基于agent 的分布式集成环境

本文提出了一种基于多ａｇｅｎｔ的分布式集成环境ＤＩＥＭＡ的通用框架,描述了ＤＩＥＭＡ的工作原理;提出了服务ａｇｅｎｔ和请求ａｇｅｎｔ的实现框架及其设计与实现。     

美国空军飞机战伤修理的发展及其对我们的启示

论述了美国空军战伤修理在方针、组织、培训、战伤修理规程、备件及工具箱、设计、试验数据库、新技术开发和常用抢修技术等方面的发展。同时提出了我空军战伤修理在这些方面的发展建议。     

异构资源类型下多无人机任务分配

针对多无人机在执行侦察、打击任务的过程中携带任务资源的异构性,以及任务对于异构资源的要求,设计了一种改进的基于共识的捆绑算法(consensus-based bundle algorithm, CBBA)。考虑任务价值、任务执行时间窗以及航程代价等条件建立了多无人机对地目标侦察、打击任务分配模型。利用K-medoids聚类分析方法对多无人机进行基于距离和携带资源平衡的聚类,以解决多无人机对于异构资源类型的要求。对打击任务进行子任务生成,并利用改进后的CBBA求解所建立的任务分配模型,通过对比仿真实验验证了算法的可行性和有效性。     

新型潜伏性环氧树脂体系固化动力学

采用非等温差示扫描量热(DSC)技术对改性咪唑类固化剂(MIM)及其微胶囊固化剂(MIC)与E-51环氧树脂的固化反应过程进行了跟踪,并利用Kissinger和Crane方程对该固化反应进行了动力学分析,在此基础上探讨了固化剂包覆处理前后其环氧树脂体系的固化动力学参数与固化剂室温贮存性能的关系。结果表明:在不同升温速率下,E-51/MIM反应体系的放热量均大于E-51/MIC体系;两固化反应体系的反应级数均为0.89;与E-51/MIM体系相比,E-51/MIC体系的固化反应活化能和频率熵因子均较大,并具有更好的室温贮存性能。     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Client‐contractor bargaining on net present value in project scheduling with limited resources

The client‐contractor bargaining problem addressed here is in the context of a multi‐mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows, which is formulated as a progress payments model. In this model, the contractor receives payments from the client at predetermined regular time intervals. The last payment is paid at the first predetermined payment point right after project completion. The second payment model considered in this paper is the one with payments at activity completions. The project is represented on an Activity‐on‐Node (AON) project network. Activity durations are assumed to be deterministic. The project duration is bounded from above by a deadline imposed by the client, which constitutes a hard constraint. The bargaining objective is to maximize the bargaining objective function comprised of the objectives of both the client and the contractor. The bargaining objective function is expected to reflect the two‐party nature of the problem environment and seeks a compromise between the client and the contractor. The bargaining power concept is introduced into the problem by the bargaining power weights used in the bargaining objective function. Simulated annealing algorithm and genetic algorithm approaches are proposed as solution procedures. The proposed solution methods are tested with respect to solution quality and solution times. Sensitivity analyses are conducted among different parameters used in the model, namely the profit margin, the discount rate, and the bargaining power weights. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

一种面向Agent的概念化建模方法*

面向Agent的建模方法为基于Agent系统的概念化描述提供了一种新的技术.针对多Agent系统分析与建模问题,扩展并规范了面向Agent概念化建模过程,定义了Agent模型及其扩展模型,并给出了形式化描述.同时,给出面向Agent的分析和设计过程,为其具体建模提供了一种高层指导.最后,与其它现有面向Agent的方法在应用方面进行了类比分析,为该方法的广泛和深入地应用研究打下基础.     

在任职教育中开发学员任职经验的探讨

任职教育是在受训学员有着一定的任职经验基础上,提高岗位任职能力的一种短期培训。在教学实施过程中,必须注重挖掘任职经验,交流任职经验,再把经验上升为理论从而去指导部队实践。这种任职经验的开发,有利于在教学过程中按需施教,扩大师生的视野,丰富教学资源,实现理论与实践的统一,有效达成任职教育的目标。     

A genetic algorithm with neighborhood search for the resource‐constrained project scheduling problem

The resource‐constrained project scheduling problem (RCPSP) consists of a set of non‐preemptive activities that follow precedence relationship and consume resources. Under the limited amount of the resources, the objective of RCPSP is to find a schedule of the activities to minimize the project makespan. This article presents a new genetic algorithm (GA) by incorporating a local search strategy in GA operators. The local search strategy improves the efficiency of searching the solution space while keeping the randomness of the GA approach. Extensive numerical experiments show that the proposed GA with neighborhood search works well regarding solution quality and computational time compared with existing algorithms in the RCPSP literature, especially for the instances with a large number of activities. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Technical note: Find a hidden “treasure”

This paper deals with a two searchers game and it investigates the problem of how the possibility of finding a hidden object simultaneously by players influences their behavior. Namely, we consider the following two‐sided allocation non‐zero‐sum game on an integer interval [1,n]. Two teams (Player 1 and 2) want to find an immobile object (say, a treasure) hidden at one of n points. Each point i ∈ [1,n] is characterized by a detection parameter λ_i (μ_i) for Player 1 (Player 2) such that p_i(1 ? exp(?λ_ix_i)) (p_i(1 ? exp(?μ_iy_i))) is the probability that Player 1 (Player 2) discovers the hidden object with amount of search effort x_i (y_i) applied at point i where p_i ∈ (0,1) is the probability that the object is hidden at point i. Player 1 (Player 2) undertakes the search by allocating the total amount of effort X(Y). The payoff for Player 1 (Player 2) is 1 if he detects the object but his opponent does not. If both players detect the object they can share it proportionally and even can pay some share to an umpire who takes care that the players do not cheat each other, namely Player 1 gets q₁ and Player 2 gets q₂ where q₁ + q₂ ≤ 1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is found and numerical examples are given. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007