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731.
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网络空间越来越被世界各国公认为是继陆地、海洋、空中和太空之后的第五个作战域,为获得和保持像其它作战域那样世界领先的军事优势,美国正在大力进行网络空间作战能力建设。提出了美国网络空间作战能力建设框架,从战略规划、作战力量、作战理论、作战训练、武器装备、战场基础环境、人才培养和作战联盟八个方面全面总结了美国近年来在网络空间作战能力建设方面的主要做法。 相似文献
733.
Joakim Erma Møller 《Defence Studies》2019,19(3):235-256
Norway, Sweden and Finland have proclaimed a willingness to cooperate militarily in a future crisis or conflict despite their diverging alliance affiliation. This article assesses their ability to do so through various elements affecting their interoperability, with Arctic Challenge, a multinational military exercise, as an empirical basis. The analysis finds that the NATO/non-NATO-divide has a negative impact on the trilateral defence cooperation, especially on exchange of information and aspects related to command and control. At the same time, Finland and Sweden have become largely NATO-standardized through their active partnership with the Alliance. This has affected interoperability aspects, such as communication, culture, and the compatibility of technical solutions, in a positive manner. Through agreements with the Alliance, as well as domestic legal changes, the two NATO-partners have facilitated receiving military assistance from Norway and other NATO-members during a crisis. Other agreements between the Nordic countries, however, have been limited to peacetime. 相似文献
734.
Stephan De Spiegeleire Karlijn Jans Mischa Sibbel Khrystyna Holynska Deborah Lassche 《Defense & Security Analysis》2019,35(1):59-81
Most countries put significant amounts of time and effort in writing and issuing high-level policy documents. These are supposed to guide subsequent national defence efforts. But do they? And how do countries even try to ensure that they do? This paper reports on a benchmarking effort of how a few “best of breed” small- to medium-sized defence organisations (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) deal with these issues. We find that most countries fail to link goals to resources and pay limited attention to specific and rigorous ex-ante or post-hoc evaluation, even when compared to their own national government-wide provisions. We do, however, observe a (modest) trend towards putting more specific goals and metrics in these documents that can be – and in a few rare cases were – tracked. The paper identifies 42 concrete policy “nuggets” – both “do’s and don’ts” – that should be of interest to most defence policy planning/analysis communities. It ends with two recommendations that are in line with recent broader (non-defence) scholarship on the policy formulation-policy implementation gap: to put more rigorous emphasis on implementation (especially on achieving desired policy effects), but to do so increasingly in more experiential (“design”) ways, rather than in industrial-age bureaucratic ones (“PPBS”-systems). 相似文献
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Guillem Colom Piella 《Defence Studies》2016,16(1):1-19
The article analyses the Spanish military transformation. This process started in 2004 as a means to adapt the force structure, organization and capabilities of the Spanish military to meet present and future threats in compliance with NATO’s initiatives, thus ensuring the continuity of the equipment modernization, professionalization and the adjustment of the country’s defence architecture to the post-cold war environment. A decade later, although transformation is still a priority for the Ministry of Defence, limited political will, a lack of strategic guidance, poor resource management and the effects of the economic crisis are compromising its development. This article describes the Spanish military transformation and assesses its value in adapting the country’s armed forces to the current and prospective security environment. 相似文献
738.
量子技术是基于量子力学和其他学科交叉产生的新兴学科,已经涉及到计算、信息、导航、能源等多个应用领域。近年来,随着量子技术的快速发展和应用潜力,量子技术已成为研究热点并逐步走向应用。与此同时,世界新军事革命发展中武器装备须具有远程精确化、职能化、隐身化、无人化的技术特点。结合量子技术的特点,从量子计算,量子通信与量子密码、量子控制、量子导航、量子雷达,量子电池,量子技术对作战模式的改变等方面对武器装备领域的应用、作战能力和作战模式进行阐述。研究表明,量子计算的发展必然使现有武器装备的性能得到提高、作战能力得到提升,进而改变现有作战模式。 相似文献
739.
Nicolas Groffman 《Defense & Security Analysis》2016,32(2):144-162
India and China both have powerful spy networks; completely different in their approaches to espionage; both effective against their perceived enemies. China focuses first on internal threats, on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then the US and Japan. India’s defense policy focuses on Pakistan and internal terrorist threats, and then on China. In reality, however, when it comes to spying on each other, both China and India suffer from incompetence and apathy – which endangers both their own security and regional stability. This article looks at how they spy on each other, and asks why and how they need to improve. The narrative also touches upon some of the individuals who are waging the spy war, from India’s wily spymaster Ajit Doval down to junior Chinese agents such as Wang Qing and Pema Tsering. The two countries are not friends. They have the largest territorial dispute in the world on their hands, covering an area the size of North Korea, and they have large armies facing each other along 4000 kilometers of frontier. But they also lay claim to the world’s two oldest and richest civilizations, with a rich history of exchange, and now with a combined population of 2.6 billion people and more than a quarter of the world’s economic output. If they cooperated, they could solve many of the world’s problems; but if they lurch into conflict, the potential consequences are terrifying to contemplate. Unfortunately, despite their geographical closeness, they do not know much about each other. They have few cultural interchanges, little diplomacy, few trade missions. They do not watch each other’s films, read each other’s books or listen to each other’s music. Chinese tourists would rather fly to New Zealand for their holidays than cross the border to India, and Indian students would rather study in Europe than China. China and India are neighbors that barely talk to each other. Most significantly, they do not spy on each competently. For countries that do not interact socially, defensive understanding is important for security – but China prefers the glamor of facing up to its Pacific and other maritime rivals such as the US and Japan. India, for its part, does talk a great deal about the China threat, but its resources and expertise are wrapped up in controlling its security threat from Pakistan and the Islamic world. When China and India do try to spy on each other, it is often without the benefit of a long-term focus or understanding. India has some very skilled operatives within the Research and Analysis Wing, but few that specialize in China. China has an enormous pool of resources spread across several government departments, including the Ministry of Public Security, and also has extensive facilities and manpower in the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (the JSD) and the new Strategic Support Force (the SSF). However, China’s intelligence services generally behave as if India is not worth spying on. Given that the two countries do not have the cultural or political machinery in place to understand each other, espionage and intelligence gathering is vital to ensure that miscalculations do not take place. This has been apparent over the last few years in stand-offs in the Himalaya, as well as top-level suspicions on each side about a variety of subjects including terrorism, covert operations in Sri Lanka and Burma, and the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs. Both countries do occasionally make efforts in espionage against each other, especially during sensitive periods such as the mountain stand-offs of 2014 and 2013 and during policy developments in nuclear warfare. In this article the author looks at actual spying incidents between the two countries, their methodologies, their staff, their technical capabilities, and how the act of spying, which is usually viewed as intrinsically adversarial, can be a force for good. The article relies on interviews with actual participants in intelligence from both countries as well as extensive use of contemporary online sources, and secondary analysis by both military and academic experts from China, India and NATO countries. 相似文献
740.