卫政策,其军事色彩会略微下降,但也将更重视技术积累和太空的开发利用。     

Decision support model for effects estimation and proportionality assessment for targeting in cyber operations

Cyber operations are relatively a new phenomenon of the last two decades.During that period,they have increased in number,complexity,and agility,while their design and development have been processes well kept under secrecy.As a consequence,limited data(sets)regarding these incidents are available.Although various academic and practitioner public communities addressed some of the key points and dilemmas that surround cyber operations(such as attack,target identification and selection,and collateral damage),still methodologies and models are needed in order to plan,execute,and assess them in a responsibly and legally compliant way.Based on these facts,it is the aim of this article to propose a model that i))estimates and classifies the effects of cyber operations,and ii)assesses proportionality in order to support targeting decisions in cyber operations.In order to do that,a multi-layered fuzzy model was designed and implemented by analysing real and virtual realistic cyber operations combined with interviews and focus groups with technical-military experts.The proposed model was evaluated on two cyber operations use cases in a focus group with four technical-military experts.Both the design and the results of the evaluation are revealed in this article.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE WORLD DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND US MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL ON THE ISRAELI DEFENSE INDUSTRY: A DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS MODEL

This paper models the interactions between the defense industry market structure and the defense needs of Israel, the USA and Western Europe, which produce several heterogeneous defense goods. The model specifies that the defense industries of the US and Europe are ‘large’ while that of Israel is ‘small’. The US military aid to Israel is also an integral part of the model. The results show that net defense costs of Israel are minimal when the number of its defense firms is one. The model predicts that an increase in US military aid reduces Israel’s government expenditure, its defense industry’s profits and its net defense costs.     

The economic effects of international trade in armaments in the major western industrialized and developing countries†

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to assess the impact of exports and imports of armaments (based on 1980 data) on sectoral trade and employment and other economic variables in the major Western trading countries. If the United States were to place a unilateral embargo on its arms exports and imports, we calculate that it would experience a comparatively small amount of employment displacement in the aggregate and that most of this displacement would occur in the transport equipment and electric machinery sectors. If all the major Western countries were to place a multilateral embargo on their arms trade, the sectoral effects on the United States would be similarly small. But the sectoral effects in several other industrialized and developing countries measured as a percentage of sectoral employment, would be larger, indicating potential short‐run adjustment problems in labor markets in some cases.     

France and its allies: A comparative study of defence spending trends since 1985*

Within the EU France devotes to defence the largest financial and human resources although it is not the richest country, nor has it the largest population or labour force. The cost of nuclear weapons accounts for only a small fraction of this abnormally high French defence effort. If France had restructured its military capabilities at the same rate as its principal Allies during the 1985–1994 period, then French defence outlays would be about 20% less than at present. The fundamental reasons for France's excess defence outlay comprise virtual total dependence on French sources for equipment, produced in very small numbers; a military presence outside of Europe; and too many personnel. These deficiencies, and the consequent absence hitherto of a “peace dividend”, indicate a failure to identify the country's real strategic requirements, and a lack of will to reorganise efficiently French defence. The recently announced reform towards an all‐professional force is unlikely to achieve the potential and desirable improvement in cost‐effectiveness.     

MEASURING UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION AND INACTION IN THE 1990S

Although Africa is host to the vast majority (and the most deadly) of conflicts in the world, it would appear that there is a distinct lack of genuine interest in African affairs shown by the UN Security Council and its key members. This paper proposes a 10-level scale of response system to measure the seriousness of the Council in dealing with conflicts. By comparing the Council response with the size and severity of each individual conflict, the scale attempts to assess the Council performance in the fulfilment of its duty to restore international peace and security. The results show that Africa has been (and remains) marginalized in the Council work.     

The sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942–1974

This article had its genesis in a background study for the development of a new Australian Army counter-insurgency doctrine. Archival research showed that the Australian counter-insurgency doctrine employed in such post-1945 conflicts as Burma, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam originated in the jungle campaigns of the South West Pacific Area during World War II. The historical record also showed that the Army's counter-insurgency doctrine, as with its World War II-jungle warfare doctrine, was a pragmatic amalgam of Australian experience and British doctrine. The article traces this process through the development of a series of doctrine manuals. It also considers the contribution of key individuals to both counter-insurgency theory and practice. This distinctively Australian approach to the development of doctrine was responsible for producing a highly successful manual, The Division in Battle: Pamphlet No. 11, Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (DIB 11), which the Army used during its involvement in Vietnam.     

When Peacekeepers Fail Thousands are Going to Die. The ETO in Rwanda: a Story of Deception

This study develops the concepts of fourth generation operations and the associated principles. First, the concept of fourth generation operations is introduced and defined. Fourth generation operations are the evolution and extension of third and fourth generation warfare based on a change of tactics, technology, and combatants. These operations are currently ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the global war on terrorism. Based on the framework of US joint doctrine, the supporting principles of fourth generation operations are developed. This requires the introduction of the principle of Population Perception.     

Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the Rhodesian Front regime propaganda warfare strategy during Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. It uses the case of the Chilonga area of Chiredzi located in the south-east of Zimbabwe to demonstrate that propaganda warfare was introduced as a measure to counter guerrilla infiltration and civilian cooperation with them. Drawing on ideas of military anthropology vis-à-vis the importance of cultural awareness in counterinsurgency, the paper argues that the efforts of the Rhodesian Front regime to use propaganda were fruitless. This is because they mostly ignored the culture of the Shangani, local people. Despite that, there were other reasons for the failure of the Rhodesian Front’s propaganda strategy, including the lack of conformity between politics and military action.