THE CASE FOR DEFENCE

What is the case for defence and is it a worthwhile investment? This question is addressed for two contrasting nations, namely, the UK and New Zealand. Economists have a set of standard analytical tools for addressing the question but they are difficult to operationalise. This paper provides policy‐relevant answers.     

Modelling the demand for national security expenditure: a note

In the past, national security for the majority of countries was almost exclusively associated with an external military threat emanating from a rival state(s). This was reflected in the standard models for the demand for military expenditure. The emergence of new security challenges such as terrorism, transnational crime networks, failed and rogue states, has profoundly affected the international security environment and the concept of national security. This note develops a model for the demand for national security expenditure adopting a broader, more inclusive definition of national security and includes concomitant budgetary outlets to meet the new security challenges.     

Concept costing for defence projects: the problem and its solution

It is intrinsic to the nature of military competition that the unit acquisition costs of defence systems rise generation by generation. Traditional “bottom‐up” methods of cost‐estimating cannot meet the increasing demands for extensive studies of many options before commencing design and, while “top‐down” estimating techniques are an improvement, in particular by reducing the time required for preparing estimates, they also are inadequate to meet current requirements. A new method has been devised, therefore, further developing “top‐down” methods using Bayesian techniques to make best use of the available information, whether certain or uncertain, and its accuracy established by example.     

A Muslim by any other name

Abstract

A crisis is emerging in the Nile Basin, where some 300 million people in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi rely on the Nile directly or indirectly. Egypt and Sudan wish to preserve a regime based on treaties drawn up during the colonial era that allocated the vast majority of the Nile's water to them. Countries upstream are determined to challenge this. In 1999 the countries using the river formed the Nile Basin Initiative to try to resolve these differences. More than a decade of negotiations failed to break the impasse. In May Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda decided to wait no longer and signed a new treaty, without the consent of Egypt and Sudan. The signatories have given the other Nile Basin countries one year to join the pact. For Egypt, which relies on the Nile for 95 per cent of its water, this is a question of life or death. Egypt has, in the past, indicated it will go to war if its share of the Nile is reduced. Talks continue, but the impasse is driving the region towards a crisis to which there is no easy resolution.     

The right place at the right time,or the right person in the right place?

South Africa's military has, since the First World War, been an oft-used and effective tool in the conduct of South African foreign policy, but this role has not always translated into power for Defence Department principals in its formulation. South African Defence Ministers for most of the country's history have played a minor role in the making of foreign policy; despite a change in this dynamic between approximately 1975–1990, the post-apartheid era has once again seen a diminishment of Defence's power in this arena. This article examines why Defence Ministers have generally been such weak players, with an eye toward disaggregating whether this was a product of interpersonal relationships with Cabinet and – most importantly – the Head of State, or whether this influence (or lack thereof) was more a function of South Africa's international standing. While determining who has influence on this process is difficult given the primacy of the national leader in making foreign policy and a lack of insider accounts by participants in the process, this article relies upon several interviews with participants and knowledgeable observers that help illuminate the process and Defence's role in it.     

Defense spending and the macroeconomy

Given Kinsella's (1990, 1991) appeal for analysis to be pursued using sub‐annual level of data, we pursue such an endeavor in this paper. We examime the effect of defence spending on real output, the unemployment rate, price level, and interest rate covering a quarterly time frame 1960:1 to 1988:1 using an unrestricted vector autoregression framework. Our results parallel the findings of Kinsella in that there appears no causal relationship in either direction between defence spending and economic performance.     

France and its allies: A comparative study of defence spending trends since 1985*

Within the EU France devotes to defence the largest financial and human resources although it is not the richest country, nor has it the largest population or labour force. The cost of nuclear weapons accounts for only a small fraction of this abnormally high French defence effort. If France had restructured its military capabilities at the same rate as its principal Allies during the 1985–1994 period, then French defence outlays would be about 20% less than at present. The fundamental reasons for France's excess defence outlay comprise virtual total dependence on French sources for equipment, produced in very small numbers; a military presence outside of Europe; and too many personnel. These deficiencies, and the consequent absence hitherto of a “peace dividend”, indicate a failure to identify the country's real strategic requirements, and a lack of will to reorganise efficiently French defence. The recently announced reform towards an all‐professional force is unlikely to achieve the potential and desirable improvement in cost‐effectiveness.     

Croatia's bitter harvest: Total National Defence's role in the Croatian War of Independence

Croatia's successful bid for independence was one of the defining moments of the immediate post-Cold War period. Nevertheless, the means that Croatia used to obtain independence remains relatively unexamined by academics. This article focuses on the early period of Croatia's bid for secession, and specifically the role that Yugoslavia's policy of Total National Defence played in facilitating its independence. Unlike in Slovenia, where the legacies of Total National Defence facilitated Slovenia's bid for secession, in Croatia the decision of its political leaders meant that the country largely neglected its positive legacies, resulting in a protracted four-year struggle.     

The Rise of Special Operations Forces: Generalized Specialization,Boundary Spanning and Military Autonomy

The special operations forces (SOF) of the industrial democracies have suddenly and rapidly grown in numbers and resources during the past decades. Most explanations for this growth focus on factors external to the armed forces. We argue that the enlargement of SOF is also the result of internal organizational dynamics. First, we compare SOF to other units and military appendages that have grown over the past 30 years in order to delineate what is unique to their development and the special adaptive potential they bring to the armed forces: generalized specialization, boundary spanning roles, and enlargement of military autonomy. Second, we analyze the actions of internal military entrepreneurs and their organizational mentors to show how they use this adaptive potential to “sell” the use of SOF to key policy-makers and decision-makers.     

Moving the techno-science gap in Security Force Assistance

This paper looks at the impact of military technology diffusion on military assistance operations (MAO), in the United States known as Security Force Assistance or SFA. The discussion looks conceptually at the role of technological change and how it interacts with martial cultures in military assistant operations. I argue that growing trends in science and technology suggest potential conflicts between culture and technology. Relying on a culture-technology model drawn from anthropology, the paper contends that new technologies will present increasing challenges for the emerging MAO landscape. The paper will illustrate that the techno-science gap will continue to grow as innovations such as robotics, sensors, and networks continue to develop. Finally, the paper will look at ways to overcome this conflict between culture and technology.