排队论在导弹防御体系射击效能中的应用

针对当前空袭手段多样化、综合化和一体化的特点,运用排队论方法,设计了一种基于排队论的射击效能评估模型。该模型综合考虑了各种因素对舰空导弹射击效能的影响,当编队的配置(如防御层数、通道数量)有所变化时,依然可以灵活运用上述模型对编队射击效能做出准确评估。     

尾流自导鱼雷有效射击阵位范围

基于尾流自导鱼雷的弹道分析,采用几何分析法,分别对尾流自导鱼雷在一次转角射击和二次转角射击两种模式下的有效射击阵位范围进行解算。得出该雷在两种射击模式下的有效射击阵位范围数学模型,该数学模型能够较好地满足了尾流自导鱼雷作战使用时对作战平台占位机动就位点选择的要求。     

过程方法在防化科研质量管理系统中的应用

介绍了根据国军标要求建立的科研质量管理系统．运用“过程方法”,对现行科研体制下的科研进程进行了识别,并提出了具体的控制要求。     

基于遗传算法的弹炮混编防空群火力分配

近期局部战争中的防空作战经验表明:实施弹炮混编可以大大提高防空武器系统的作战效能,而如何实施有效的火力分配又是其中的一个重要环节.针对陆军弹炮混编防空群射击指挥中的火力分配问题,简要分析了防空导弹和高炮武器系统射击的不同特点,提出了弹炮混编防空群的火力分配方法,并建立了优化火力分配方案的数学模型.在此基础上,采用遗传算法对此模型求解.结果表明,遗传算法为弹炮混编防空群的火力优化分配问题提供了一条有效途径.     

舰艇编队对空防御火力分配评价模型

未来高技术条件下水面舰艇编队防空作战能力是其生存能力的关键因素.对舰艇编队防空来讲,进行硬抗击的武器主要是舰空导弹和舰炮两种,如何合理地利用这些武器,最大地发挥舰艇编队的防空作战能力,成为舰艇对空防御作战研究的一个重要课题.结合舰艇编队对空防御的实际情况,利用模糊数学的方法,建立了舰艇编队对空防御火力分配方案的模糊综合评价模型.     

TOPSIS法用于区域防空重点保卫目标排序计算

区域防空作战中优化选择重点保卫目标,集中部署优势防空兵力,才能确保重点目标不受或少受损失.分析了影响保卫目标重要性的主要因素,采取德尔菲法获得指标值,采用层次分析法得到指标权重,利用逼近理想解的排序法对保卫目标的重要性进行了定量分析.最后通过算例对算法的正确性和实用性进行了验证.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE WORLD DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND US MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL ON THE ISRAELI DEFENSE INDUSTRY: A DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS MODEL

This paper models the interactions between the defense industry market structure and the defense needs of Israel, the USA and Western Europe, which produce several heterogeneous defense goods. The model specifies that the defense industries of the US and Europe are ‘large’ while that of Israel is ‘small’. The US military aid to Israel is also an integral part of the model. The results show that net defense costs of Israel are minimal when the number of its defense firms is one. The model predicts that an increase in US military aid reduces Israel’s government expenditure, its defense industry’s profits and its net defense costs.     

The structure of the defense industry and the security needs of the country: a differentiated products model

This paper models the interactions between the defense needs of the USA and Western Europe, which produce several heterogeneous defense goods, and the defense industry market structure. The results show that net defense costs of the USA and Europe are lower when the number of defense firms in each arms‐producing country is small and when the world prices of the defense goods are high. The model predicts that the increase in world prices will crowd‐out countries in the developing world from the market for modern weapon systems and may force them to develop and use ‘cheap and dirty’ weapon systems.     

Does Geopolitical Risks Predict Stock Returns and Volatility of Leading Defense Companies? Evidence from a Nonparametric Approach

Abstract

We use the k-th-order nonparametric causality test at monthly frequency over the period of 1985:1 to 2016:06 to analyze whether geopolitical risks can predict movements in stock returns and volatility of 24 global defense firms. The nonparametric approach controls for the existing misspecification of a linear framework of causality, and hence, the mild evidence of causality obtained under the standard Granger tests cannot be relied upon. When we apply the nonparametric test, we find that there is no evidence of predictability of stock returns of these defense companies emanating from the geopolitical risk measure. However, the geopolitical risk index does predict realized volatility in 50% of the companies. Our results indicate that while global geopolitical events over a period of time is less likely to predict returns, such global risks are more inclined in affecting future risk profile of defense firms.     

ESCAPE FROM NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Since the post-World War II genesis of nuclear deterrence, two presidential initiatives have been presented to deliver humanity from the threat of its failure. The first was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a constellation of space- and ground-based systems that President Ronald Reagan envisioned would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” The second is President Barack Obama's roadmap to “a world without nuclear weapons,” commonly referred to as “Global Zero.” While these proposals appear to have little in common, deeper investigation reveals a number of provocative similarities in motivation and presentation. Moreover, both generated fierce debate, often with ideological overtones, about their strategic desirability and technical feasibility. We use these parallels, as well as prominent dissimilarities, to draw lessons from the SDI experience that can be applied to the debate over Global Zero.