Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts

When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Noncooperative cost spanning tree games with budget restrictions

We extend the noncooperative game associated with the cost spanning tree problem introduced by Bergantiños and Lorenzo (Math Method Oper Res 59(2004), 393–403) to situations where agents have budget restrictions. We study the Nash equilibria, subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and strong Nash equilibria of this game. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2008     

Hybrid warfare through the lens of strategic theory

Hybrid warfare is the latest of the terms/concepts that have been used within the defence community in the last three decades to label contemporary warfare. It has been officially adopted in the core strategic documents of NATO, EU and national governments and has already inspired many articles, policy papers and books; however, this paper is unique in the sense that it analysis the hybrid warfare concept through the lens of strategic theory. It is argued that hybrid warfare does not merit the adoption as a doctrinal concept. Strategic theory instead, which lies at the nexus of all dimensions of warfare, provides a better viewpoint to approach contemporary warfare. It concludes that efforts should be directed towards exploring warfare under the light of eternal principles instead of proving the emergence of new types of warfare.     

基于纯方位理论的运动舰船长度测量方法

获得运动舰船的船体长度对于航海避碰和目标识别具有重要的参考价值。然而,由于诸多因素的限制,现有视觉技术难以精确测量。为此,引入了纯方位目标运动分析理论结合双目视觉技术实现对运动舰船长度的测量。首先就所研究问题建立运动模型,推导了基于目标舰船方位、距离参数的舰船长度测量方法,针对该方法测量误差大的问题提出了基于航向、距离、方位的舰船长度测量方法。目标航向无法直接获取,为此引入基于纯方位理论的目标航向视觉估计方法,并进行了仿真验证。最后对两种舰船长度测量模型的误差进行了仿真比较分析,结果表明采用本文提出的"距离航向"法,当观测点位于目标舰船正横左右范围内时误差可以控制在10%内,"方位距离"法误差更小,适用的舷角范围更大。     

一种基于证据间距离和信息熵的证据组合方法?

针对改进的基于证据间距离的组合方法,首先计算证据间距离并求出各个证据的支持度和可信度,选取支持度高的作为较可信证据,其次引入证据信息熵,计算修正系数,对这些证据的可信度进行修正,将可信度作为权重,进行证据的加权平均,再利用Dempster组合规则对所有证据进行融合。算例表明,该方法比现有的方法更加有效。     

一种修正的冲突证据融合方法

对于冲突证据,D-S证据理论无法使用甚至无法得出正确的结果,进而引发了专家学者的研究。针对该问题,提出了一种新的冲突证据融合方法,建立了多传感器综合可信度的计算模型,根据综合可信度得到多传感器的合成结果,采用D-S证据理论对合成结果进行组合,既解决了高冲突问题,又解决了低冲突问题。最后通过仿真验证了该方法的有效性。     

相控阵雷达维修方案优选方法研究

针对相控阵雷达维修方案的选择问题,确定了维修方案的决策属性,并提出一种基于改进TOPSIS法的相控阵雷达维修方案优选方法。该方法通过引入Vague集来处理维修方案选择中存在的模糊信息,并采用博弈论综合赋权法来确定决策属性的综合权重。通过计算各备选方案与正、负理想方案的灰色关联度,得到了维修方案的灰色关联相对贴近度,进而实现对维修方案的排序和选择。最后,通过算例应用与分析,对提出的方法进行了验证。     

AHP和三角白化权函数的武器装备研制技术风险评估

提出了武器装备技术风险的评价体系,采用层次分析法给出了各指标对技术风险的权重;阐述了基于三角白化权函数的灰色理论,建立了武器装备研制项目技术风险的评估模型,详细给出了技术风险评估的过程和步骤。最后,结合一个航空项目实例说明了该方法的适用性和有效性。     

Potential impact of recharging plug‐in hybrid electric vehicles on locational marginal prices

Plug‐in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), upon market penetration, will create additional recharging loads to the electric power systems. This article considers different recharging scenarios and uses game theoretic models to study the potential impact of the recharging loads on locational marginal prices (wholesale electricity prices). Computational results from a Pennsylvania‐New Jersey‐Maryland Interconnection case study show that, under the existing recharging infrastructures, even a small magnitude of load increase caused by PHEV recharging could have a significant undesirable impact on locational marginal prices. The impact could be mitigated to a varying extent by the availability of possible future recharging infrastructures, including realtime pricing recharging meters, battery stations, or vehicle‐to‐grid technology.© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

基于辩证语义的分布式协同态势分析方法

分布式协同态势分析在联合作战战役筹划中起着十分重要的作用。当前的战场环境呈现动态不确定性,传统的态势分析方法在处理不确定、不一致及不完全信息等实际应用中存在较大的局限性。本文基于辩论理论的辩证语义,提出了一种新的分布式协同态势分析方法。该方法通过多方对话博弈展现不同参与者的主张和论据之间的攻击关系及矛盾焦点,进而构建相应的辩证分析树网格以辅助决策者协同解决态势分析中的信息不一致和观点冲突问题。该方法的研究将为联合作战的态势分析提供新的方法论。