日本预防街头犯罪对策与启示

在剖析解读日本街头犯罪＂预防对策＂的基础上,提出日本警察运用简单手段取得社会治安的理想效果。预防犯罪,在理念上把警方全包全责调整向组织牵头、协调联动和指导督促;在实践上完善警察牵头,以警察、政府相关部门、生产相关企业、新闻媒体和普通民众等广泛参与为基础的联动群防机制;在落实上不断加强高技术手段与原始方法相互补充的立体防范环境建设;在过程中尽量贴近现实需要,以完整的系统来控制街头犯罪,是降低预防犯罪成本、提高预防犯罪效率的捷径之一。     

The Odyssey of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

This study examines the failures of the William J. Clinton and Barack Obama administrations to secure ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It applies an integrated analytical framework for assessing treaty ratification that builds upon previous research in order to understand why the Clinton administration failed to achieve CTBT ratification in 1999 and why the Obama administration has so far failed to advance the treaty in the Senate. The study concludes that CTBT ratification, despite Obama administration pledges of support, remains highly unlikely. Finally, the study analyzes the common domestic political factors present in both cases and suggests areas for further research.     

舰艇机动穿越深海会聚区对潜艇探测研究

深海会聚区效应是深海水声传播显著的特征,并为远距离潜艇探测提供了有效途径。首先分析了深海会聚区形成的原因和条件,然后根据海区会聚区的预报距离和宽度,构建了舰艇采用两次机动穿越会聚区测算被探测潜艇的位置和运动要素模型,最后通过算例分析舰艇两次穿越会聚区的方法和求解潜艇运动要素和位置的过程,分析结果验证了舰艇穿越会聚区对潜艇定位方法的可行性。     

扩展信念网络模型的军事情报检索系统设计

着眼信息化战争条件下军事情报分类、处理困难的现实,在深入分析军事情报检索系统特点基础上,提出一个基于分类的自动存储和利用查询术语同义词关系扩展信念模型的检索军事情报检索原型系统,详细描述了其存储和检索设计思路.     

Polaris,East of Suez: British Plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964–1968

This article investigates the little-known plans formulated by Harold Wilson's Labour government to deploy Polaris submarines in the Indo-Pacific region. The scheme was first proposed in 1965 as a response to several problems faced by British policy-makers, including China's acquisition of a nuclear capability, Britain's wish to maintain a meaningful position ‘East of Suez’ at reduced cost, and German pressure for equal treatment within NATO on nuclear matters. Despite extensive high-level discussion, the plans were finally abandoned in mid-1968, as Labour moved more decisively to forsake the world role.     

French war plans, 1914: The ‘Balance of Power Paradox’

Historians have noted that both German and French war preparation in 1914 fell victim to the inadequacies of traditional threat-based planning: vulnerability to ‘threat deception’ which caused each to underestimate or mischaracterize the threat; a tendency to ‘mirror-image’ by fitting intelligence into preconceived notions of how the enemy was expected to behave; and ‘group think’ that discouraged a serious consideration of alternative scenarios. This article applies the ‘Balance of Power Paradox’ to explain why, at the dawn of the twentieth century, war planning in both Germany and France was driven by an acute sense of weakness which encouraged each side to fashion highly ‘risk acceptant’ strategies. In particular, he examines why and how French commander-in-chief General Joseph Joffre evolved and rationalized his audacious, and disastrous, Plan XVII to leverage French weaknesses and prevent the stronger German Army from bringing the full weight of its military strength to bear against France. The potential implication of this historical vignette is that leaders, and by extension military planners, of both strong and weak states focus on the constraints faced by their opponents, and assume that they can avoid the limitations of their position, while their opponent cannot.     

Disregarding the Bear: How US Intelligence Failed to Estimate the Soviet Intervention in the Egyptian–Israeli War of Attrition 1

This article analyzes the main factors that contributed to the failure of the US intelligence community to alert against Soviet intentions and the intervention in the Egyptian–Israeli War of Attrition in 1969–70. Based on fresh archival sources, this research describes the US intelligence conception concerning the USSR; explains the crystallization of the intelligence estimate on the probability of Soviet intervention in 1970; deals with the intelligence data that were acquired but eventually ignored; and concludes with several plausible explanations for the intelligence blunder.     

The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan's Maritime Strategy

Washington's so-called Maritime Strategy, which sought to apply US naval might against Soviet vulnerabilities on its maritime flanks, came to full fruition during the 1980s. The strategy, which witnessed a major buildup of US naval forces and aggressive exercising in seas proximate to the USSR, also explicitly targeted Moscow”s strategic missile submarines with the aim of pressuring the Kremlin during crises or the early phases of global war. Relying on a variety of interviews and newly declassified documents, the authors assert that the Maritime Strategy represents one of the rare instances in history when intelligence helped lead a nation to completely revise its concept of military operations.     

A reply to Larry cable

Recent counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the local operating environment often is dominated by indigenous power-holders. As counterinsurgents seek to establish control over the local population, collaboration with these agents has become an essential aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency. Although the practice of constructing collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders might be perceived as unconventional by today's counterinsurgents, the approach itself goes back to the colonial era in which modern counterinsurgency has its roots. This article explores the dynamics, benefits, and dangers of collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders by analysing an infamous episode in Dutch colonial history, the case of the collaboration between Dutch colonial authorities and warlord Teuku Uma during the Aceh War (1873–1913). This relationship ended in disaster for the Dutch as Uma departed their side at the moment he had become their pivotal asset in the local political landscape. The article explains that the Dutch succeeded to co-opt Uma, but failed to control him as they lacked the will and means to do so. Furthermore this case study provides an insight in the way the Dutch colonial authorities dealt with the complex process of intelligence-gathering in a fragmented indigenous society.     

Countering terrorism in Northern Ireland: the role of intelligence

This article aims to review some of the key lessons learnt by the Royal Ulster Constabulary's (RUC) Special Branch in the 37 years of the troubles in Northern Ireland. Above all counter-terrorism is an intelligence led operation and Special Branch are the key agency for this in all UK police forces, who have now benefited enormously from the expertise that the RUC's Special Branch built up over the years and have passed on to their colleagues throughout the UK. Intelligence is more often than not a human role and relies on human agencies, which was the case in Northern Ireland. The bulk of intelligence gathering was carried out at quite low levels although the sifting and analysing of it became a more specialist skill. Electronic intelligence and computerised systems were often quite low down in the order of priorities and uses, which tends to confound popular impressions. Agents, informers and good old fashioned ‘coppers’ who knew their patch were much more important both in terms of gathering information and in terms of undermining the terrorists morale from within and it was these factors that fundamentally defeated the IRA in Northern Ireland.