论寓教于乐的教学理念与设计

“寓教于乐”是一种理想的教育教学目标,也是大学教学改革的重点,教育游戏的出现为教学拓宽了道路,实践着“寓教于乐”的理念。通过参阅大量文献资料,对教育游戏的概念与现状进行了阐述,并提出了教育游戏的设计理念与策略,为教育游戏的设计提供指导和帮助。     

Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.     

Purchase and retrieval competition for seasonal produce

We study the competition problem of purchase and multiretrieval of perishable seasonal produce, where wholesalers purchase and stock their products in the first period, and then retrieve and sell them in subsequent periods. We first consider the duopoly case and assume that the prices are exogenous and fluctuate. In each period, after the price realization, the wholesalers retrieve some stock from their warehouses to satisfy their demands. One wholesaler's unsatisfied customers can switch to another and be satisfied by its left retrieved products. Any unsold retrieved stock has no salvage value and any unsatisfied demand is lost. The unretrieved stock is carried to the next period at a perishable rate. The wholesalers compete for the substitute demand by determining their own purchase and retrieval quantities. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and that the Nash equilibrium strategy has the simple “sell-down-to” structure. We also consider the general N-person game and show the existence of the Nash equilibrium, and characterize the structure of the equilibrium strategy for the symmetric case. In addition, we consider the case with endogenous prices, and show that the problem reduces to a repeated newsvendor game with price and inventory competition. We derive the conditions under which a unique Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to examine the impacts of the model parameters on the equilibrium outcomes and to generate managerial insights.     

军事物流服务商准入标准设置和甄选研究综述

军事物流服务商甄选研究是新军事变革下供应商管理发展的重要方向,是有效完成后勤保障任务、顺利实施作战行动的重要保证。基于此,本文从供应商关系理论和发展、物流服务商指标体系选择以及结合其他方法对物流服务商甄选三个方面对国内外研究现状进行总结概述,对整个军事物流服务商的选择过程加以研究,将其科学客观地运用于军事物流服务商选择的实际操作中,对于加强军事物流服务商需求管理、提高选择质效以及优化工作流程具有重大意义。同时,分析现有研究成果的不足,并对其未来发展前景提出展望,针对性地提出了军事物流服务商初步准入标准以及后续复选的方法,为军事物流服务商选择体系的完善提供参考。     

航天器轨道追逃态势分析的水平集方法

航天器轨道追逃是当前航天动力学与控制领域的研究热点。针对轨道追逃定性问题开展研究,提出了一种综合运用降维动力学模型和后向可达集的航天器近距离轨道追逃态势分析方法,以支撑任务可行性分析;通过在视线旋转坐标系下推导博弈系统降维动力学模型,建立近距离追逃定性问题模型,减少了状态空间维度;使用目标集的后向可达集描述捕获区并划分追逃状态空间,基于水平集方法建立可达集在降维动力学模型中演化的动态HJI(Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs)偏微分方程,并设计WENO-TVD求解器数值计算HJI方程终值问题粘性解,完成了追逃目标集的准确描述并避免了可能出现的终端奇异现象。通过不同推力构型的追逃场景数值仿真验证了方法的有效性,展现了一次计算批量化处理初始态势的功能。     

多目标模糊微分对策

多目标问题是微分对策研究的一个重要而困难的方面.多目标微分对策是动态向量对策,结合了多目标规划与动态对策,扩大了微分对策在分析冲突问题时解决问题的范围,多具有非线性和不确定性特点.为避免非线性带来求解上的困难和处理不确定信息等,基于T-S模糊微分对策思想,构造出多目标微分对策的模糊线性化模型,然后在模糊线性多目标微分对策系统下对控制器的设计方法作出探讨.对一个1∶2对策问题做了仿真,其效果说明了解决问题方法的可行.     

Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks

The inspection game is a two-player noncooperative game that models a situation where an inspector verifies whether the inspectee complies with the rules (on the assumption that the inspectee has the tendency to violate at least one of the rules). The usual approach in the analysis of this game seeks to find an optimal strategic inspection scheme for each of the two players yielding favorable payoffs. Recently, there have been some developments in the study of such games that use a mathematical structure known as reaction network involving a set of molecular species and the existing reactions among these species. In this paper, we use a reaction network to analyze the inspection game giving an alternative way of modeling the social situation. The molecular species play the role of the players' decision moves and their resulting gain or loss, while the reactions are the encounters of the decisions of the players which, as expected, yield payoffs. We reexamine the dynamics of the inspection game through the lens of reaction network theory and consider various situations that call for more detailed analyses such as equal or unequal reaction rates and inspection leadership. Conditions concerning reaction rates, initial population of decision species, benefits, and costs are determined in order to identify strategies that yield better payoffs both for the inspector and inspectee. These results illustrate practical insights rooted from the formulated simple game models.     

Some implications of pricing bundles

In this article, we consider a problem in which two suppliers can sell their respective products both individually and together as a bundle, and study the impact of bundle pricing. Four pricing models (centralized, decentralized, coop–comp, and comp–coop) are analyzed with regard to the competition formats and sequences. As one would expect, the firms are always better off when pricing decisions are centralized. However, rather surprisingly, we find that firms may be worse off if the bundle prices are set in a cooperative way; we provide analytical characterization of those instances. Numerical studies show that these insights also hold for some nonlinear demand. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

公安边防部队缉毒斗争中的博弈分析

当前,我国毒品犯罪活动呈现出集团化、隐秘化、有组织化和跨国化等复杂特征,境内外社会环境、贩毒集团和执法者之间存在着彼此交错的关系,使得公安边防部队缉毒斗争面临着严峻的形势和挑战。在整合多位学者的理论观点和现实研究基础之上,基于博弈论的成熟理论,紧密结合公安边防部队缉毒斗争实际,构建了公安边防部队与贩毒集团之间的博弈模型,并对其进行深入分析,从微观角度为公安边防部队缉毒斗争实际提供有效参考和决策依据。     

联合作战中作战单元决策演化博弈研究

利用演化博弈理论,探讨了联合作战中担负相同作战任务的作战单元间其策略选择根据利益变化的演化过程,建立了复制动态方程并求得平衡点解,通过复制动态的相位图直观反映了博弈的演化稳定策略,并通过Malab软件对作战单元策略选择与收益关系进行了仿真,其行为选择的演化结果与相位图展示具有一致性。研究结论表明,收益大小及变化是作战单元策略改变的重要依据,最后针对提高作战单元间的策略稳定性提出对策建议.