COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.     

YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames.     

Japan's plutonium policy: Consequences for nonproliferation

ABSTRACT

What do we mean by nuclear proliferation? What does it mean to proliferate? This article investigates both the literal and figurative meaning of the term “proliferation.” It argues that many of the definitions and conceptualizations of nuclear proliferation often used by scholars are either limited in their utility or logically inconsistent. It then reconceptualizes and redefines the term, incorporating an understanding of both its etymological origins and the geopolitical context in which the phenomenon occurs. It concludes by exploring the potential impact that the politicization of the phenomenon may have on the identification of occurrences of proliferation, from both an academic and a policy-making perspective.     

The “yellow rain” controversy: Lessons for arms control compliance

Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam recently announced that they are launching nuclear energy programs, and Malaysia and the Philippines soon may follow suit. As a result, by 2020, at least three states in Southeast Asia could possess latent nuclear capabilities—the option to pursue military applications of dual-use nuclear technology. Analysis of the nuclear programs, domestic proliferation pressures, and the external threat environment in Southeast Asia leads the authors to conclude that the nuclear intentions of states in that region are entirely peaceful and the probability of future nuclear breakout there is low. However, this finding does not justify complacency. In the long term, the benign outlook for regional security may change, and in the near term weak regulatory regimes present serious challenges to nuclear safety and create opportunities that non-state actors may exploit. To minimize these risks, the authors recommend creating a “proliferation firewall” around the region, which would combine strong global support for Southeast Asian nuclear energy programs with innovative regional multilateral nuclear arrangements.     

基于云理论一二元语义的雷达装备保障指挥效能评估模型

针对云重心和云模型评判方法存在的信息丢失、难于评判以及信息扭曲等问题,从确定权重等级、评价集和评价结果3个方面对模型进行了改进和完善．应用二元语义确定指标权重,避免了评价信息的丢失和扭曲,采用综合云的思想确定评价集,充分利用评价者给出的信息,简化相似云的理论来定量衡量评价结果,从而建立了基于云理论一二元语义的雷达装备保障指挥效能评估模型．     

基于效果的炮兵行动C2系统动力学建模与仿真

一体化联合作战参战军兵种多、指挥控制(C2)与协调复杂。围绕炮兵行动特点要求,运用系统动力学理论建立联合作战炮兵行动指挥控制的系统动力学模型,研究常规打击和基于效果作战两种指挥控制模式下炮兵行动所产生的不同结果及其原因,并给合作战想定仿真验证,得出较为可靠的结论,为解决联合作战炮兵行动精确指挥控制与协调提供一种有效途径     

New Light on the Gold Sword of Major George Wilson

This paper provides new information on the gold sword awarded to Major George Wilson, 39th Regiment of Foot, in 1800 and on the retailer and silversmith, who were commissioned to provide the token.     

可信软件研究

可信软件是近年来软件工程领域研究的热点,装备软件可信性的研究有助于提升我国国防武器装备的作战效能。首先分析了进行装备软件可信相关研究的必要性;然后阐述可信软件技术的研究现状,主要包括软件可信度量和评估、可信软件的构造与验证、可信软件的演化与控制等三个方面;最后分析了研究可信装备软件面临的挑战。     

超低能耗建筑的实践探索——以后勤工程学院绿色建筑示范楼为例

后勤工程学院绿色建筑示范楼是“超低能耗”理论的实践成果。通过理论研究和对当地气候以及建筑能耗的现状分析,综合采用自然通风采光技术、墙体自保温技术、建筑自遮阳设计等被动式节能技术,地源热泵应用、太阳能利用、楼宇智能控制等主动式节能技术,对示范楼进行了设计、建造。经过两年多的使用,各项节能数据的测定表明：示范楼节约能耗75．4％,实现了公共建筑超低能耗的节能要求。     

William and John Pickering and the garniture made for the Prince of Brunswick under their supervision at the Royal ‘Almain’ Armoury at Greenwich, 1610 to 1612

Abstract

The princely garniture ‘commanded’ to be made by Prince Henry Frederick for his cousin, Prince Friedrich Ulrich, later Duke of Brunswick, from the Royal ‘Almain’ Armoury at Greenwich, during the stewardship of the Master Armourer, William Pickering, his son, John, and the men of the Greenwich workshop, is described, illustrated and discussed. Accounts are presented of the lives and work of the Pickerings and the evidence is reviewed for the manufacture of this last decorated garniture of the Greenwich School.