多捐赠者肾脏调换问题

用于器官移植的肾脏处于严重的短缺状态。为缓解这一问题,越来越多的国家开始实施各种形式的肾脏调换计划。肾脏调换问题一般被建模为一个合作博弈(KE)。其中的局中人为病人及与其配型失败的捐赠者所构成的二元组。现实中不乏拥有多个配型失败捐赠者的病人。定义了多捐赠者肾脏调换博弈(MDKE),分析了其可行解及稳定解的结构,证明了捐赠多颗肾脏无益于参与稳定调换,将TTC算法、KE稳定解的NP难解性以及最大覆盖稳定解的不可近似性拓展到MDKE。实验表明引入MDKE效果显著。     

基于凸优化理论的三维微分对策制导规律求解

针对三维微分对策制导律(DGL)求解问题,引入凸优化理论,将DGL求解归结到Hamilton系统的求解,设计了DGL求解算法,通过对代价函数梯度特征的凸分析,推导出对策系统鞍点存在的充要条件和求解方法,解决了以往通过对微分对策模型简化求解导致的模型不能客观反映作战过程的问题.     

Discrete search allocation game with false contacts

This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

基于时空序贯融合的TBM拦截效果评估

基于时空信息进行了TBM拦截效果评估的研究。首先分析了拦截效果评估信息的特征,建立了TBM拦截效果评估流程;在此基础上提出了基于"空间特征级-时间决策级"思想的序贯融合评估模型;融合评估算法中,空间域选取模糊神经网络进行特征级融合,时间域选取D-S证据理论完成决策级融合,空间特征级融合模糊神经网络的各层映射函数分别由模糊隶属函数和采用贝叶斯网络的方法来获取;最后通过实验仿真了评估流程,验证了融合评估模型及融合算法的有效性。     

基于博弈论和灰色关联分析的雷达抗干扰评估

首先,将基于博弈论的组合权重确定方法引入到雷达抗干扰评估指标的权重确定之中,克服了单一方法确定权重的片面性。然后,介绍了灰色关联分析,对确定指标权重后的雷达抗干扰能力进行了综合评估。最后,利用所建方法对国外7部雷达的抗干扰能力进行排序,验证了模型的正确性。     

New results on a stochastic duel game with each force consisting of heterogeneous units

Two forces engage in a duel, with each force initially consisting of several heterogeneous units. Each unit can be assigned to fire at any opposing unit, but the kill rate depends on the assignment. As the duel proceeds, each force—knowing which units are still alive in real time—decides dynamically how to assign its fire, in order to maximize the probability of wiping out the opposing force before getting wiped out. It has been shown in the literature that an optimal pure strategy exists for this two‐person zero‐sum game, but computing the optimal strategy remained cumbersome because of the game's huge payoff matrix. This article gives an iterative algorithm to compute the optimal strategy without having to enumerate the entire payoff matrix, and offers some insights into the special case, where one force has only one unit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 56–65, 2014     

A nonatomic‐game model for timing clearance sales under competition

We deal with dynamic revenue management (RM) under competition using the nonatomic‐game approach. Here, a continuum of heterogeneous sellers try to sell the same product over a given time horizon. Each seller can lower his price once at the time of his own choosing, and faces Poisson demand arrival with a rate that is the product of a price‐sensitive term and a market‐dependent term. Different types of sellers interact, and their respective prices help shape the overall market in which they operate, thereby influencing the behavior of all sellers. Using the infinite‐seller approximation, which deprives any individual seller of his influence over the entire market, we show the existence of a certain pattern of seller behaviors that collectively produce an environment to which the behavior pattern forms a best response. Such equilibrium behaviors point to the suitability of threshold‐like pricing policies. Our computational study yields insights to RM under competition, such as profound ways in which consumer and competitor types influence seller behaviors and market conditions. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 365–385, 2014     

军事通信领域上下文本体建模及不确定性推理＊

为支持军事通信业务的智能化,研究了军事通信业务上下文信息的表示和推理,提出了一种表示业务上下文信息的语法结构、语义以及上下文元信息的本体建模方法。并利用贝叶斯网络理论,提出了一种支持不确定性推理的业务上下文认知模型的构建方法,最后通过案例分析验证了模型和结论的合理性。     

基于动态贝叶斯网的炮兵战斗效果评估建模仿真

依据炮兵火力作战的特点规律,分析炮兵战斗效果评估的内容、程序、建模过程和影响因素,运用动态Bayesian网建立炮兵战斗效果评估模型,运用主成分分析方法确定评估专家权重,运用Poly Tree的消息传递算法进行评估网络推理分析,最后结合案例仿真验证。结果表明,该研究解决了情报信息不确定性、模糊性和动态性等影响战斗效果精确评估问题。     

Inventory pooling games for expensive,low‐demand spare parts

We consider several independent decision makers who stock expensive, low‐demand spare parts for their high‐tech machines. They can collaborate by full pooling of their inventories via free transshipments. We examine the stability of such pooling arrangements, and we address the issue of fairly distributing the collective holding and downtime costs over the participants, by applying concepts from cooperative game theory. We consider two settings: one where each party maintains a predetermined stocking level and one where base stock levels are optimized. For the setting with fixed stocking levels, we unravel the possibly conflicting effects of implementing a full pooling arrangement and study these effects separately to establish intuitive conditions for existence of a stable cost allocation. For the setting with optimized stocking levels, we provide a simple proportional rule that accomplishes a population monotonic allocation scheme if downtime costs are symmetric among participants. Although our whole analysis is motivated by spare parts applications, all results are also applicable to other pooled resource systems of which the steady‐state behavior is equivalent to that of an Erlang loss system. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012