便携式防空导弹舵面偏转运动对比研究

建立了便携式防空导弹舵面偏转运动的数学模型,包括正弦偏转运动、不带零位脉冲调宽偏转运动和带零位脉冲调宽偏转运动,推导了相应的等效舵偏角矢量的公式,对比了3种舵面偏转运动对导弹性能的影响,所得结果对导弹设计中舵机的选取有参考价值。     

制导炸弹--一种重要的空袭兵器和应对措施

根据越南战争、海湾战争和科索沃战争的战例,阐述了制导炸弹的主要战术技术特点,认为制导炸弹是未来空袭作战重要兵器,是中低空中近程地(舰)空导弹的重要目标,拦截制导炸弹是地(舰)空导弹应该着力研究的问题.论证了中低空中近程地(舰)空导弹拦截制导炸弹的可行性,并提出了应开展的专项技术研究课题.     

基于Floyd算法的常规导弹连续波次作战运输规划

为提高常规导弹连续波次作战效能,对常规导弹连续波次作战运输规划问题进行研究。以Floyd算法为基础,首先生成了作战机动区域的交通网络最短路径、距离矩阵;其次将常规导弹连续波次作战运输过程分解为不同阶段,以运输过程中的整体暴露时间最短为目标,构建了初始规划方案0-1整数规划模型;然后考虑道路通行量及地域容量限制,对初始规划方案中存在的地域容量超过限制及单行道路中会车、超车情况进行逐步循环优化,以得到最佳运输规划方案;最后选择了一个作战案例想定,通过Matlab编程对案例进行了求解,得到了针对此案例的最佳运输规划方案,验证了模型的正确性和算法的有效性。     

A nuclear-armed North Korea without ICBMs: the best achievable objective

This article analyzes the North Korean nuclear crisis from a balance-of-power perspective. It is in the long-term interests of international peace for a secure and independent North Korea to serve as a buffer between US and Chinese ground forces. However, the conventional military advantage of the South Korean-American alliance over North Korea has grown drastically since the end of the Cold War, threatening North Korea’s survival. Since North Korea lacks any reliable ally, nuclear weapons represent its most cost-effective way to restore a balance of power and thus secure itself. Accepting security guarantees in exchange for its nuclear arsenal is rhetorically appealing but not a viable approach. North Korea’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), however, has overcompensated for the post-Cold War imbalance, inviting talk in Washington of waging a preventive war. Persuading North Korea to give up its ICBM capability, not its nuclear arsenal, should therefore be the primary objective of US diplomacy.     

基于Agent的水面舰艇单舰作战系统建模

对于水面舰艇单舰作战系统这样的复杂系统,传统建模方法已不能很好地对其加以描述.为此,采用基于Agent建模的方法对单舰作战系统建立模型,从结构组成、主要任务、具体动作和输入输出四方面对模型内部各模块进行描述,并以单舰中程反导作战为例具体说明了Agent内部各模块的功能以及在Agent中如何实现整个作战过程.这种建模方法不仅符合对复杂系统从微观到宏观的研究方法,而且支持模型间的聚合和解聚,较好地满足了对单舰作战系统建模的需求.     

超视距反舰导弹射击方式优化选择

射击方式的选择是反舰导弹作战使用的重要内容。在超视距作战需求的牵引下,传统视距反舰导弹的射击方式受到了巨大挑战。为优化选择超视距反舰导弹的射击方式,建立了两种常用射击方式的导弹捕捉概率模型和目标机动模型,给出一种典型条件不同目标机动航向的导弹捕捉概率,结果表明采用有前置量方式射击无法有效提高超视距导弹的捕捉概率,甚至在某些典型条件下还低于无前置量方式射击的捕捉概率,指出无前置方式是超视距反舰导弹射击的优选方式。     

European defence industry consolidation and domestic procurement bias

How have European cross-border defence industrial mergers and acquisitions affected domestic procurement bias among the major EU powers? This article departs from the findings of Andrew Moravcsik more than two decades ago suggesting that major West European states had no ingrained preferences for defence industrial autarchy. When cross-national armament projects were derailed, this could be attributed to political efforts of national defence industrial champions favouring purely domestic projects. As former national champions join pan-European defence groups, their preferences are likely modified. Does this shift procurement towards non-European “off-the-shelf” solutions which, according to Moravcsik, are favoured by defence departments? Or does it give impetus to a stronger preference for European as opposed to domestic systems? In this article, procurement patterns in the aftermath of cross-border defence industry consolidation will be analysed. Procurement bias is assessed in two industry segments characterised by pervasive consolidation.     

BALLISTIC TRAJECTORY

North Korea has been one of the world's most active suppliers of ballistic missile systems since the mid-1980s, but the nature of its missile export business has changed significantly during this period. Unclassified, publicly available data show that the great majority of known deliveries of complete missile systems from North Korea occurred before 1994. The subsequent fall-off took place a decade too early to be explained by the Proliferation Security Initiative of 2003. It can be explained by a combination of factors that have reduced demand. First, after selling production equipment for ballistic missiles to many states, especially in the Middle East, North Korea by the late 1990s had become primarily a supplier of missile parts and materials, not complete systems. Second, after Operation Desert Storm, some missile-buying states shifted their attention away from ballistic missiles in favor of manned aircraft, cruise missiles, and missile defense systems supplied by Western powers. Third, some states experienced pressure from the United States to curtail their dealings with North Korea. During the last decade, having shed most of its previous customer base, North Korea has entered a phase of collaborative missile development with a smaller number of state partners, particularly Iran and Syria. Its known sales of complete missile systems are relatively small and infrequent. North Korea's time as missile supplier to the Middle East at large has ended, but there is a risk that regional states will turn to North Korea as a supplier of nuclear technology in the future.     

US Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike Ambitions:

ABSTRACT

The dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions.     

NATO Territorial Ballistic Missile Defense and its Implications for Arms Control

ABSTRACT

Since 2002, NATO's territorial missile defense has evoked continuous debates between NATO states and the Russian Federation. Thirteen years have passed without reaching a common denominator. This article provides a comprehensive overview of the historical background of the debate and the technical details of the missile defense system, highlighting its shortcomings and the state of its deployment process. It also contrasts the military-technical and political arguments of both sides, before addressing the applicable norms of international law to highlight violations and the effect of this noncompliance on existing arms control measures.