AGENDA FOR DEFENSE AND PEACE ECONOMICS

This brief introduction celebrates the 20th Anniversary of the Journal, Defence and Peace Economics. Suggesting elements of an agenda for the future of this branch of economics, I raise several topics that are new and that seem to indicate that the field will expand and shift focus substantially in future years.     

Remaking the military industrial relationship: A French‐American comparison

Defense industrial complexes in leading Cold War nations have downsized and reallocated resources to other productive activities in the 1990s. In this paper, we analyze the experience of two key countries ‐ the US and France. Comparing the two countries, we find similar outcomes in budgetary retrenchment and large firm restructuring but marked differences in the pace of downsizing and diversification among small and medium‐sized firms. We hypothesize that three sets of contextual differences may explain these differences: 1) institutional differences in the way that the State bureaucracies ‐ the Pentagon and the French Délégation générale pour l'armement (DGA) ‐ oversee defense industrial matters, 2) differences in military industry ownership and firm size patterns, and 3) differences in the regional distribution of defense industrial capacity and associated regional policies. In closing, we note that the two countries’ defense industrial complexes are becoming more alike and speculate on the significance of invidious competition and interactions between them. We address briefly the future of French/American arms industrial competition and cooperation, given the trend towards transnational security arrangements and defense industry globalization     

Burden Sharing in CSDP Military Operations

Abstract

Military burden sharing has been a subject of repeated debates in NATO and the UN. Despite more modest goals, the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has experienced no fewer difficulties in garnering men, money, and materiel. While this may not come as a surprise, the fact that some EU member states have carried disproportionate shares of the burden of CSDP operations is a puzzle that remains unaccounted for. We address this gap by analyzing determinants of contribution levels to CSDP operations. In employing an innovative multi-method design that combines insights from collection action theory with those from integrated theories of military burden sharing, our results indicate that EU countries tend to contribute in positive disproportion with their capabilities when they have a strong peacekeeping tradition and elections are distant. In contrast, they undercontribute when small trade volumes with the area of operations combine with a weak peacekeeping tradition.     

UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S ANTISATELLITE TEST

In discussing China's January 2007 hit-to-kill intercept of the Chinese weather satellite FengYun-1C, most American analysts sought the “message” for the United States—either by asserting that China's test was a deliberate step toward a comprehensive counterspace capability to offset U.S. conventional military superiority or an attempt to force the United States to the negotiating table on “the prevention of an arms race in outer space.” Chinese officials, after a long silence, eventually claimed the test was an “experiment” that was “not targeted at any country.” We traveled to China several times in 2007 and had a series of conversations with Chinese individuals knowledgeable about the history of this particular antisatellite program and with access to information about the decision-making process prior to and after the final test. These discussions were off the record, not for attribution, given the sensitivity of the subject. They reflected the views of some of the key institutions involved in the test from the State, the Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army, and aerospace experts involved in debris calculations. The information conveyed to us suggests that American commentators tend to place much greater importance on the United States as a driver in China's decision to develop the technology and conduct the test than do the Chinese.     

The Finger on the Button

Taiwan's international status is such that the country's ability to trade and to supply certain goods and technologies remains its primary means of practicing diplomacy and asserting international influence. U.S. pressure to conform to international nonproliferation standards has made the issue of export controls a troubling one for Taiwan. Limiting Taiwan's economic relations affects its ability to sustain itself economically and to maintain productive relations with other nations. On the other hand, as a recipient of U.S. high-technology transfers and security assurances, Taiwan cannot ignore the directives of the United States. The article focuses on this dilemma and how a shift in power to the Democratic Progressive Party is affecting Taiwan's choice between placing limitations on its global economic power or risking being cut off from U.S. technology and losing U.S. security assurances. In order to address this challenge properly, Taiwan will need to reassess its fundamental economic and security interests.     

Aligning national “logics” in a European military helicopter program

This article analyzes the public side of the NH90 network consisting of four participating countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands) and their industrial partners. Comparable to observations in earlier international projects in the defense sector, the development and production of the NH90 defense helicopter did not match original plans and costs estimates. On the basis of four mechanisms that were intended to facilitate the cooperation between the partnering countries (the General Memorandum of Understanding; coalition formation; the role of the central agency; and the process of vertical escalation) the question is posed whether or not there was a true alignment of national interests and “logics.” The lack of standardization, as well as program delays and issues concerning the division of the work-share, lead to the emerging alignment being characterized as “quasi-alignment” at best.     

加强网络国防建设战略运筹需要强化的六种意识

针对网络国防的现实需求,文章就加强网络国防建设的战略运筹指出了需要强化的六种意识：忧患意识,全局意识,创新意识,主动意识,重点意识,优势意识。在分析了三个方面的忧患意识,归纳了服务于国家安全战略、加强全局筹划、强化长远效益的全局意识。总结了理论创新、法律创新、技术创新为主要领域的创新意识等基础上,提出了维护国家根本利益、聚力局部竞争优势、拓展综合防卫能力的重点意识,探讨了主动探索建设途径、主动加强机制建设、主动构建核心能力的主动意识．分析了尽快形成战斗力生成模式优势、尽快形成防御力量和人才优势、尽快形成军民融合发展体系的优势意识。     

火箭悬浮深弹拦截尾流自导鱼雷研究

为了分析了水面舰艇发射火箭悬浮深弹拦截潜射尾流自导鱼雷的作战使用问题,首先,概括了潜射尾流自导鱼雷的攻击原理。其次,介绍了水面舰艇针对尾流自导鱼雷的弹道预测原理以及鱼雷提前角估算数学模型,在此基础上,进一步建立了火箭悬浮深弹拦截鱼雷的射击要素求解模型。最后,进行了仿真检验,归纳了火箭悬浮深弹射击提前角随相关参数变化的分布规律。研究结果对火箭悬浮深弹拦截潜射尾流自导鱼雷的作战使用具有指导意义。     

防空指挥控制系统情报融合能力测试空情设计

针对防空指挥控制系统情报融合能力测试需要,重点研究了测试空情设计问题。具体论述了防空情报融合的目的和评判准则,基于提出的评判准则分析了测试空情设计策略和步骤,设计了测试空情基本用例,开发设计了测试系统。经仿真测试,测试系统能较好地满足空情设计需求,支持防空指挥控制系统情报融合能力测试。     

水面舰艇纯机动规避线导鱼雷航向研究

纯机动规避是水面舰艇防御潜射线导鱼雷的手段之一。首先,归纳了潜射线导鱼雷的攻击过程和导引规律。其次,分别针对线导导引状态和自导追踪状态的鱼雷分析了水面舰艇实施规避机动的目的。然后,结合具体装备性能仿真分析了不同影响因素对水面舰艇实际规避航向的影响效果。最后,根据规避目的和仿真结果提炼出水面舰艇纯机动规避潜射线导鱼雷实际航向的分布规律。研究结果对于提高水面舰艇的生存能力具有重要意义。