美国海基中段防御系统--海军全战区防御系统

美国初期部署的弹道导弹防御系统(BMDS)将由3部分构成,其中之一是海基中段防御系统(SMDS).主要阐述了该系统的功能、组成、关键技术、进展,及其对美称霸全球的影响.     

基于排列法的目标威胁评估模型

目标威胁评估是一个推理、决策的行为,结合现代防空作战的特点和指挥自动化系统的工作过程,分析了影响目标威胁评估的几个重要因素,应用多属性决策中的一种改进排列法建立了数学模型,验证了其可行性。     

弹道导弹突防数概率分布列计算模型

针对双层反导防御系统,在单枚导弹突防概率的基础上,分别建立了多枚战术弹道导弹突破单层和双层拦截的最终突防数概率分布列计算模型,同时进行了算例分析,对模型进行了验证.     

反舰导弹发展趋势分析及其末端防御

分析了现代反舰导弹的特点(包括超声速反舰导弹的弱点)及未来发展趋势,论述了当前国外反导防御的手段及新思想,指出末端防御的重要性。主要讨论了目前防空反导系统存在的困难及火控系统存在的局限性,总结了反舰导弹末端具有的弱点(红外特征明显、速度过大不易机动等),从系统的角度论述了末端拦截反舰导弹的可行性及需研究的新技术。     

The mercurial development of Russia's United Aircraft Corporation

Russia's 2006 renationalisation of its aerospace industry heralded a new era in industrial policy. Symbolising a return to the importance of securing sovereignty over the Federation's strategic assets, it also posits, powerfully, that sectors like aerospace and shipbuilding are too important to be left to the market. In what now appears a reversal of this policy approach, Moscow is promoting partial privatisation and encouraging partnership with Western aerospace companies. Foreign infusion of capital and technology is viewed as the catalyst for Russian dominance in the global military and commercial aerospace industries.     

Success and failures of the Gripen offsets in the Visegrad Group countries

The Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance member, Central European countries found themselves in a difficult political and economic situation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Three post-Eastern Bloc countries formed the Visegrad Group to strengthen their ties to the West, but the need for foreign investment, job creation and technology transfer was urgent.

This is when military modernisation also came into the picture and the counter-trade—as known as offset—as a tool to help these economies. A trade practice which was meant to energise these economies via defence acquisitions linked economic programmes.

Two Visegrad Group member countries, Hungary and the Czech Republic decided to sign offset agreement with the defence firm SAAB to license Gripen fighter aircrafts. This study intends to analyse if these deals were able to help governments to reach their objectives or the two countries were unable to take advantage of the offset programmes.     

Clustering in defence-related procurement: the case of a Belgian naval construction cluster

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the importance of closer co-operation in defence-related procurement. Led by the decision that Belgium will lead the procurement of 12 Mine CounterMeasures Vessels (MCMV), the case of a potential Belgian naval construction cluster is discussed. The feasibility of a potential cluster is investigated by looking at key elements of a successful naval construction cluster, the Dutch naval construction cluster, and comparing those key elements to the current Belgian situation. Forming a sustainable Belgian naval construction cluster will be difficult. Most of the procurement process of the MCMVs is set on a European tender. In the long run, due to the absence of both a launching customer and leader firms, no party is able to carry the cluster with investments and knowledge spill-overs. In order to keep public support for large defence-related investments, clustering around the MCMV integration system and proactive cluster support is recommended.     

The Czech defence and security industry: taking the pulse to an ailing man

ABSTRACT

The paper summarises the evolution of the iron triangle of the mutual relationships amongst the ministry of defence, defence industry, and the political elite in the post-communist Czech Republic in 1990-2020. The essay stresses the oddness of this relationship. On the one hand, the government is bound by a partnership to the Defence and Security Industry Association of the Czech Republic (DSIA), a lobbying group of more than 100 organisations that conduct business in defence and security sector in Czechia. Yet, since its creation in 2000, this assemblage of industries within DSIA's market position is falling, in fact. Neither political parties in power, nor the governments have been able to support national defence industry through the small military. Just a few DSIA national members are able to compete internationally with their cutting-edge products. Others have evolved into middlemen trading intime-expired Czechoslovak equipment retired from the Czech Armed Forces.     

Defence industry in Iran – between needs and real capabilities

ABSTRACT

The paper’s goal is to analyses the potential of the Iranian defence industry, including both research-and-development and production capabilities. It is argued that, despite official statements about the great power and sophistication of the Iranian defence industry, in reality its capabilities are very limited and cannot meet the operational needs of the Iranian armed forces. At the same time, it is argued that many official releases, which are abundantly available in the Iranian press and often unthinkingly repeated by the Western media, do not present the real and value of military products, but are rather a tool for deception and propaganda.     

Are the Baltic States and NATO on the right path in deterring Russia in the Baltic?

ABSTRACT

The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia.