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51.
战术对抗演练是战术训练的重要方法,已在边防部队实战技能训练中得到广泛运用。侧重挖掘的是战术对抗演练在边防战术训练中的另一个重要作用,即评估战术训练水平的作用,着重从对抗演练法评估边防战术训练的必要性、运用的基本思路及应注意的问题三个方面进行论述。 相似文献
52.
王保安 《中国人民武装警察部队学院学报》2008,24(11):20-22
在和平时期,各国武装警察的基本任务是打击各种违法犯罪活动。但是,各种反人类的违法犯罪活动是一种极少数人的行为,违法犯罪分子与武装警察的作战必然是一种非对称力量对抗的特殊作战。面对这种客观存在的非对称力量作战,公安武警边防部队要深入研究此条件下作战的基本战法。 相似文献
53.
运用潜艇和远程导弹联合作战形成的信息与火力联合打击优势来开发突袭航母战斗群的战法是联合作战研究中尚未解决的关键问题之一,根据信息作战、网络中心战和海上游击战原理,分别利用潜艇获取目标位置信息优势和远程导弹对目标打击火力优势,通过海上游击战战法,运用在以卫星为平台的网络中心环境中形成的信息与火力联合打击能力,实施对航母战斗群的突袭,对一个典型实例的初步试验及分析结果表明:与潜艇侦察目标能力有关的正确发现目标概率和评估远程导弹打击目标效果概率以及与远程导弹打击能力有关的命中目标概率对信息与火力联合打击能力的影响分别为20.79%、22.57%和20.20%%,是成功突袭航母战斗群的最重要的因素,而网络中心联合潜艇与远程导弹突袭航母则是充分发挥潜艇和远程导弹综合优势的科学战法。 相似文献
54.
对敌后侦察反军事诱骗的远程火力打击战法的定量分析是战役研究中尚未解决的关键问题之一,根据信息作战原理,运用仿真和统计学分析的混合方法,建立基于概率的二人非零和(TPNZS)非合作博弈模型,设计基于侦察与诱骗博弈的远程火力打击战法,定量分析我方的敌后侦察和敌方的军事诱骗对远程信息与火力联合打击能力的影响,并对一个典型实例的初步试验及分析结果表明:与敌后侦察和军事诱骗有关的正确识别目标和错误识别目标的概率以及远程火力命中目标的概率是评估远程信息与火力联合打击能力的关键,而对评估结果进行博弈分析则是远程火力打击战法设计的关键,用识别正确目标和错误目标能力以及远程火力命中目标能力描述的基于敌后侦察与诱骗博弈的远程火力最优打击战法为Δ*=(0,Δ2*,1-Δ2*)=(0.0000,0.7727,0.2273),被打击方对远程火力打击的最优战法为π*=(π1*,0,1-π1*)=(0.8511,0.0000,0.1489)。 相似文献
55.
Firing multiple artillery rounds from the same location has two main benefits: a high rate of fire at the enemy and improved accuracy as the shooter's aim adjusts to previous rounds. However, firing repeatedly from the same location carries significant risk that the enemy will detect the artillery's location. Therefore, the shooter may periodically move locations to avoid counter‐battery fire. This maneuver is known as the shoot‐and‐scoot tactic. This article analyzes the shoot‐and‐scoot tactic for a time‐critical mission using Markov models. We compute optimal move policies and develop heuristics for more complex and realistic settings. Spending a reasonable amount of time firing multiple shots from the same location is often preferable to moving immediately after firing an initial salvo. Moving frequently reduces risk to the artillery, but also limits the artillery's ability to inflict damage on the enemy. 相似文献
56.
Sylvie Kleinman 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2014,25(4):784-799
Secret French plans to launch guerrilla-style raids on the British Isles devised in the spring of 1796 were referred to as ‘chouanneries’. The name and concept behind these small-war operations were modelled on the irregular tactics used by the Chouan rebels in the Vendée, which the French state army had brutally quashed, but some wished to transfer into their institutional practice. Part of France's ongoing military strategy in the war against Britain, which included fomenting insurrection in Ireland, these irregular operations were to be manned partially by pardoned deserters and released convicts and prisoners of war. Of these, only Tate's brief invasion of Wales in 1797 was realised, but the surviving plans provide insightful historical lessons into an Anglophobic mindset shared by a small network of practitioners and policy deciders on the effectiveness of such shock and awe tactics. Largely motivated by the desire to take revenge for Britain's support of counter-revolutionaries in the Vendée, these plans could more aptly be referred to as counter-‘chouanneries’. 相似文献
57.
Iver Gabrielsen 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2014,25(2):257-283
This article fills a gap in the research on Hezbollah by evaluating their military performance from their formation in 1982 and up till the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war. This study tests the theses that Hezbollah had developed a very strong tactical proficiency in the late 1990s and that there are more similarities in their strategy and tactics during the 2006 war and the 1982–2000 insurgency in Southern Lebanon than previously assumed. Another central theme of this article is how Hezbollah has been constantly adapting and evolving for the duration of its existence. 相似文献
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