A facility reliability problem: Formulation,properties, and algorithm

Having a robustly designed supply chain network is one of the most effective ways to hedge against network disruptions because contingency plans in the event of a disruption are often significantly limited. In this article, we study the facility reliability problem: how to design a reliable supply chain network in the presence of random facility disruptions with the option of hardening selected facilities. We consider a facility location problem incorporating two types of facilities, one that is unreliable and another that is reliable (which is not subject to disruption, but is more expensive). We formulate this as a mixed integer programming model and develop a Lagrangian Relaxation‐based solution algorithm. We derive structural properties of the problem and show that for some values of the disruption probability, the problem reduces to the classical uncapacitated fixed charge location problem. In addition, we show that the proposed solution algorithm is not only capable of solving large‐scale problems, but is also computationally effective. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Optimal operating policies in a commodity trading market with the manufacturer's presence

With the help of the Internet and express delivery at relatively low costs, trading markets have become increasingly popular as a venue to sell excess inventory and a source to obtain products at lower prices. In this article, we study the operational decisions in the presence of a trading market in a periodic‐review, finite‐horizon setting. Prices in the trading market change periodically and are determined endogenously by the demand and supply in the market. We characterize the retailers'optimal ordering and trading policies when the original manufacturer and the trading market co‐exist and retailers face fees to participate in the trading market. Comparing with the case with no trading fees, we obtain insights into the impact of trading fees and the fee structure on the retailers and the manufacturer. Further, we find that by continually staying in the market, the manufacturer may use her pricing strategies to counter‐balance the negative impact of the trading market on her profit. Finally, we extend the model to the case when retailers dynamically update their demand distribution based on demand observations in previous periods. A numerical study provides additional insights into the impact of demand updating in a trading market with the manufacturer's competition. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

一种新的CLEFIA多字节差分故障分析方法

阐述了CLEFIA分组密码算法及故障分析原理,根据在CLEFIA密码第r轮与第（r-2）轮注入多字节故障,提出了一种新改进的针对CLEFIA的多字节故障模型及分析方法,并通过软件仿真实验进行了验证。结果表明,CLEFIA算法的Feistel结构和差分S盒特性使其易遭受多字节故障攻击,而改进算法使得密钥的恢复效率大大提高。     

军事供应链不确定性产生机理研究

军事供应链中不可避免地存在不确定性。构建了军事供应链不确定性产生机理的概念模型,从需求、供应、环境三个方面分析了军事供应链不确定性产生的原因,同时,对军事供应链中可能存在的各种不确定性进行了讨论,明确了加剧不确定性影响的因素是军事供应链系统的复杂性。具体表现为军事供应链成员交互关系的复杂性和军事供应链网络结构的复杂性。提出正是由于这两个原因的存在,对军事供应链的保障性能产生了巨大的影响。     

Strategic dynamic sourcing from competing suppliers with transferable capacity investment

We study the supplier relationship choice for a buyer that invests in transferable capacity operated by a supplier. With a long‐term relationship, the buyer commits to source from a supplier over a long period of time. With a short‐term relationship, the buyer leaves open the option of switching to a new supplier in the future. The buyer has incomplete information about a supplies efficiency, and thus uses auctions to select suppliers and determine the contracts. In addition, the buyer faces uncertain demand for the product. A long‐term relationship may be beneficial for the buyer because it motivates more aggressive bidding at the beginning, resulting a lower initial price. A short‐term relationship may be advantageous because it allows switching, with capacity transfer at some cost, to a more efficient supplier in the future. We find that there exists a critical level of the switching cost above which a long‐term relationship is better for the buyer than a short‐term relationship. In addition, this critical switching cost decreases with demand uncertainty, implying a long‐term relationship is more favorable for a buyer facing volatile demand. Finally, we find that in a long‐term relationship, capacity can be either higher or lower than in a short‐term relationship. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

An integrated electric power supply chain and fuel market network framework: Theoretical modeling with empirical analysis for New England

In this article, we develop a novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the economic network transactions in energy supply markets and the physical network transmission constraints in the electric power network. The theoretical derivation and analysis are done using the theory of variational inequalities. We then apply the model to a specific case, the New England electric power supply chain, consisting of six states, five fuel types, 82 power generators, with a total of 573 generating units, and 10 demand market regions. The empirical case study demonstrates that the regional electric power prices simulated by our model match the actual electricity prices in New England very well. We also compute the electric power prices and the spark spread, an important measure of the power plant profitability, under natural gas and oil price variations. The empirical examples illustrate that in New England, the market/grid‐level fuel competition has become the major factor that affects the influence of the oil price on the natural gas price. Finally, we utilize the model to quantitatively investigate how changes in the demand for electricity influence the electric power and the fuel markets from a regional perspective. The theoretical model can be applied to other regions and multiple electricity markets under deregulation to quantify the interactions in electric power/energy supply chains and their effects on flows and prices. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

区块链在分队战术协同中的应用构想

从战术分队角度出发,探讨了区块链技术在作战实体之间的信息交互及智能协同方面的应用设想,分析了战术分队信息交互的相关技术及面临的挑战,阐述了区块链在未来战术分队指挥体系构建中的发展构想。     

舰炮武器系统对大目标跟踪精度评估修正方法

随着技术的发展,舰炮武器系统的精度水平越来越高.在真实目标环境下一些影响系统精度评估的因素必须加以考虑,将具有相当外形尺度的目标作为点目标考虑势必带来系统精度评估的误差.针对大尺度目标,在目标坐标系下建立了目标外形尺度模型.利用目标坐标系和瞄准线坐标系之间的坐标变换,得到目标外形尺度在瞄准线法面上的描述,据此提出了一种大目标瞄准精度评估修正的计算方法.