Addressing the “headwinds” faced by the European arms industry

ABSTRACT

The European arms industry is challenged by several adverse “headwinds.” Fragmentation leads to costly duplications and, in conjunction with stagnating budgets and sharply increasing costs, prevents firms from exploiting economies of scale and learning. This is exacerbated by size differentials vis-a-vis the leading US arms manufacturers and competition from emerging producers. As some “headwinds” are self-enforcing, far-reaching industrial and policy responses are required to improve the industry's outlook. As exports may not indefinitely compensate for low domestic demand, there is an economic imperative for further cross-border collaboration and consolidation. Despite various EU policy initiatives, progresses regarding the European Defence Equipment Market and strengthening the European Defence Technological Industrial Base have been relatively slow. It remains to be seen whether the European Defence Fund will be the proclaimed “game-changer,” raising competitiveness of the European arms industry. At the same time, the UK's withdrawal from the EU adds uncertainties.     

Brazilian National Defence Policy: foreign policy,national security,economic growth,and technological innovation

ABSTRACT

With the world’s ninth largest economy and comprising nearly 60% of South America’s GDP, 47% of its territory, and 49% of its population, Brazil has become a regional power and an important actor in world affairs over recent decades. This scenario has led the government to re-evaluate its role in the world order, resulting in the enactment of the National Defence Policy, whose objective was to consolidate the country as a regional power while at the same time addressing national security issues, promoting economic development through a series of defence programmes, restructuring the defence industrial base, fostering innovation through technology and knowledge transfer to Brazil, and indigenous research and development. However, the policy’s implementation suffers from several challenges discussed in this article, which may test the capability and competence of Brazilian policymakers, military, industrialists, and other individuals and organisations involved in its implementation.     

Coping with the refugee and migrant crisis in Slovenia: the role of the military

Approximately 470,000 refugees and migrants passed through Slovenian territory between September 2015 and March 2016, creating a crisis that required a great deal of organisational and field work on the part of many governmental and non-governmental institutions. In the social sciences, a discourse on “security versus humanitarian approach” on the refugees and migrant issue appeared; however, the article goes over such a discourse and deals with roles and problems of different institutions – mostly the military – that responded to the crisis. Namely, coping with the crisis was characterised by significant institutional adjustments, difficult co-ordination, and intense public debate. The Slovenian Armed Forces were included in this process as support for Civil Protection and Police. The military’s role followed the military missions defined by the Defence Act; however, the government also proposed some changes to the act that were met with some doubts on the part of the public and different institutions.     

South African defence policy: the rationale and impact of the SANDF’s primary role and conventional force design

The 2015 South African Defence Review set out to reverse the deterioration of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) capabilities. Within the South African Department of Defence (DOD) this deterioration is expressed mainly in terms of a decreasing defence budget, subsequent declining conventional capabilities and obsolete prime mission equipment. Contemporary research and defence expert debates on this theme, point out the disjuncture between policy ends and the available means, with scepticism for an increased defence budget given the DOD’s lack of internal reform and strategy adjustment. One question that remains largely unanswered in the literature regarding the decline of the SANDF, is why both the policy-makers and the SANDF have remained focused on the primary role of the military (defending territorial integrity) accompanied with an unaffordable conventional force design? This question relates to the aim of this paper and is explored by revisiting initial defence policy decisions and compromises that were made in the 1990s. It is argued that the primary role of the SANDF and its conventional force design suited the interests of both the politicians and the military, but that the drawbacks thereof have harshly caught up with the DOD.     

Collective action and the common enemy effect

How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).     

Militarism in post-war Cyprus: the development of the ideology of defence

This article provides a theorisation of militarism in post-war Cyprus. Based on qualitative empirical research conducted in Cyprus in 2011, the article explores the manifestation and steadfastness of Greek-Cypriot militarism, and the development of this militarism, which appeared after the partition of the island in 1974. In particular, it proposes the ideology of defence as a way to understand post-war Greek-Cypriot militarism. It shows the embedded nature of defence in the idea of the national struggle. It aims at mapping the character of this militarism in order to provide the grounds for future discussion. Only by understanding the interconnecting discourses that made Greek-Cypriot militarism possible in post-war Cyprus, can we understand its past, present, and future.     

Defence industrial policy – a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy?

This article explores whether it makes sense for national governments to employ defence industrial policies – such as offsets and discriminatory procurement practices – to support their domestic defence industries. This question has so far primarily been discussed by economists, who have argued strongly against the use of defence industrial policies. This article maintains that these economists fail to address the often complex motivation behind the introduction of these policies. It illustrates these shortcomings by contrasting their arguments against a case study of Norway, which accounts for the country’s use of defence industrial polices from the early post-Second World War era up until today. The article concludes that, depending on their objectives, defence industrial policies can be seen as either a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy.     

Strategic and Budgetary Necessity,or Decision-making ‘Along the Grain’? The Royal Navy and the 1981 Defence Review

The 1981 Defence Review undertaken by John Nott as Secretary of State for Defence controversially and dramatically cut the capabilities of the Royal Navy’s surface fleet. Many of those involved in these decisions have emphasised the budgetary and politico-strategic drivers for these reductions in capability, and the first generation of academic analysis has broadly followed this position. However, recently released government and private archival sources demonstrate that Nott’s review was initially much more severe than thought, and that this was due as much to the presumptions and assumptions of the key decision makers as to any strategic or budgetary factors.     

Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy 1949–2009

During their 60 years within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Denmark and Norway have experienced both high and low standings within the alliance, which can be attributed to both external and internal factors influencing their alliance strategies. During the ‘first’ Cold War and Détente, 1949–79, Danish and Norwegian alliance strategy aimed to simultaneously deter and reassure the Soviet Union. During the ‘second’ Cold War, 1979–89, Danish alliance policy became driven by domestic politics, and the Danish government was forced to formally dissociate the country from NATO's policies. Norway was not uncritical, but held a much lower profile. After the Cold War this situation shifted. Denmark successfully rehabilitated itself as a loyal and dependable ally by responding to the call for focusing on out-of-area operations. Meanwhile, Norway's continued focus on the lingering Russian Threat made the country seem out-of-touch with priorities in the post-Cold War alliance, and domestic politics prevented a more active out-of-area engagement.     

The Zimbabwe people’s revolutionary army military operations in Makonde district and the attack on Salisbury’s fuel storage tanks, 1965-1979

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army operations in Mashonaland West province with particular reference to Makonde District during the country’s war of liberation. Despite the growing literature on ZAPU and ZPRA in Zimbabwe’s war of liberation there is little that has been written concerning the operations of ZPRA guerrillas in Mashonaland provinces. Guided by evidence drawn from secondary and primary sources the article further asserts that ZPRA adopted a four pronged strategy in Makonde District. This strategy in part was hinged on the politicization of the population on the one hand and annihilation of the enemy forces, attrition and manoeuvre warfare on the other. Again, the article argues that ZPRA guerrillas attempted to capture Salisbury (Harare) in order to conquer the Rhodesian Security Forces’ centre of gravity. It was hoped that the capture of the capital city would Makoni District was of strategic significance to the conduct of ZPRA operations and arguably hastened Ian Smith’s decision to attend the Lancaster House Conference negotiations that led to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.