基于模糊理论的空袭目标威胁判断模型

对空袭目标威胁度进行合理排序是提高防空效能的重要因素。分析了影响空袭目标威胁度的各种因素,利用模糊综合评判的思想,建立了一种进行目标威胁判断的模型,并根据具体情况给出了排序的合理方法。通过实例,给出了具体的计算过程,并将此方法得出的结果与文献中的方法得出的结果进行了比较,充分说明了模型的可行性。     

航空电子综合火控系统驾驶员操作程序(POP)仿真

驾驶员操作程序(POP)是航电综合设计最重要的顶层设计文件,其仿真对支持总体设计具有不可替代的作用。首先从整个航空火控系统的角度阐述了POP的组成及任务操作,然后介绍了POP仿真模型的建立方法和制作思路,并对某型飞机航电综合火控系统POP进行了仿真实现。其结果可用于评价飞机航电综合火控系统的POP操作逻辑关系的正确性。     

基于熵的空中目标识别模型及应用

空中目标识别是现代防空作战的重要研究内容。研究根据不同类型的目标产生不同的辐射和不同的雷达回波信号对目标进行识别。提出利用熵理论来处理目标识别问题,采用层次分析法与熵权的组合来确定指标的权重。仿真实例表明,基于熵的识别是一种运算简单,结果可靠的目标识别算法。     

小波理论的单脉冲雷达目标RCS特性测量

随着现代信号处理技术的发展,对非平稳信号分析和处理的小波分析技术已成功应用于雷达目标特性分析领域,大功率单脉冲雷达作为我国航天测控网当中的主干设备,具有一定的目标特性识别能力。主要针对目前靶场的现有装备,讨论了基于小波理论的单脉冲雷达空间目标RCS特性测量,并对窄带低分辨率雷达在未来空间目标识别中发挥其作用谈了作者的看法。     

基于星载照射源的被动SAR系统时频同步误差影响分析

时间和频率同步问题是基于星载照射源的被动SAR系统的关键技术之一。为了研究时、频同步误差对其成像的影响,针对系统工作特性,分析了时、频同步误差的产生机理,建立了时、频同步误差模型,并利用二阶距离模型和RD成像算法,建立了完整的时、频同步误差到成像结果的传递模型,仿真验证了理论分析的准确性。理论推导和仿真计算结果指出了基于星载照射源的被动SAR系统对时间同步和频率同步的精度要求。分析结论对于指导基于星载照射源的被动SAR系统设计及同步方法研究具有重要意义。     

一种基于离散混沌系统的S-Box候选算法设计

S-Box是现行分组密码中唯一的非线性部件,主要提供了分组密码算法中必需的混淆作用,其密码强度决定了整个分组密码的安全强度。为进一步提高S-Box的强度,结合离散混沌系统的内在随机性、有界性、非周期性及对初始条件和参数极度敏感等特点,提出一种采用多混沌映射和交叉映射生成S-Box的生成算法。实验分析表明,该算法生成的样本密钥敏感性强,随机性好,既能较好地满足S-Box设计所要求的各项准则和特性,安全性高,同时又能降低计算复杂度,提高计算速度,且易于生成和扩展,因而是一种性能良好的S-Box候选算法。     

IRA operational intelligence: the heartbeat of the war

This article will seek to provide a detailed examination of the IRA's operational intelligence methodologies. Providing not only a lengthy discussion on the organization's intelligence collection protocols, it will also examine the interplay between intelligence and IRA decision-making. It will be contended that intelligence's influence resided in its ability to introduce a strong element of predictability into the IRA's decision-making process. This depended on an ability to construct a detailed intelligence picture of the target and its geographical milieu so as to minimize the likelihood of volunteers encountering unforeseen circumstances that could adversely affect planned or anticipated outcomes.     

Controlled warfare: how directed-energy weapons will enable the US Military to fight effectively in an urban environment while minimizing collateral damage

US military operations are increasingly conducted within urban environments and with these operations come the risk of increasing the number of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. The use of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, is one method for minimizing collateral damage. This method enables US military forces to effectively fight within urban environments through force escalation capabilities. Using a series of historical examples and future scenarios for urban warfare, this article highlights deficiencies affecting military capabilities in military urban operations, addresses the consequences of collateral damage, assesses the effectiveness of directed-energy weapons in military urban operations and encourages further funding, research and integration of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, within the US military.     

Escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies: Insights from Northeast India

Insurgencies in the Northeast of India have been a recurring phenomenon since India's independence in 1947. One of the most significant aspects of the multiple insurgencies has been the use of violence for political goals. By drawing upon three cases of insurgencies in Northeast India, the article offers a conceptual framework on escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies. The article argues that the most critical variables which have a direct bearing on the levels of insurgent violence are: popular support, loss of legitimacy and the state's counter-response.     

The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: ascertaining causation and determining solutions

By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.