模拟训练系统中CGF的号手操作技能建模

针对模拟训练系统对CGF真实性的要求,从号手的操作技能入手,建立可以反映真实训练水平的号手操作技能模型。在分析操作技能相关原理和规律的基础上,采用时间序列分析的方法对其进行预测。采用了指数平滑预测模型,详细分析了其原理,并针对其在实际应用中的缺陷进行了改进。最后,通过两个实际案例验证了模型的可用性和可信性。所建模型反映了号手的操作技能,为模拟训练系统中CGF的真实性研究提供新的思路和方法。     

Peacekeeping and civil–military relations in Uruguay

ABSTRACT

There have been over 90,000 UN peacekeepers deployed around the world to 78 peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in over 125 countries since 1948. Some scholars have made the case that these missions have had a positive impact on the relationship between the military and the civilians they work for. However, other scholars have identified a negative impact on civil military relations (CMR). This paper contributes to this debate by investigating how peacekeeping has impacted civil-military relations in Latin America's most prolific contributor to peacekeeping: Uruguay. This paper finds that PKOs in Uruguay have facilitated post-transitions attempts by civilians to build first-generation control, but not second-generation control. Further, PKOs have marginally improved military effectiveness, but we find that they do not improve societal trust in the armed forces.     

Pakistan’s nuclear future: continued dependence on asymmetric escalation

ABSTRACT

In 2019, the geostrategic landscape of South Asia significantly changed. A crisis between India and Pakistan involved air strikes across international boundaries for the first time since the 1971 war. Pakistan came close to economic collapse, while India re-elected hawkish Narendra Modi as prime minister in a landslide. These developments, alongside the United States’ efforts to strike a deal to leave Afghanistan and rapidly improving US-India relations, portend new challenges for Pakistan’s security managers—challenges that nuclear weapons are ill-suited to address. Despite the shifting security and political situation in the region, however, Pakistan’s nuclear posture and doctrine seem unlikely to change. This article explores the roots of Pakistan’s reliance on the traditional predictions of the nuclear revolution, most notably the notion that nuclear-armed states will not go to war with one another, and argues that this reliance on nuclear deterrence is a response both to Pakistan’s security environment and to serious constraints on moving away from nuclear weapons toward an improved conventional force posture. Pakistan’s central problems remain the same as when it first contemplated nuclear weapons: the threat from India, the absence of true allies, a weak state and a weaker economy, and few friends in the international system. While 2019 may have been a turning point for other states in the region, Pakistan is likely to stay the course.     

The U.S. Navy's task forces: 1–199

ABSTRACT

Grouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces than the previous single-type-of-warship formations. This system has evolved and spread to naval forces ashore but remains fundamentally unchanged. It now covers numbers between 1 to over 1000, of which the most prominent is the first 100 or so which U.S. Navy combat forces use. The numbered fleets worldwide utilize the series covering 20-79; 1-19 and 90-99 appear to be reserved for special allocations and Commander, Pacific Fleet; numbers over 80 to the Atlantic; 100-119 for Northern Europe and briefly Tenth Fleet; the 120 series for Second Fleet as a Joint Task Force leader; the 150 series for Naval Forces Central Command; and the 180 series for Atlantic Fleet and now-Fleet Forces Command.     

Are the Baltic States and NATO on the right path in deterring Russia in the Baltic?

ABSTRACT

The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia.