增强公安边防部队基层思想政治教育实效性的思考

为了贯彻和落实《中国人民解放军政治工作条例》和《中国人民解放军思想政治教育大纲》,进一步探索坚持用科学理论指导思想政治教育工作、树立思想政治教育的科学理念、充实和丰富思想政治教育的内容、创新思想政治教育的形式方法,对于增强公安边防部队基层思想政治教育的实效性具有重要意义。     

论诱惑侦查在边防刑事案件中的具体运用

诱惑侦查作为一种有效的侦查手段,在边防案件侦查中被广泛使用。但如何对诱惑侦查作一个准确的定位,如何在边防实践中正确地运用诱惑侦查,仍然有重要的研究价值。     

谈消防部队会计监督职能的发挥

全国消防部队先后在各级建立了财务集中核算中心,按照统一的财务规章制度对本级及其所属单位一切经费进行集中核算、集中监管。但是,现行核算中心会计监督职能的发挥仍存在一些不足,文章对此进行了分析。并提出强化消防部队会计监督职能的建议。     

航母编队航渡过程中预警机阵位确定方法研究

提供了一种航母编队航渡过程中预警机的阵位确定方法。通过对航母编队防空区域划分与防空作战过程的分析,总结了航母编队航渡过程中预警机阵位确定的原则,建立了预警机阵位的数学模型,仿真计算了模型中各个参数对预警机前出距离的影响。这些模型可用于确定预警机的前出距离、方位和高度,满足航母编队作战使用的需要。     

伊犁地区边境线区域义务教育调研报告

边境线区域义务教育的发展是提高人民整体素质、提升边境地区劳动力素质和人力资本质量的一项重要工程,课题组考察了伊犁地区边境线区域义务教育发展的现状,总结了其取得的成绩,并进一步分析其发展中存在的问题,为今后工作的发展提出了建议。     

Peace-building or structural violence? Deconstructing the aftermath of Nigeria/Cameroon boundary demarcation

ABSTRACT

There is a great conviction that the International Court of Justice’s ruling in 2002 on the Bakassi boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon, and Nigeria’s decision to obey the ruling may have stopped a fierce inter-state war over the boundary. Indeed, many then ascribed to the whole boundary demarcation process as peacebuilding, disregarding the structural changes marked by the violence of forced migration. This article explores how the boundary delimitation has produced particular sorts of structural violence characterised by state neglect, loss of livelihoods and destitution. Thus, the article argues that although a full-blown war was avoided, the socio-economic conditions of the Nigerian populations on both sides of the border were not adequately considered and guaranteed as part of the peace-building agenda. It further argues that Nigeria, like many post-colonial states with the concentration of developments in major cities, neglects rural and border communities. Thus, the border communities accommodating the former Bakassi residents have further degenerated into ‘ill-governed’ spaces. This article uses structural violence as a framework to analyse the primary and secondary data to provide some deeper insights into the issues of violence being experienced by the local populations living on both sides of the demarcated border.     

Peacekeeping and civil–military relations in Uruguay

ABSTRACT

There have been over 90,000 UN peacekeepers deployed around the world to 78 peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in over 125 countries since 1948. Some scholars have made the case that these missions have had a positive impact on the relationship between the military and the civilians they work for. However, other scholars have identified a negative impact on civil military relations (CMR). This paper contributes to this debate by investigating how peacekeeping has impacted civil-military relations in Latin America's most prolific contributor to peacekeeping: Uruguay. This paper finds that PKOs in Uruguay have facilitated post-transitions attempts by civilians to build first-generation control, but not second-generation control. Further, PKOs have marginally improved military effectiveness, but we find that they do not improve societal trust in the armed forces.     

The U.S. Navy's task forces: 1–199

ABSTRACT

Grouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces than the previous single-type-of-warship formations. This system has evolved and spread to naval forces ashore but remains fundamentally unchanged. It now covers numbers between 1 to over 1000, of which the most prominent is the first 100 or so which U.S. Navy combat forces use. The numbered fleets worldwide utilize the series covering 20-79; 1-19 and 90-99 appear to be reserved for special allocations and Commander, Pacific Fleet; numbers over 80 to the Atlantic; 100-119 for Northern Europe and briefly Tenth Fleet; the 120 series for Second Fleet as a Joint Task Force leader; the 150 series for Naval Forces Central Command; and the 180 series for Atlantic Fleet and now-Fleet Forces Command.     

Are the Baltic States and NATO on the right path in deterring Russia in the Baltic?

ABSTRACT

The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia.