Quality risk in outsourcing: Noncontractible product quality and private quality cost information

This article addresses the concept of quality risk in outsourcing. Recent trends in outsourcing extend a contract manufacturer's (CM's) responsibility to several functional areas, such as research and development and design in addition to manufacturing. This trend enables an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to focus on sales and pricing of its product. However, increasing CM responsibilities also suggest that the OEM's product quality is mainly determined by its CM. We identify two factors that cause quality risk in this outsourcing relationship. First, the CM and the OEM may not be able to contract on quality; second, the OEM may not know the cost of quality to the CM. We characterize the effects of these two quality risk factors on the firms' profits and on the resulting product quality. We determine how the OEM's pricing strategy affects quality risk. We show, for example, that the effect of noncontractible quality is higher than the effect of private quality cost information when the OEM sets the sales price after observing the product's quality. We also show that committing to a sales price mitigates the adverse effect of quality risk. To obtain these results, we develop and analyze a three‐stage decision model. This model is also used to understand the impact of recent information technologies on profits and product quality. For example, we provide a decision tree that an OEM can use in deciding whether to invest in an enterprise‐wide quality management system that enables accounting of quality‐related activities across the supply chain. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

A two‐echelon inventory‐location problem with service considerations

We study the problem of designing a two‐echelon spare parts inventory system consisting of a central plant and a number of service centers each serving a set of customers with stochastic demand. Processing and storage capacities at both levels of facilities are limited. The manufacturing process is modeled as a queuing system at the plant. The goal is to optimize the base‐stock levels at both echelons, the location of service centers, and the allocation of customers to centers simultaneously, subject to service constraints. A mixed integer nonlinear programming model (MINLP) is formulated to minimize the total expected cost of the system. The problem is NP‐hard and a Lagrangian heuristic is proposed. We present computational results and discuss the trade‐off between cost and service. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

To wait or not to wait: Optimal ordering under lead time uncertainty and forecast updating

There has been a dramatic increase over the past decade in the number of firms that source finished product from overseas. Although this has reduced procurement costs, it has increased supply risk; procurement lead times are longer and are often unreliable. In deciding when and how much to order, firms must consider the lead time risk and the demand risk, i.e., the accuracy of their demand forecast. To improve the accuracy of its demand forecast, a firm may update its forecast as the selling season approaches. In this article we consider both forecast updating and lead time uncertainty. We characterize the firm's optimal procurement policy, and we prove that, with multiplicative forecast revisions, the firm's optimal procurement time is independent of the demand forecast evolution but that the optimal procurement quantity is not. This leads to a number of important managerial insights into the firm's planning process. We show that the firm becomes less sensitive to lead time variability as the forecast updating process becomes more efficient. Interestingly, a forecast‐updating firm might procure earlier than a firm with no forecast updating. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

金属风暴武器系统反导命中模型研究

根据金属风暴武器系统具有多管同时发射和超高射速的特点,从弹幕射击入手,建立了金属风暴武器系统反导射击毁伤的数学仿真模型。对研究金属风暴的作战效能研究具有重要意义。     

基于风险控制的装备供应链网络设计模型

针对风险管理中的装备供应链正向（供应）网络设计问题,在对装备供应链风险和成本进行量化分析的基础上,综合考虑风险和成本2方面因素,建立了基于风险控制的装备供应链网络设计优化模型。并设计了遗传算法对模型进行求解,给出在指定风险水平下最优设计方案与总成本。最后通过实例分析和计算,结果表明,该优化模型合理、有效、可行。     

Optimal capacity in a coordinated supply chain

We consider a supply chain in which a retailer faces a stochastic demand, incurs backorder and inventory holding costs and uses a periodic review system to place orders from a manufacturer. The manufacturer must fill the entire order. The manufacturer incurs costs of overtime and undertime if the order deviates from the planned production capacity. We determine the optimal capacity for the manufacturer in case there is no coordination with the retailer as well as in case there is full coordination with the retailer. When there is no coordination the optimal capacity for the manufacturer is found by solving a newsvendor problem. When there is coordination, we present a dynamic programming formulation and establish that the optimal ordering policy for the retailer is characterized by two parameters. The optimal coordinated capacity for the manufacturer can then be obtained by solving a nonlinear programming problem. We present an efficient exact algorithm and a heuristic algorithm for computing the manufacturer's capacity. We discuss the impact of coordination on the supply chain cost as well as on the manufacturer's capacity. We also identify the situations in which coordination is most beneficial. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Competing with channel partners: Supply chain conflict when retailers introduce store brands

Private‐label products are of increasing importance in many retail categories. While national‐brand products are designed by the manufacturer and sold by the retailer, the positioning of store‐brand products is under the complete control of the retailer. We consider a scenario where products differ on a performance quality dimension and we analyze how retailer–manufacturer interactions in product positioning are affected by the introduction of a private‐label product. Specifically, we consider a national‐brand manufacturer who determines the quality of its product as well the product's wholesale price charged to the retailer. Given the national‐brand quality and wholesale price, the retailer then decides the quality level of its store brand and sets the retail prices for both products. We find that a manufacturer can derive substantial benefits from considering a retailer's store‐brand introduction when determining the national brand's quality and wholesale price. If the retailer has a significant cost disadvantage in producing high‐quality products, the manufacturer does not need to adjust the quality of the national‐brand product, but he should offer a wholesale price discount to ensure its distribution through the retailer. If the retailer is competitive in providing products of high‐quality, the manufacturer should reduce this wholesale price discount and increase the national‐brand quality to mitigate competition. Interestingly, we find the retailer has incentive to announce a store‐brand introduction to induce the manufacturer's consideration of these plans in determining the national‐brand product quality and wholesale price. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

模拟体系对抗价值链的网络同步模型

描述战斗毁伤"规模效应"的Lanchester模型默认作战体系内部是"完美的"。本文扬弃此假设,首次从作战体系内部"共识"涌现的视角提出了一个模拟体系对抗价值链的网络"同步效应"模型,研究了战场变化、个体/群体认知、自同步与对抗均衡等概念的网络拓扑和权值演化形式,并发现在对抗均衡条件下无标度网络具有"同步脆弱性"。     

新体制下战场柔性后勤保障网链建设

为满足新体制下联合作战后勤保障需求,本文采用系统分析方法,针对战场后勤保障力量体系构建,提出以联勤保障部队为主体,构建一体化后勤保障网链。针对后勤保障网链保障能力的可变性,提出提升后勤保障网链柔性建设运用的方法措施。     

Excess procurement strategies by a dominant buyer under constrained supply

Supply chains are often characterized by the presence of a dominant buyer purchasing from a supplier with limited capacity. We study such a situation where a single supplier sells capacity to an established and more powerful buyer and also to a relatively less powerful buyer. The more powerful buyer enjoys the first right to book her capacity requirements at supplier's end, and then the common supplier fulfills the requirement of the less powerful buyer. We find that when the supplier's capacity is either too low (below the lower threshold) or too high (above the higher threshold), there is no excess procurement as compared to the case when supplier has infinite capacity. When the supplier's capacity is between these two thresholds, the more powerful buyer purchases an excess amount in comparison to the infinite capacity case.