改进博弈论的舰载无人机编队协同对海突击目标分配

目标分配问题是UAV自主控制的重要问题。针对舰载无人机编队协同对海突击目标分配问题,首先建立了基于离散动态贝叶斯网络的目标价值评估模型,在此基础上构建了舰载无人机编队的益损值矩阵,设计了舰载无人机编队协同对海突击目标分配的决策函数,提出了一种基于改进博弈论的目标分配方法,为4种不同约束条件下的目标分配问题分别设计了算法。最后对所建立的目标价值评估模型和改进博弈论的目标分配算法进行了实例仿真,仿真结果表明了模型和算法的可行性和有效性。     

The solution to an open problem for a caching game

In a caching game introduced by Alpern et al. (Alpern et al., Lecture notes in computer science (2010) 220–233) a Hider who can dig to a total fixed depth normalized to 1 buries a fixed number of objects among n discrete locations. A Searcher who can dig to a total depth of h searches the locations with the aim of finding all of the hidden objects. If he does so, he wins, otherwise the Hider wins. This zero‐sum game is complicated to analyze even for small values of its parameters, and for the case of 2 hidden objects has been completely solved only when the game is played in up to 3 locations. For some values of h the solution of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations is known, but the solution in the remaining cases was an open question recently highlighted by Fokkink et al. (Fokkink et al., Search theory: A game theoretic perspective (2014) 85–104). Here we solve the remaining cases of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations. We also give some more general results for the game, in particular using a geometrical argument to show that when there are 2 objects hidden in n locations and n→∞, the value of the game is asymptotically equal to h/n for h≥n/2. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 23–31, 2016     

Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016     

基于仿真结果的舰载武备系统试验鉴定方法研究

由于舰载武备系统现场实验效率低、实现困难等现状,提出了仿真结果用于试验鉴定的基本思想。用数学、统计语言对小子样场合下武器装备系统的试验鉴定问题进行了描述,将其"映射"成Bayes统计推断问题,得到了其Bayes统计推断数学仿真模型。经实例分析研究,与传统方法相比较,该方法提高了舰载武备系统试验鉴定水平,缩短了试验周期,有效保障了武器装备系统的作战使用。     

论寓教于乐的教学理念与设计

“寓教于乐”是一种理想的教育教学目标,也是大学教学改革的重点,教育游戏的出现为教学拓宽了道路,实践着“寓教于乐”的理念。通过参阅大量文献资料,对教育游戏的概念与现状进行了阐述,并提出了教育游戏的设计理念与策略,为教育游戏的设计提供指导和帮助。     

Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks

The inspection game is a two-player noncooperative game that models a situation where an inspector verifies whether the inspectee complies with the rules (on the assumption that the inspectee has the tendency to violate at least one of the rules). The usual approach in the analysis of this game seeks to find an optimal strategic inspection scheme for each of the two players yielding favorable payoffs. Recently, there have been some developments in the study of such games that use a mathematical structure known as reaction network involving a set of molecular species and the existing reactions among these species. In this paper, we use a reaction network to analyze the inspection game giving an alternative way of modeling the social situation. The molecular species play the role of the players' decision moves and their resulting gain or loss, while the reactions are the encounters of the decisions of the players which, as expected, yield payoffs. We reexamine the dynamics of the inspection game through the lens of reaction network theory and consider various situations that call for more detailed analyses such as equal or unequal reaction rates and inspection leadership. Conditions concerning reaction rates, initial population of decision species, benefits, and costs are determined in order to identify strategies that yield better payoffs both for the inspector and inspectee. These results illustrate practical insights rooted from the formulated simple game models.     

Technical note: Characterization of binomial semivalues through delegation games

Semivalues are allocation rules for cooperative games that assign to each player in a given game a weighted sum of his marginal contributions to all coalitions he belongs to, where the weighting coefficients depend only on the coalition size. Binomial semivalues are a special class of semivalues whose weighting coefficients are obtained by means of a unique parameter. In particular, the Banzhaf value is a binomial semivalue. In this article, we provide an axiomatic characterization for each binomial semivalue. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

装备采购中的信息不对称问题及其对策研究

装备采购中存在着严重的信息不对称,减少装备采购中的信息不对称问题是一项重要的工作,在介绍装备采购中非对称信息的基础上,运用博弈论的数学工具建立起装备采购中非对称信息博弈的模型图,并给出了减少非对称信息问题的博弈模型,提高了装备采购的效益.     

多元先验信息的融合问题

在多元先验信息条件下,运用Bayes理论讨论问题时,必然会遇到先验信息融合问题.文中提出了几种简化形式,并针对产品失效率的多个先验信息情形,结合实例与熵度量的拟合优度说明了该方法的合理性.