防空中存在两次转火射击时的火力分配模型

在对空防御时 ,进行火力分配不但要考虑到一次性分配的最佳方案 ,而且应该考虑是否在条件允许的情况下进行一次或两次转火射击 ,如果存在 ,怎样进行转火才能使其射击效果最好。把威胁判断和火力分配结合起来考虑 ,以我方的生存概率为指标 ,建立了存在两次转火射击的火力分配模型 ,并用实例计算检验了模型的正确性。     

潜艇水下推算舰载机作战时间动态计算模型

由于受探测手段的限制,水下潜艇对空中目标的威胁评估一直是研究难题.针对潜艇所能获得的各种信息,分析了舰载反潜直升机作战起飞影响因素、跳跃时间影响因素以及声纳定测时间影响因素,给出量化形式,构造出了潜艇水下推算舰载反潜直升机作战时间的动态计算模型,为潜艇定量评估潜在空中目标的威胁程度提供了合理的逻辑支持.     

驱护舰编队对潜防御作战兵力运用

针对驱护舰武器装备的发展,结合现代海上对潜防御作战的新特点,对驱护舰编队在海上对潜防御作战中的兵力运用问题进行了探讨,提出了驱护舰编队对潜防御作战的指导思想、兵力运用原则和兵力攻击行动方式,并就确保编队的兵力行动提出了引导保障、安全保障应遵循的战术原则,对部队作战与训练具有一定的参考价值。     

单舰防空能力评估模型

水面舰艇海上作战的主要威胁来自于敌方反舰导弹的攻击,因而水面舰艇的反导作战能力成为其战斗能力和生存能力的重要指标之一。在传统武器系统效能评估模型的基础上,根据单舰防空武器系统的特点,利用数学整合的方法建立了单舰在遭受单发导弹攻击和多发导弹攻击情况下的防空能力评估模型。这在一定程度上为导弹武器作战系统的指标论证、方案论证、工程研制、鉴定定型和作战运用等提供参考依据。     

Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problem

The assignment of personnel to teams is a fundamental managerial function typically involving several objectives and a variety of idiosyncratic practical constraints. Despite the prevalence of this task in practice, the process is seldom approached as an optimization problem over the reported preferences of all agents. This is due in part to the underlying computational complexity that occurs when intra-team interpersonal interactions are taken into consideration, and also due to game-theoretic considerations, when those taking part in the process are self-interested agents. Variants of this fundamental decision problem arise in a number of settings, including, for example, human resources and project management, military platooning, ride sharing, data clustering, and in assigning students to group projects. In this article, we study an analytical approach to “team formation” focused on the interplay between two of the most common objectives considered in the related literature: economic efficiency (i.e., the maximization of social welfare) and game-theoretic stability (e.g., finding a core solution when one exists). With a weighted objective across these two goals, the problem is modeled as a bi-level binary optimization problem, and transformed into a single-level, exponentially sized binary integer program. We then devise a branch-cut-and-price algorithm and demonstrate its efficacy through an extensive set of simulations, with favorable comparisons to other algorithms from the literature.     

Upstream engagement and downstream entanglements: The assumptions,opportunities, and threats of partnering

This article addresses Western recruitment and management of personnel from non-Western countries in armed forces as part of a strategy of state stabilisation, examining its risks and benefits. ‘SFA’ (Security Forces Assistance) to indigenous forces has long been practised by the West and seems to have returned in recent years in a new form with the creation of armies in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, while providing cheap, proxy substitutes for the West and offering opportunities for state-building, the policy creates its own problems and can have significant, negative consequences.     

要地防空中的光电对抗战术

介绍了光电精确制导武器和光电对抗装备的特点,进而分析得出要地防空中要采用分层对抗战术,并分析了实施方法和运用方式,给出了战术配置原则,从技术、战术和地形气候方面分析了影响战术配置的因素,对部队开展基地训练中的光电对抗战术训练具有一定的参考价值。     

Use it or lose it: On the incentives to spend annual defence operating budgets

In most western countries, there is a strong incentive for defence department budget-holders to expend all of the funds they are authorized to spend in a fiscal year. In this paper, we question whether this emphasis makes sense. We develop a model of a defence department’s operating expenditure assuming a fixed level of funding for a year and uncertain costs. The results of the model suggest that the incentive for departmental managers to expend all authorized funds is inefficient. We explore the implications of the model for the Department of National Defence (DND) in Canada in light of the recent criticism of DND lapsed funding by the Auditor-General of Canada.     

EUROPEAN DEFENCE FIRMS: THE INFORMATION BARRIER ON PRIVATE FINANCE*

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, European governments adopted a hands‐off policy towards the defence industrial base, in an attempt to increase the sector’s efficiency and reactivity. In this context, one topical issue is how to motivate defence firms to apply for private rather than public finance. Since banks have no prior experience with European defence firms, a problem of asymmetric information may block this transition. The problem is analysed within the framework of a game between defence firms and banks. It is shown that the Bayesian Equilibrium might correspond to a situation where low‐risk firms prefer the state‐financed scheme; yet, in a perfect information set‐up, the same firms would apply for bank credit. In order to facilitate the transition to private finance, the government might decide to subsidize investors who agree on financing defence firms; the state aid should be made available during a transitory learning period.