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181.
为谋求外层空间作战的绝对战略优势,2002年6月美国正式退出《反弹道导弹条约》并加快部署NMD系统。综述了俄罗斯应对美国部署NMD系统的战略和措施。  相似文献   
182.
美国导弹防御系统的支持技术计划   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
介绍了美国导弹防御系统支持技术计划中的一些重点项目:助推段拦截计划,先进探测器技术计划和先进拦截弹材料与系统技术计划,通过分析得到了一些有益的启示。  相似文献   
183.
无人机对未来防空作战的影响及对策研究   总被引:6,自引:1,他引:5  
未来防空战场中,无人机已成为一种重要的空中威胁。阐述了无人机的现实威胁,分析了无人机对防空作战的影响,探讨了抗击无人机的对策及措施。  相似文献   
184.
Norway, Sweden and Finland have proclaimed a willingness to cooperate militarily in a future crisis or conflict despite their diverging alliance affiliation. This article assesses their ability to do so through various elements affecting their interoperability, with Arctic Challenge, a multinational military exercise, as an empirical basis. The analysis finds that the NATO/non-NATO-divide has a negative impact on the trilateral defence cooperation, especially on exchange of information and aspects related to command and control. At the same time, Finland and Sweden have become largely NATO-standardized through their active partnership with the Alliance. This has affected interoperability aspects, such as communication, culture, and the compatibility of technical solutions, in a positive manner. Through agreements with the Alliance, as well as domestic legal changes, the two NATO-partners have facilitated receiving military assistance from Norway and other NATO-members during a crisis. Other agreements between the Nordic countries, however, have been limited to peacetime.  相似文献   
185.
Most countries put significant amounts of time and effort in writing and issuing high-level policy documents. These are supposed to guide subsequent national defence efforts. But do they? And how do countries even try to ensure that they do? This paper reports on a benchmarking effort of how a few “best of breed” small- to medium-sized defence organisations (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) deal with these issues. We find that most countries fail to link goals to resources and pay limited attention to specific and rigorous ex-ante or post-hoc evaluation, even when compared to their own national government-wide provisions. We do, however, observe a (modest) trend towards putting more specific goals and metrics in these documents that can be – and in a few rare cases were – tracked. The paper identifies 42 concrete policy “nuggets” – both “do’s and don’ts” – that should be of interest to most defence policy planning/analysis communities. It ends with two recommendations that are in line with recent broader (non-defence) scholarship on the policy formulation-policy implementation gap: to put more rigorous emphasis on implementation (especially on achieving desired policy effects), but to do so increasingly in more experiential (“design”) ways, rather than in industrial-age bureaucratic ones (“PPBS”-systems).  相似文献   
186.
The article analyses the Spanish military transformation. This process started in 2004 as a means to adapt the force structure, organization and capabilities of the Spanish military to meet present and future threats in compliance with NATO’s initiatives, thus ensuring the continuity of the equipment modernization, professionalization and the adjustment of the country’s defence architecture to the post-cold war environment. A decade later, although transformation is still a priority for the Ministry of Defence, limited political will, a lack of strategic guidance, poor resource management and the effects of the economic crisis are compromising its development. This article describes the Spanish military transformation and assesses its value in adapting the country’s armed forces to the current and prospective security environment.  相似文献   
187.
India and China both have powerful spy networks; completely different in their approaches to espionage; both effective against their perceived enemies. China focuses first on internal threats, on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then the US and Japan. India’s defense policy focuses on Pakistan and internal terrorist threats, and then on China. In reality, however, when it comes to spying on each other, both China and India suffer from incompetence and apathy – which endangers both their own security and regional stability. This article looks at how they spy on each other, and asks why and how they need to improve. The narrative also touches upon some of the individuals who are waging the spy war, from India’s wily spymaster Ajit Doval down to junior Chinese agents such as Wang Qing and Pema Tsering. The two countries are not friends. They have the largest territorial dispute in the world on their hands, covering an area the size of North Korea, and they have large armies facing each other along 4000 kilometers of frontier. But they also lay claim to the world’s two oldest and richest civilizations, with a rich history of exchange, and now with a combined population of 2.6 billion people and more than a quarter of the world’s economic output. If they cooperated, they could solve many of the world’s problems; but if they lurch into conflict, the potential consequences are terrifying to contemplate. Unfortunately, despite their geographical closeness, they do not know much about each other. They have few cultural interchanges, little diplomacy, few trade missions. They do not watch each other’s films, read each other’s books or listen to each other’s music. Chinese tourists would rather fly to New Zealand for their holidays than cross the border to India, and Indian students would rather study in Europe than China. China and India are neighbors that barely talk to each other. Most significantly, they do not spy on each competently. For countries that do not interact socially, defensive understanding is important for security – but China prefers the glamor of facing up to its Pacific and other maritime rivals such as the US and Japan. India, for its part, does talk a great deal about the China threat, but its resources and expertise are wrapped up in controlling its security threat from Pakistan and the Islamic world. When China and India do try to spy on each other, it is often without the benefit of a long-term focus or understanding. India has some very skilled operatives within the Research and Analysis Wing, but few that specialize in China. China has an enormous pool of resources spread across several government departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, and also has extensive facilities and manpower in the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (the JSD) and the new Strategic Support Force (the SSF). However, China’s intelligence services generally behave as if India is not worth spying on. Given that the two countries do not have the cultural or political machinery in place to understand each other, espionage and intelligence gathering is vital to ensure that miscalculations do not take place. This has been apparent over the last few years in stand-offs in the Himalaya, as well as top-level suspicions on each side about a variety of subjects including terrorism, covert operations in Sri Lanka and Burma, and the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs. Both countries do occasionally make efforts in espionage against each other, especially during sensitive periods such as the mountain stand-offs of 2014 and 2013 and during policy developments in nuclear warfare. In this article the author looks at actual spying incidents between the two countries, their methodologies, their staff, their technical capabilities, and how the act of spying, which is usually viewed as intrinsically adversarial, can be a force for good. The article relies on interviews with actual participants in intelligence from both countries as well as extensive use of contemporary online sources, and secondary analysis by both military and academic experts from China, India and NATO countries.  相似文献   
188.
防空兵群指挥所配置是兵力部署的重要内容,它从根本上决定了指挥所的指挥效能和野战生存能力。多年来,指挥所的配置多是根据防空兵战斗的相关战术原则,由作战参谋提出数个配置方案,然后由指挥员做出决策。这种仅凭主观决策的做法与现代防空作战的要求不相适应。结合模糊多指标评判方法与优化理论,从发挥指挥效能与提高生存能力两个方面出发,对防空群指挥所的配置进行了分析,并建立了配置方案优化的模型,从根本上改变了指挥所配置完全依赖主观判断的做法。最后应用模型分析了一个实例。  相似文献   
189.
研究了混合攻击机机群在对由截击 -歼击机机群组成的敌国土防空系统进行突防过程中的最优控制方法 ,以攻击机的最小突防损失为战效指标 ,给出了其最优控制策略。  相似文献   
190.
The post-communist countries transition from the Warsaw Pact style of platforms and systems to Western-compatible capabilities has never been an easy task or a process without conflicts. This was no different for the Visegrád countries either, in which case the Hungarian Gripen procurement stands out. After much debate, Budapest decided to modernize its fighter fleet with the not battle tested Swedish-made Gripen fighter aircraft. This decision received several critiques due to the lack of transparency in the selection process and the initial lack of NATO-required systems. Subsequently, the fleet has had to operate in a financially demanding environment. Moreover, the air force has lost two aircrafts in accidents. Now that the jets are in the middle of their envisaged life cycle, it is more than appropriate to answer the question if the Gripens can utilize their full combat potential or will they fail the test of time?  相似文献   
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