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51.
李雅普诺夫运动稳定性与平衡状态稳定性的关系   总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7  
稳定性是系统分析的重要内容 ,针对在系统稳定性分析中 ,运动稳定性和平衡状态稳定性之间常易于混淆的问题 ,详细分析了两种稳定性之间内在本质联系 ,给出了从一种稳定性过渡到另一种稳定性的方法  相似文献   
52.
In the apparel industry, vendors often suffer from high mismatches in supply and demand. To cope with this problem, they procure the same style product from different suppliers with different manufacturing costs. Especially in the quick response environment, which allows vendors to monitor trends in customer demand and search for available suppliers through the electronic market, they have additional opportunities to improve their decision‐making. In this paper, we propose an analytical profit maximization model and develop efficient decision tools to help both the middle and lower level managers pursuing this strategy. Furthermore, we have shown how significantly the vendors' potential competitive edge can be improved by exploiting multiple supply options, even at the expense of high premium procurement costs for late orders. The effect is critical, especially in a highly competitive market, and it has important implications for the top managers. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003  相似文献   
53.
研究一类易感者和潜伏者都有新增常数输入,疾病具有饱和发生率的SEIS传染病模型.经计算得到模型的基本再生数,证明当基本再生数〉1时,模型只存在惟一的地方病平衡点的结论,并利用特征方程和Hurwitz判据分析地方病平衡点的局部稳定性,通过采用第二加性复合矩阵理论证明地方病平衡点的全局渐近稳定性.  相似文献   
54.
基于动态贝叶斯网的炮兵战斗效果评估建模仿真   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
依据炮兵火力作战的特点规律,分析炮兵战斗效果评估的内容、程序、建模过程和影响因素,运用动态Bayesian网建立炮兵战斗效果评估模型,运用主成分分析方法确定评估专家权重,运用Poly Tree的消息传递算法进行评估网络推理分析,最后结合案例仿真验证。结果表明,该研究解决了情报信息不确定性、模糊性和动态性等影响战斗效果精确评估问题。  相似文献   
55.
    
We study the competition problem of purchase and multiretrieval of perishable seasonal produce, where wholesalers purchase and stock their products in the first period, and then retrieve and sell them in subsequent periods. We first consider the duopoly case and assume that the prices are exogenous and fluctuate. In each period, after the price realization, the wholesalers retrieve some stock from their warehouses to satisfy their demands. One wholesaler's unsatisfied customers can switch to another and be satisfied by its left retrieved products. Any unsold retrieved stock has no salvage value and any unsatisfied demand is lost. The unretrieved stock is carried to the next period at a perishable rate. The wholesalers compete for the substitute demand by determining their own purchase and retrieval quantities. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and that the Nash equilibrium strategy has the simple “sell-down-to” structure. We also consider the general N-person game and show the existence of the Nash equilibrium, and characterize the structure of the equilibrium strategy for the symmetric case. In addition, we consider the case with endogenous prices, and show that the problem reduces to a repeated newsvendor game with price and inventory competition. We derive the conditions under which a unique Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to examine the impacts of the model parameters on the equilibrium outcomes and to generate managerial insights.  相似文献   
56.
针对军事欺骗战法定量分析困难的问题,采用基于贝叶斯统计推断和博弈均衡分析的数学方法,在理论上为解决此难题提供了一种可行的方法.该方法首先定义基本概率矩阵,然后根据贝叶斯原理为交战双方构造用于统计推断的主观概率矩阵,并在由两个主观概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链与实施军事欺骗机会之间建立对应关系,再将此关系推广到基本概率矩阵,即是否存在实施军事欺骗的机会将由基本概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链决定.对理论成果的初步应用表明:通过分析由战场情报信息构成的基本概率矩阵的偏序链,可以科学地运用军事欺骗和反军事欺骗战法.  相似文献   
57.
本文由热力学理论定量指出,只要两相平衡的饱和蒸气比热为负,饱和蒸气经绝热膨胀后成过饱和蒸气,并讨论了饱和蒸气比热为负的条件。  相似文献   
58.
    
In this paper we study a capacity allocation problem for two firms, each of which has a local store and an online store. Customers may shift among the stores upon encountering a stockout. One question facing each firm is how to allocate its finite capacity (i.e., inventory) between its local and online stores. One firm's allocation affects the decision of the rival, thereby creating a strategic interaction. We consider two scenarios of a single‐product single‐period model and derive corresponding existence and stability conditions for a Nash equilibrium. We then conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium solution with respect to price and cost parameters. We also prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a generalized model in which each firm has multiple local stores and a single online store. Finally, we extend the results to a multi‐period model in which each firm decides its total capacity and allocates this capacity between its local and online stores. A myopic solution is derived and shown to be a Nash equilibrium solution of a corresponding “sequential game.” © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006  相似文献   
59.
提出了一种新的分析具有分解形式的高维非线性电路平衡点全局渐近稳定的方法.这种方法以矩阵分解为工具,结合平衡点的渐近稳定判据,用分解矩阵的稳定性决定平衡点的全局渐近稳定性.与目前该问题所采用的LIYAPUNOV直接法相比,该方法具有无须判断平衡点的唯一性,判别方法直接明了等优点.电路维数越大时,此方法越有其优势.同时,该方法对于其他形式的非线性系统的分析,也有重要的启发性及应用价值.  相似文献   
60.
    
A simultaneous non‐zero‐sum game is modeled to extend the classical network interdiction problem. In this model, an interdictor (e.g., an enforcement agent) decides how much of an inspection resource to spend along each arc in the network to capture a smuggler. The smuggler (randomly) selects a commodity to smuggle—a source and destination pair of nodes, and also a corresponding path for traveling between the given pair of nodes. This model is motivated by a terrorist organization that can mobilize its human, financial, or weapon resources to carry out an attack at one of several potential target destinations. The probability of evading each of the network arcs nonlinearly decreases in the amount of resource that the interdictor spends on its inspection. We show that under reasonable assumptions with respect to the evasion probability functions, (approximate) Nash equilibria of this game can be determined in polynomial time; depending on whether the evasion functions are exponential or general logarithmically‐convex functions, exact Nash equilibria or approximate Nash equilibria, respectively, are computed. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 139–153, 2017  相似文献   
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