基于神经网络的超精密机床伺服进给非线性模型辨识

以双轴Ｔ型结构的超精密金刚石车床的伺服进给系统为研究对象,采用自构造神经网络技术,建立了系统的非线性动态数学模型,为系统非线性控制与补偿提供参考模型     

精密加工中顶尖、中心孔形状误差对工件圆度的影响及其作用机理

对于轴类零件精密、超精密车削和磨削加工,顶尖夹持是最常见的夹持方式。本文分析了精密加工中顶尖夹持误差对工件圆度的影响,通过分析工件回转轴线的轨迹变化及夹持的径向接触刚度与顶尖、中心孔圆度误差的各阶谱成份之间的关系,论述了顶尖、中心孔形状误差对工件圆度的影响及其作用机理。探讨了顶尖夹持方式下提高工件圆度的有效途径。     

双基地中两坐标收站的三维定位跟踪算法

文中讨论了Ｔ／Ｒ—Ｒ型双基地系统中无俯仰信息收站对运动目标的三维定位跟踪能力;通过若干观测点上测量数据的组合,较好地实现厂对运动目标的三维定位跟踪,从而可以将目标的高度信息从变化的距离和之差的测最值中提取出来。文中以仿真手段证明了这种方法的可行性。     

车辆驾驶模拟运动机构的控制原理及其应用

本文讨论了一、二、三自由度运动机构的工作原理,并在实践中得到了应用.各种参数都是经过反复论证、试验运行的结果.这三种类型的运动机构具有广泛的代表性.     

机构的工作能力与约束条件

本文是“机构可靠性”的续篇.进一步讨论了机构的工作能力和约束条件,将其划分为构件的和运动副的工作能力与约束条件,给出了描述方法,为机构可靠性与工作能力的定量分析打下了基础.     

Kane方程在平面机构动力学中的应用

在平面机构动力学的研究过程中,因其含有闭环结构而使得经典动力学的应用遇到许多麻烦。本文采用近几年发展起来的Kane方程对此进行了研究,给出了任意的平面机构的动力学方程和与之对应的数值计算方法,所得结果程序化。为平面机构的动力学控制与仿真提供了有效的方法。同时使Kane方程得以运用到新的领域。     

面向文本数据库管理系统的授权模型

构造新的授权模型以满足面向对象、语义、文本数据模型等对授权的需求是当前数据库技术的重要研究课题之一。本文提出了一个基于复杂对象数据模型的、以权主群及权体簇作为授权单位的多级授权模型,即MAM模型,并讨论了面向文本数据库授权系统的基本功能及基本操作。     

机载脉冲多卜勒雷达图像模拟框架

对计算机模拟机载脉冲多卜勒雷达图像框架进行了研究。主要讨论了在机载雷达图像模拟中运用目标和基于数字地形的地杂波和海杂波的雷达图像的模拟机理,给出了图像生成的一般步骤。由于背景图像生成时的计算量较大,影响仿真的实时性,模拟器设计中对仿真模型进行简化,研究了快速算法来降低运行时间。在Windows环境下采用VC++开发语言完成雷达图像仿真软件的设计,在某型机载雷达的训练模拟器中得到应用。     

Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan

It is not too soon to draw cautionary lessons from the inconclusive results of US performance during more than 11 years of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. As in Vietnam, fundamental difficulties persist in adapting enduring institutions to the requirements of strategy. At the heart of the matter is tension between the assumptions that underlie counterinsurgency as practiced in Afghanistan and organization of the US Armed Forces, State Department, and Agency for International Development. Knowledge of basic principles and necessary changes is available to answer the question, could the US have done better?     

The incentive effect of acceptance sampling plans in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This article studies a firm that procures a product from a supplier. The quality of each product unit is measured by a continuous variable that follows a normal distribution and is correlated within a batch. The firm conducts an inspection and pays the supplier only if the product batch passes the inspection. The inspection not only serves the purpose of preventing a bad batch from reaching customers but also offers the supplier an incentive to improve product quality. The firm determines the acceptance sampling plan, and the supplier determines the quality effort level in either a simultaneous game or a Stackelberg leadership game, in which both parties share inspection cost and recall loss caused by low product quality. In the simultaneous game, we identify the Nash equilibrium form, provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and find parameter settings under which the decentralized and centralized supply chains achieve the same outcome. By numerical experiments, we show that the firm's acceptance sampling plan and the supplier's quality effort level are sensitive to both the recall loss sharing ratio and the game format (i.e., the precommitment assumption of the inspection policy). © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013