The perils of special approaches to counterterrorism: the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in 2005

The death of Jean Charles de Menezes on the London Underground in 2005 remains a horrifying example of what happens when counterterrorism goes wrong. One of the extraordinary features of the shooting was the remarkable number of special elements, police units, military Special Forces, and unusual procedures and tactics involved in the incident. This article attempts to assess the causal significance of the special dimension in the horrific chain of circumstances. It does so by interrogating numerous explanations for the tragedy and highlighting the role of the special factor. The Stockwell shooting remains very important today because it casts a sharp and somewhat harsh spotlight on the particular pitfalls of special responses, measures and units to the multitudinous threats posed by international terrorism in the twenty-first century.     

干扰条件下防空兵通信装备系统效能分析

为研究干扰条件下防空兵通信装备系统效能,在ADC模型的基础上构建了ADCF系统效能模型,并结合实例对模型进行了仿真分析.仿真结果显示,该模型能较好反映敌方干扰对通信装备系统效能的影响.提出了干扰条件下提高防空兵通信装备系统效能的措施.     

A gentle occupation: unravelling the Dutch approach in Iraq, 2003–2005

This article examines the so-called ‘Dutch approach’ to conducting stabilisation operations. The term is mostly used in relation to the mission carried out by the Netherlands armed forces in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province from 2006 to 2010, but actually originates in the Iraqi province of Al Muthanna. Here, a 1350-strong battle group operated from July 2003 until March 2005 as part of the US-led coalition, after which the Dutch forces left Iraq relatively unscathed and self-confident of their ability in dealing with this type of conflict. On the basis of archival research and interviews, the authors unravel the ‘Dutch approach’ in southern Iraq by tracing its roots and by examining the Dutch operation in the context of the American and British experiences. They argue that despite predominantly effective tactical reflexes and an overall adequately broad interpretation by battle group commanders of a too narrowly defined political mandate, stability in Al Muthanna was conditions-driven rather than the result of a unique and effective approach. The term ‘Dutch approach’ turned out to be a convenient fabrication which, after the relatively successful mission in Al Muthanna, became increasingly politicised in the run-up to a dangerous new operation in southern Afghanistan.     

The Use and Abuse of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counter-Insurgency

This article argues that there is little evidence supporting the existence of the often praised, and allegedly subtle and successful ‘Dutch approach’ to stabilisation and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. It denounces the uncritical use of the term and refutes suggestions of historical and cultural roots to such an approach, for instance in Dutch colonial warfare in the Indonesian archipelago. It concludes by explaining the true conditions that gave rise to this notion, which seems to feed into a gratifying national self-image of the Dutch as non-martial, conflict averse and tolerant, rather than offering an original and successful formula for countering insurgencies.     

Local defence forces and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: learning from the CIA's Village Defense Program in South Vietnam

Some scholars would have us believe that the distinctions between military and policing roles, methods and objectives have become increasingly blurred by the security demands of a post-Cold War and post-11 September global and domestic order. This article explores the current state of the police–military divide through a conceptual and case study analysis. It concludes that, in this case, there is some conflation occurring at a macro-level as international and domestic affairs have become increasingly indistinct, but the article also demonstrates that the actual ethos and practice of these agencies still differs strongly. Most importantly, the article argues that this distinction is in fact a very useful one in planning for future peace support operations     

论武警法是独立的部门法

武警法究竞是否独立的部门法,是由来已久且必须回答的重要命题。《中华人民共和国人民武装警察法》的颁布为武警法的独立性提供了实证。武警法与相关法律部门,如军事法、行政法、警察法有本质的区别。武警法是我国法律体系中具有独立地位的部门法。     

The limits of covert action: SAS operations during ‘Confrontation’, 1964–66

This article evaluates the performance of the Special Air Service (SAS) during secret cross-border raids conducted as part of Britain’s undeclared war against Indonesia from 1963–1966. The analysis reviews the existing debate on the SAS’ performance during this campaign; it looks more closely at how military effectiveness might be defined; and it then examines, using the SAS’ own operations reports, the nature of their activities and their success or failure. This article concludes that critics of the SAS’ effectiveness during Confrontation are right; but for the wrong reasons. SAS operations did indeed have less effect than orthodox accounts would have it. But the reasons for this lay not in their misuse but in the exigencies of British strategy. This article demonstrates an enduring truth – no matter how ‘special’ a military force might be, tactical excellence cannot compensate reliably for problems in strategy.     

Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation in the Baltic Sea: motives,prospects and challenges

Recently, Finland and Sweden decided to substantially deepen their defence cooperation and this project involves creating a bilateral standing Naval Task Group (SFNTG). The present article aims at examining the deepening naval cooperation between Finland and Sweden from a regional integration perspective, focusing on its motives, current challenges and future prospects. Driven by perceptions of common challenges and desires for cost-effectiveness, and strengthened by recent successes on sea surveillance and a combined Amphibious Task Unit, the bilateral project has considerable potential to achieve success. To fulfil its objectives, substantial legal changes in both countries are required to allow the use of force on each other’s territorial waters. To cater for the requirement of not conflicting with EU, NORDEFCO or NATO cooperations, the bilateral Task Group must operate according to NATO standards and by using English as the language in command and control. The costs of adjusting the naval units to NATO’s technical requirements are far from negligible and this issue still remains to be solved. If Finland and Sweden manage to incorporate new policies, common structures and common organisational norms among their navies, an even deeper integration, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, are conceivable.     

Defence budgets in the post-Cold War era: a spatial econometrics approach

This paper examines the determinants of national defence budgets in the post-Cold War era employing a spatial econometric framework. Using data for 124 countries over a 16-year time period, I examine spatial relationships in defence spending to investigate how countries account for the military spending of other countries when setting their budgets. Using specially developed weighting matrices, the regression results indicate that defence budgets are positively spatially correlated. These results provide support for the use of ‘external’ factors when examining defence budgets over this time period. The importance of a country’s spatial location when setting its budget is further examined through the identification of regions of high and low defence spending.     

Create compliance and cohesion: how rebel organizations manage to survive

Established conflict theories focus on the role of incentives in the decision to join, stay, or leave an insurgency. These theories, however, disregard the pressure that an organization can impose on its members. Similar to legal organizations, we assert that a rebel organization can sustain itself by effective human resource management. Using narratives resulting from psychological trauma therapy of former combatants of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), these management strategies are examined. The analysis shows that the LRA sustains itself in the first place by the use of brute force. However, they also manage themselves by a careful selection process of their fighters, by the conscious creation of social control, and by offering their members an alternative social network in which promotion and compensation play a role.