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371.
Non‐zero‐sum nonlinear network path interdiction with an application to inspection in terror networks 下载免费PDF全文
Noam Goldberg 《海军后勤学研究》2017,64(2):139-153
A simultaneous non‐zero‐sum game is modeled to extend the classical network interdiction problem. In this model, an interdictor (e.g., an enforcement agent) decides how much of an inspection resource to spend along each arc in the network to capture a smuggler. The smuggler (randomly) selects a commodity to smuggle—a source and destination pair of nodes, and also a corresponding path for traveling between the given pair of nodes. This model is motivated by a terrorist organization that can mobilize its human, financial, or weapon resources to carry out an attack at one of several potential target destinations. The probability of evading each of the network arcs nonlinearly decreases in the amount of resource that the interdictor spends on its inspection. We show that under reasonable assumptions with respect to the evasion probability functions, (approximate) Nash equilibria of this game can be determined in polynomial time; depending on whether the evasion functions are exponential or general logarithmically‐convex functions, exact Nash equilibria or approximate Nash equilibria, respectively, are computed. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 139–153, 2017 相似文献
372.
This article investigates the correlation of space and time in the clustering of robbery incidents in metropolitan Lagos. Analysis was carried out on 781 selected robbery incidents in 2013. Using the Mantel index to correlate place and time intervals for pairs of robbery incidents, the results show that robberies are respectively concentrated in residential areas, transport nodes and public places, peaking at midnight during weekdays. The results further show that this concentration is most likely greater than what would be expected on the basis of a chance distribution. The study concludes that various factors may exist which cause clusters of robberies to occur in these places at these times. 相似文献
373.
This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game in which player I chooses in integer interval [1, N] two integer intervals consisting of p and q points where p + q < N, and player II chooses an integer point in [1, N]. The payoff to player I equals 1 if the point chosen by player II is at least in one of the intervals chosen by player II and 0 otherwise. This paper complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, Lee, Garnaev, and Zoroa, Zoroa and Fernández‐Sáez. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 98–106, 2001 相似文献
374.
D-S证据论在空中目标分类中的应用 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
首先叙述识别、分类空中目标时需使用多传感器融合技术,分析可利用的各类传感器和从其可得到的各种目标属性参数,以及各种数据融合方法.然后详细介绍了基于D-S证据论的3种多源信息融合分类空中目标方法,并对具体仿真应用结果作了比较. 相似文献
375.
李盛业 《兵团教育学院学报》2001,11(1):29-33
进学生头脑”是在高等学校全面实现邓小平理论“三进”目标的关键。在深入调查研究基础上 ,找准联系实际改进邓小平理论教学的切入点 ;采用专题教学方式 ;改变被动的学习方式 ;改革重理论轻实践的考核方式 ,促进邓小平理论进学生头脑目标的全面实现。并在上述过程中 ,注意遵循有利于唤起学生学习兴趣 ,有利于发挥学生学习的主体作用 ,就事论理 ,深化认识 ,不割断历史及实事求是 ,科学严肃的原则 相似文献
376.
应用螺旋理论对并联机器人中常用的一种结构形式—Stewart平台机构进行了静力分析计算 ,并对我校的一个六自由度试验平台进行了校核 ,结果表明分析过程简单明了、运算方便 相似文献
377.
设S1,S2 ,… ,SN 是Rn 上的N个仿射压缩映射 ,若Rn 的紧子集E满足E UNi =1 Si(E) ,则称E为子自仿射集 .作者在一定条件下得到了子自仿射集E的Hausdorff维数 . 相似文献
378.
379.
在现代防空中,经常由不同类型的防空武器多层部署联合进行防空,故需要对不同类型的防空武器多层防御部署进行分析.针对不同类型防空武器多层防御部署的问题,以排队论为基础,建立了防御体系射击效能的数学模型.按照模型,通过对仿真的实验数据进行分析,推测出不同类型防空武器的部署规律.最后,通过理论推导,证明了部署规律的正确性. 相似文献
380.
Zhimin Huang 《海军后勤学研究》2000,47(8):669-685
This paper explores the role of franchising arrangements in the context of game theory. We assume a single franchisor and a single franchisee channel and address the impact of fixed lump‐sum fees, royalties, wholesale price, and retail price on the franchise contracts. We start with the chance cross‐constrained noncooperative situation where the franchisor, as the leader, first specifies his/her strategies. The franchisee, as the follower, then decides on his/her decision. We then relax the assumption of franchisee's inability to influence the franchisor's decisions and discuss cooperative situation between the franchisor and the franchisee. Nash's bargaining model is utilized to select the best Pareto‐efficient payment scheme for the franchisor and the franchisee to achieve their cooperation. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 669–685, 2000 相似文献