Equilibrium customer strategies and social–profit maximization in the single‐server constant retrial queue

We consider the single‐server constant retrial queue with a Poisson arrival process and exponential service and retrial times. This system has not waiting space, so the customers that find the server busy are forced to abandon the system, but they can leave their contact details. Hence, after a service completion, the server seeks for a customer among those that have unsuccessfully applied for service but left their contact details, at a constant retrial rate. We assume that the arriving customers that find the server busy decide whether to leave their contact details or to balk based on a natural reward‐cost structure, which incorporates their desire for service as well as their unwillingness to wait. We examine the customers' behavior, and we identify the Nash equilibrium joining strategies. We also study the corresponding social and profit maximization problems. We consider separately the observable case where the customers get informed about the number of customers waiting for service and the unobservable case where they do not receive this information. Several extensions of the model are also discussed. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

高超声速流动计算中LU-SGS隐式算法的应用

在高超声速条件下,对原始LU-SGS格式及其改进方法的收敛速度做了深入的比较分析,目的是进一步更好地将LU-SGS算法用于工程上复杂外形的计算模拟中。二维圆柱,三维钝锥及空天飞机算例的结果表明:对于高超声速粘性流动的计算,粘性项应进行隐式处理;BLU-SGS方法给出的内迭代方式的收敛性优于DP-LUR方法所给出的内迭代方式;LU-SGS算法中雅克比系数矩阵的计算方式对计算量及收敛性影响较大,若采用精确的矩阵形式,则在流动无分离情况下能取得快速收敛的效果,而在含有流动分离的情况,因受稳定性的影响,精确的矩阵形式的收敛表现不及对角近似形式。     

The impact of military spending cutbacks on economic activity in an incentive‐wage two‐sector aggregative economy∗

We examine the theoretical outcomes of disarmament on economic activity in a two‐sector model of endogenous equilibrium unemployment rate. Three main shocks are analyzed: Exogenous cutbacks in military spending on the capital good and employment, and a reduction in public sector debt. The first shock is contractionary for equilibrium employment if the capital‐goods producing sector is relatively labour‐intensive but expansionary under the alternative factor intensity assumption. The second shock is contractionary for employment under either relative factor intensity assumption. If Ricardian equivalence fails, a reduction in public sector debt is likely to expand long‐term employment (JEL E24).     

New maximum entropy methods for modeling lifetime distributions

This article introduces two new maximum entropy (ME) methods for modeling the distribution of time to an event. One method is within the classical ME framework and provides characterizations of change point models such as the piecewise exponential distribution. The second method uses the entropy of the equilibrium distribution (ED) for the objective function and provides new characterizations of the exponential, Weibull, Pareto, and uniform distributions. With the same moment constraints, the classical ME and the maximum ED entropy algorithms generate different models for the interarrival time. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 427–434, 2014     

非对称Colonel Blotto博弈模型下的多信道功率分配抗干扰

针对智能干扰条件下传输速率固定的通信系统多信道功率分配问题,建立了非对称Colonel Blotto博弈模型。在完全信息条件下,推导出了各种功率预算约束下通信方和干扰方的等效单信道最优功率分配策略,进而证明了通信方和干扰方存在唯一混合纳什均衡策略,并求得了纳什均衡收益。基于等效单信道最优功率分布,提出了一种多重扫描直接列元素交换算法,可以快速构建多信道混合功率分配矩阵,且相比于线性规划方法,可适应更多的信道数和更广的功率分布范围。通过数值仿真,验证了所提多信道混合功率分配矩阵构造算法的有效性及多信道功率分配策略的最优性。     

Resource allocation in an asymmetric technology race with temporary advantages

We consider two opponents that compete in developing asymmetric technologies where each party's technology is aimed at damaging (or neutralizing) the other's technology. The situation we consider is different than the classical problem of commercial R&D races in two ways: First, while in commercial R&D races the competitors compete over the control of market share, in our case the competition is about the effectiveness of technologies with respect to certain capabilities. Second, in contrast with the “winner‐takes‐all” assumption that characterizes much of the literature on this field in the commercial world, we assume that the party that wins the race gains a temporary advantage that expires when the other party develops a superior technology. We formulate a variety of models that apply to a one‐sided situation, where one of the two parties has to determine how much to invest in developing a technology to counter another technology employed by the other party. The decision problems are expressed as (convex) nonlinear optimization problems. We present an application that provides some operational insights regarding optimal resource allocation. We also consider a two‐sided situation and develop a Nash equilibrium solution that sets investment values, so that both parties have no incentive to change their investments. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 59: 128–145, 2012     

大区域防空的进化群决策机制研究

大区域防空所涉及的区域广阔,因素众多,其作战计划的制定比较复杂。为解决此问题,提出了一种基于改进德尔菲法的具有进化学习功能的群决策机制,得到了纳什均衡解,使作战方案的制定更加合理,有助于防空作战效能的提高。     

多元先验信息的融合问题

在多元先验信息条件下,运用Bayes理论讨论问题时,必然会遇到先验信息融合问题.文中提出了几种简化形式,并针对产品失效率的多个先验信息情形,结合实例与熵度量的拟合优度说明了该方法的合理性.     

消防管理监督机制新设计

本文探讨了市场经济下的消防管理监督机制的设计,用博弃理论构造了一个消防管理监督模型。提出了新时期消防管理监督应以防火检查和经济惩罚相结合的监管机制。     

Allocation with demand competition: Uniform,proportional, and lexicographic mechanisms

We examine capacity allocation mechanisms in a supply chain comprising a monopolistic supplier and two competing retailers with asymmetric market powers. The supplier allocates limited capacity to retailers according to uniform, proportional, or lexicographic mechanism. We study the impact of these allocation mechanisms on supplier pricing decisions and retailer ordering behavior. With individual order size no greater than supplier capacity, we show that all three mechanisms guarantee equilibrium ordering. We provide precise structures of retailer ordering decisions in Nash and dominant equilibria. Further, we compare the mechanisms from the perspective of the supplier, the retailers, and the supply chain. We show that regardless of whether retailer market powers are symmetric, lexicographic allocation with any priority sequence of retailers is better than the other two mechanisms for the supplier. Further, under lexicographic allocation, the supplier gains more profit by granting higher priority to the retailer with greater market power. We also extend our study to the case with multiple retailers. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 85–107, 2017