运载火箭芯级与助推级分离的数值模拟

采用动态重叠网格方法和双欧法,耦合求解非定常流动控制NS方程和6DOF运动方程,数值模拟运载火箭助推级和芯级的自由分离过程和附加外力作用下的强迫分离过程,并对芯级、助推级分离的主要影响因素进行分析。数值结果与试验结果吻合,表明动态重叠网格方法能正确预测火箭芯级与助推级间复杂的流动现象。根据数值模拟结果,给出助推级在不同分离工况下的分离参数及分离规律。     

天线阵载波相位双差的欺骗干扰检测技术

针对采用单一发射天线的导航信号欺骗干扰,研究了基于天线阵载波相位双差的欺骗干扰检测技术,采用代数方法证明了三元非线阵是进行导航信号到达角无模糊解算的最少阵元数和阵型要求,并以相应阵型为基础,提出了基于天线阵载波相位双差的欺骗干扰检测量构造方法,给出了检测性能的分析方法,定义了用于限制检测性能下降的最小检测门限。采用蒙特卡洛方法对所提检测方法的检测性能进行了仿真,结果验证了理论分析的正确性。     

Serious Rules for Nuclear Power Without Proliferation

The authors propose five principles for addressing the major deficiencies of the current treaty-based approach to nonproliferation. These involve: effectively closing the door to withdrawals from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); defining which nuclear technologies fall within the NPT's “inalienable right” provision, so as to maintain a reasonable safety margin against possible military application; expansion of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections to include greater readiness to use its “special” inspection authority; creation of an NPT enforcement regime, to include a secretariat; and universalizing the NPT so as to apply to all states, while creating a path for current non-parties to come into compliance. There is no illusion here about the prospects for the adoption of this approach. At a minimum, the world needs to be frank about the gap between nuclear programs and current nonproliferation protection. Encouragement of greater use of nuclear power should be predicated on closing that gap.     

THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

How do we assess the health of international regimes? Many analysts have insisted recently that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is in urgent need of repair or that it should even be discarded because of its supposed ineffectiveness. However, it is essential that statements about the regime being in crisis be scrutinized for veracity and utility. While the spread of nuclear weapons poses an undeniable and serious threat to international security, a mistaken crisis mentality with respect to the regime could lead to rash attempts to alter it in unnecessary or ineffective ways or, at worst, to discard it completely. This paper returns to a theoretical framework that differentiates regimes, across both issue areas and time, to provide a more specified evaluation of regime health. By disaggregating the nuclear nonproliferation regime and assessing the individual and interactive health of multiple dimensions, a number of dimension-specific, regime-strengthening policy recommendations emerge.     

Strategic Ambiguity: Nuclear Sharing and the Secret Strategy for Drafting Articles I and II of the Nonproliferation Treaty

ABSTRACT

Since the 1950s, the United States has engaged in nuclear sharing with its NATO allies. Today, 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons remain on European soil. However, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. The potential discrepancy between text and practice raises the question of how the NPT's negotiators dealt with NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements while drafting the treaty that would eventually become the bedrock of the international nonproliferation regime. Using a multitiered analysis of secret negotiations within the White House National Security Council, NATO, and US-Soviet bilateral meetings, this article finds that NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements strengthened the NPT in the short term by lowering West German incentives to build the bomb. However, this article also finds that decision makers and negotiators in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration had a coordinated strategy of deliberately inserting ambiguous language into drafts of Articles I and II of the Treaty to protect and preserve NATO's pre-existing nuclear-sharing arrangements in Europe. This diplomatic approach by the Johnson administration offers lessons for challenges concerning NATO and relations with Russia today.     

The Canary in the Nuclear Submarine: Assessing the Nonproliferation Risk of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Loophole

ABSTRACT

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allows states to exempt nuclear material from international safeguards for use in nuclear submarine programs. This material, however, could be diverted for nuclear weapons purposes without the knowledge of inspectors, creating a potentially dangerous loophole in the treaty. This article argues that exercising that loophole today would amount to admitting a nuclear weapon program, making it a particularly poor pathway to a weapon for a potential proliferant. Still, if states like Brazil ultimately exempt nuclear material from safeguards for a nuclear submarine effort, they could set a dangerous precedent that makes it easier for others to use the loophole as a route to a nuclear weapon capability. There are several policy options available to mitigate the damage of such a precedent; most promising is the prospect of a voluntary safeguards arrangement that would allow international inspectors to keep an eye on nuclear material even after it has been dedicated to a naval nuclear propulsion program.     

YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames.     

The South African Denuclearization Exemplar

ABSTRACT

South Africa's nuclear disarmament is a unique historical case, notable in part for the dramatic shift from deception to cooperation. The unprecedented transparency it demonstrated in order to convince the international community of the veracity of their disarmament is heralded as an exemplar for verifiable denuclearization. Less known is how this case affords insights into how a nuclear weapon program can be clandestinely hidden by the ambiguity provided by an otherwise completely legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy program. Using a variety of open sources, including newly declassified internal South African and US government reports, it can be shown that South Africa employed a variety of deceptive tactics before it disarmed, and even for nearly two years after becoming a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This article reviews that information to derive instructive lessons on the lengths that a nuclear proliferant state might go to conceal its true capabilities and intentions, and to thwart international discovery of the existence and full extent of an existing—or, in this case, a former—nuclear weapon program.     

基于AHP与熵权的舰艇编队信息作战能力模糊综合评估

在确立了舰艇编队信息作战能力评估指标体系的基础上,运用AHP和熵权法,得到评价指标的综合权重.通过模糊综合评判,得出综合评判总分.以舰艇编队的信息侦察处理能力为例进行综合评估.最后通过进一步研究分析,构建了一种数学模型,用于找出影响舰艇编队信息作战能力的薄弱指标.     

Lost through non-translation: bringing Clausewitz's writings on ‘new wars’ back in

While Carl von Clausewitz has generally been respected as one of the most profound philosophers of war, his expertise has been regarded as somewhat limited if not even irrelevant to the so-called ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War world. Many scholars in international relations have claimed that ‘new wars’ are essentially ‘post-Clausewitzian’ and ‘post-trinitarian’ in nature, meaning that they are no longer fathomable through a Clausewitzian framework. However Clausewitz's earlier writings were nearly exclusively dedicated to guerrilla warfare, or what he called ‘small wars’. These writings have been largely overlooked by many analysts of contemporary conflicts. By drawing on his rare and untranslated writings, the article uncovers a critical part of Clausewitz's expertise in asymmetric warfare and shows that, far from being irrelevant in an age where interstate warfare is increasingly being replaced by conflicts between states and semi-/non-state actors, Clausewitz's philosophical writings actually shed new light into the particular interactive dynamics generated during wars waged under conditions of asymmetry.