化学危险品事故处置的程序与技术要点

根据化学危险品事故的特点及消防部队的装备配备情况 ,提出了一整套化学危险品事故抢险救援的程序 ,并介绍了处置过程中的关键技术。     

金属弹簧脱碳层厚度与受热温度和时间的关系

应用给定温度下保温和模拟典型火灾温度曲线两种受热方式 ,对成品 6 5Mn弹簧进行受热处理 ,测定在不同受热温度与时间下弹簧的脱碳层厚度 ,发现在受热温度超过 6 0 0℃以后 ,随着受热时间和温度的增加 ,脱碳层厚度也随之增加。认为运用被火灾作用的弹簧钢脱碳层厚度可以鉴定火场中不同部位的受热温度和时间。     

高温结构陶瓷精密磨削塑性变质层的物理模型

用透射电镜观察发现了磨削表面微晶和非晶层的过渡行为。采用物相分析和Ｘ射线衍射谱线分析证实了变质层中微晶的存在,通过能谱分析确定了非晶层的化学成分,应用硅酸盐物理化学中的相平衡理论,在对玻璃相结构进行量化分析的基础上,研究证实了Ａｌ２Ｏ３陶瓷表面变质层是由微晶和玻璃态化合物组成的塑性变质层。在此基础上,建立了陶瓷镜面磨削塑性变质层的物理模型,并用微刃切削理论解释了表面晶粒的碎化机理。     

三维石英纤维增强氮化物基复合材料的烧蚀性能及显微结构

采用先驱体转化法制备了三维石英纤维增强氮化物基复合材料(3D SiO2f/Si3N4-BN),用等离子射流烧蚀方法研究了复合材料的烧蚀性能,运用扫描电镜及能谱仪对烧蚀表面微观形貌进行了观察和分析。结果表明氮化物基复合材料在高压高热流等离子体烧蚀下线烧蚀率为0.91mm/s,石英纤维熔融并被吹除带走了大量的热量,熔融层抑制了基体的机械剥蚀。基体由于强度高、升华温度高,延缓了熔融层的吹除,表明氮化物基复合材料是一种良好的耐高温烧蚀透波材料。     

Holmes’ front: constructing a new face of battle for America’s Civil War

ABSTRACT

In his seminal study of the changing nature of warfare between Agincourt and the Somme, military historian John Keegan proposed that future historians might consider combatants’ emotions in their assessments of the impact and nature of conflict. Recent years have witnessed the emergence of the history of emotions as an analytical approach, but rarely, if ever, is this directed toward the study of military history, far less the history of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies. This paper examines America’s civil war (1861–1865) as a case study of the ways in which an emotional history approach might illuminate not the physical experiences of but rather the immediate and longer-term reactions to counter-insurgency conflict through a focus on one specific individual, the future Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. It proposes that Holmes, whilst not a man of the ranks, nevertheless can reveal the wider ramifications of civil war and its emotional impact, both individually and culturally. As a relatively limited internecine war, one not fought by professional armies but by volunteer forces, America’s civil war highlights the ways in which the soldier’s response points us toward the kind of emotional revolution that has, to date, mainly been located within the European nations.     

Controlling Novichoks after Salisbury: revising the Chemical Weapons Convention schedules

ABSTRACT

Novichok agents are a class of nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In light of the use of a Novichok agent in Salisbury in March 2018, two sets of proposals to amend Schedule 1 of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have been put forth, one jointly by the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands, and the other by Russia. Both sets of proposals will be discussed and voted upon at the next Conference of States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in November 2019. If either set of proposals is approved, it will be the first time that the list of chemicals subject to verification under the CWC will have been modified. This viewpoint will discuss these proposals, and argue that, if adopted, the joint proposal and the portions of the Russian proposal upon which consensus can be reached would significantly strengthen the CWC by considerably expanding the coverage of its Schedule 1 and bringing Novichok agents firmly within the CWC’s verification system. We also argue that, since the OPCW Technical Secretariat did not deem the fifth group of chemicals proposed by Russia to meet the criteria for inclusion in Schedule 1, Russia should withdraw this part of its proposal from consideration. The proposals have also served an important purpose in clarifying the identity of the chemical agent used in the Salisbury incident, squarely placing it within one of the two families of Novichok agents described by the Russian chemical-weapons scientist and whistleblower Vil Mirzayanov. If either proposal is approved in November, it will be important to conduct a thorough assessment of key precursors for the synthesis of Novichok agents and assess the need to amend CWC schedules and national and multinational export-control lists accordingly.     

Chemical-weapon use in Syria: atrocities,attribution, and accountability

ABSTRACT

International efforts to hold the government of President Bashar al-Assad accountable for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War have entered a new phase. For the first time, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization responsible for implementing the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, has been empowered to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which was formed to conduct the OPCW’s new attribution mission, has announced its intention to investigate and identify the perpetrators of nine chemical attacks in Syria, including the April 7, 2018, attack in Douma. This article reviews recent efforts to attribute chemical attacks in Syria, describes what we know about the nine incidents to be investigated, summarizes what is known about the Syrian government officials, military commanders, and chemical-warfare scientists suspected of being responsible for these attacks, discusses what to expect during the next phase of the attribution process, and offers insights into how the international community can move beyond attribution to accountability. Accountability is necessary to provide justice for victims and to prevent future incidents by demonstrating that perpetrators of chemical attacks will be identified and punished.