弹道导弹防御系统对抗技术研究

介绍了国外导弹防御系统研制和部署过程中所考虑的进攻方可能采取的几种典型对抗措施,研究分析了对抗导弹防御系统的基本方法、技术和策略。通过使用大量诱饵或假目标、减弱弹头的雷达信号特征或红外特征、隐藏弹头的真实位置,以及进行弹头机动等一种或多种组合的对抗措施,可以有效对付那些使用外大气层碰撞杀伤拦截器的导弹防御系统。     

基于向量皮尔森相关系数的组合赋权法

针对多属性决策中属性权重的确定问题,提出了一种基于皮尔森相关系数的主、客观权重的集成方法。用权向量的相关度作为不同赋权方法重要性的度量,意义明确,计算简单,可操作性强。最后采用算例验证了此方法的有效性和实用性。     

基于CPN的TDRS操作规划建模与仿真

以中继卫星(Racking and Data Relay Satellite,TDRS)为研究对象,以有色Petri网(Colored Petri Net,CPN)为数学工具,根据自顶向下的原则和层次化建模思想,提出一种基于CPN的TDRS操作规划模型,该模型分为顶层模型、控制模型、前向链路数据接收任务与发送任务的操作规划模型和返向链路数据接收任务与发送任务的操作规划模型,有效地描述了TDRS的动态行为特性。最后,通过仿真实验得到了TDRS操作规划方案,验证了所建模型的有效性。与PDDL模型比较分析表明:所建模型可以有效引入TDRS的领域知识,能够有效提高求解效率。所建模型可以为TDRS操作规划方案的制定提供理论参考。     

反辐射导弹告警技术效能分析

基于反辐射导弹告警技术的原理,分析了反辐射导弹雷达告警技术和光电告警技术的可行性。定义了告警设备的抗电子摧毁因子,并给出了分析过程和计算模型。以命中概率为指标,对反辐射导弹告警技术的作战效能进行了分析研究。仿真得出反辐射导弹命中概率与告警设备告警距离、发现概率等参数的关系,可为反辐射导弹告警技术的研究提供一定的参考。     

同时射击时反坦克导弹视场交叉数学模型研究

反坦克导弹同时射击时测角视场交叉可能引起导弹失控,针对此问题,利用信息系统的位置地理信息,参照装备的基本性能参数,构建了配置阵地的数学模型,得出了同时射击的可行性判据,为阵地射击指挥提供了决策支持。     

基于移相器控制电压的“动中通”波束形成改进算法

在波束形成技术中,基于同时扰动随机梯度估计算法计算接收功率对移相器控制电压的梯度,研究了同时扰动随机梯度估计算法中扰动量和电压更新方程中步长的取值问题。仿真结果表明,随迭代次数变化的扰动量较固定扰动量能有效地提高算法的收敛性能,在同时扰动随机梯度估计算法中,将步长改为随阵元空间位置变化,能有效地提高电压更新方程的收敛速度。研究了与变扰动量有关的参数取值,指出了参数的选取准则。MATLAB仿真结果验证了所改进算法的正确性和有效性。     

PHM在空空导弹勤务保障中的应用

简要介绍了PHM概念和国内外研究现状,参照OSA-CBM模型,提出了空空导弹PHM系统结构,并阐述了各个模块的功能作用。分析了PHM技术应用于空空导弹贮存的效益和影响可靠性的因素,确定了监测参数,根据尺寸、成本等提出传感器选型要求,构建空空导弹包装箱状态监控系统。通过市场调查,确定了可用于状态监控系统的传感器类型,对未来应用于导弹内部的传感器系统提出了期待。     

多平台对AAM协同制导交接班模型

通过对协同制导交接班的类型进行分析,建立了防空武器系统对AAM(Anti-aircraft Missile)协同制导交接班的坐标转换模型、误差模型及雷达截获概率模型。通过模拟产生随机误差,利用Monte-Carlo方法进行计算,得出不同误差源对协同制导交接班概率影响的定量关系。实验结果证明了所建模型的有效性,误差分析结论可作为协同制导交接班精度控制的依据。     

Planning for the next Takur Ghar

The USA is currently facing an increasingly diverse range of threats, including non-state actors, particularly violent extremist organizations attempting to do harm. The national leadership has made it clear that for the near future it will employ Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the tool of choice in short-duration, high-intensity operations that have more in common with the battle of Takur Ghar, than those with a larger footprint. It is critical then that the lessons of the past are learnt now and are applied before employing SOF in the future. This becomes especially important given the short lead-time in concert with the short-duration/high-intensity tempo of their operations. In the Battle of Takur Ghar, during Operation Anaconda, rigid adherence to the joint functions, especially clearer and more robust Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda would have yielded a better operational outcome and saved lives. With the benefit of hindsight, many things could have been done differently, but several key issues stand out. The C2 structure must include all components from the outset to synchronize effects and rapidly re-task ISR. There must be multiple communications redundancies and adequate bandwidth. Finally, all SOF, conventional and interagency capabilities must be synchronized under one task force commander with a sufficiently robust C2 infrastructure to direct the entire effort. As our nation calls on SOF at an ever-increasing rate, we must take those lessons learned and apply them to future operations.     

How and why Boko Haram blossomed: examining the fatal consequences of treating a purposive terrorist organisation as less so

Boko Haram (BH) is an insurgent group that operates mainly in northeastern Nigeria. Its stated aim is to establish an Islamic state, and it employs terrorism as its strategy. Earlier interests of security analysts centred on the drivers of BH uprising and the possibility of its internationalisation. Today's concerns relate more to why the rebellion has lasted this long. In toeing the same line, this article demonstrates that BH is a purposive terror group against which the government has evolved no viable strategy. It examines some gains of BH over the past six years and how it benefitted from the government's underestimation of its capacity and determination. It concludes that to effectively engage BH, the Nigerian government must revaluate its threat and sincerely pursue an expanded strategy beyond the current military-centric approach. To be effective, government's response must be packaged in such a way as to enhance human security in the region.