军用移动电站战伤修理的若干问题

分析研究了电站平时修理和战伤修理的主要区别,提出了电站战伤评估逻辑图和战伤修理方法。     

穿甲弹对主战坦克毁伤的计算分析

在完善毁伤等级、目标构造、部件贡献因子、毁伤准则、目标描述系统、系统杀伤树等概念的基础上建立穿甲弹对主战坦克的毁伤模型,通过此模型计算单发弹命中坦克时的毁伤概率,提出主战坦克易损性分析的方法及降低易损性的途径.     

舰船战斗恢复力的设计要求和后勤要求

提出了舰船战斗恢复力的概念,简要概述了舰船战斗恢复力的设计要求与后勤要求,并介绍了舰船战斗恢复力量化的设想。     

装备群战斗损伤模拟方法研究

分析了影响装备战斗损伤的主要因素,讨论了量化这些因素的方法。在对该问题进行分析后,指出模拟模型是解决装备群战损分析的比较好的方法,并给出了该模型的基本结构。结合战损分析的特点与当前国内外神经网络的研究成果,作者认为BP(Back Propagation)神经网络是实现这一模型的有力工具,并给出了BP网络工作的过程。     

微结构连续损伤理论

本文从微结构理论出发,用相对变形描述微结构之间的微空隙和微裂纹引起的材料损伤的影响,得到用损伤张量描述的各向异性损伤的微结构连续损伤力学理论。该微结构损伤模型可化简为目前公认的几种主要损伤模型:如J.P. Cordebojs和F. Sidoroff的弹性各向异性损伤模型,D. Krajcino-vic和G.U.Fonseka的脆性材料平面裂纹损伤模型,J. Lemaitre的各向同性损伤理论及Kachanov的以面积减少为变量的损伤模型等。作者运用这一理论对混凝土材料的单向拉、压基本受载情形进行了数值分析,并与D. Krajcinovic的损伤模型计算结果及实验结果作了比较,所得结果与实验值比较吻合,特别是在失稳后阶段给出了较好描述,初步表明了本理论的有效性和实用性。     

Reviews

Douglas S. Derrer, We Are All the Target: A Handbook of Terrorism Avoidance and Hostage Survival. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 1992. Pp. x+135, notes, index. $14.95. ISBN 01–55750–150–5

Ian Knight, Zulu: Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift, 22–23 January 1879. London: Windrow & Greene, 1992. Pp.136, 150 illus., incl 8 colour plates, maps, biblio. £35. ISBN 1–872004–23–7

Ian Knight, By the Orders of the Great White Queen: Campaigning in Zululand through the Eyes of the British Soldiers, 1879. London: Greenhill Books and Novato: Presidio Press, 1992. Pp. 272, 17 illus., 1 map. £18.95. ISBN 1–85367–122–3

Manfried Rauchensteiner and Erwin A. Schmidl (eds.), Formen des Krieges: vom Mittelalter zum ‘Low‐intensity’ Conflict’. Graz : Verlag Styria, 1991. Pp.208. DM35. ISBN 3–22–12139–7

Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty‐First Century. Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing Company, Limited, 1992. Pp.xv + 203, 13 diagrams, index. £32.50. ISBN 1–85521–288–9     

‘Today we shall drink blood’: internal unrest in Nigeria

Despite some tentative internal peace agreements, Nigeria continues to face violence from multiple groups. This violence feeds upon itself, with segments of the population being mobilized both for self defense and for pressing their ideological and practical goals. These multiple sources of violence, which the Nigerian government appears unable to control to any significant degree, have a long term corrosive effect on the country's internal stability. There are few reasons to be sanguine as to any rapid changes to the level of overall violence or the relative number of armed groups, although their specific identities may shift. Nigeria represents a good case study of a country in which relatively low but persistent violence by a multiplicity of groups can have major impacts on internal security.     

Controlled warfare: how directed-energy weapons will enable the US Military to fight effectively in an urban environment while minimizing collateral damage

US military operations are increasingly conducted within urban environments and with these operations come the risk of increasing the number of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. The use of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, is one method for minimizing collateral damage. This method enables US military forces to effectively fight within urban environments through force escalation capabilities. Using a series of historical examples and future scenarios for urban warfare, this article highlights deficiencies affecting military capabilities in military urban operations, addresses the consequences of collateral damage, assesses the effectiveness of directed-energy weapons in military urban operations and encourages further funding, research and integration of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, within the US military.     

The missing dimension: IDF special operations forces and strategy in the Second Lebanon War

In the course of the 2006 Lebanon War the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) employed special operations forces (SOF) for raids against Hizb'allah's command and control structure. This article argues that a faulty conceptualization of the value of special operations and misguided expectations determined by the new IDF concept of operations impacted adversely on the employment of SOF for this kind of operations. Both these elements contributed in turn to substantially degrade SOF performance in the context of the war.