传感器网络在网络中心战中的应用

介绍了传感器网络对比于分立式传感器的优势所在,指出传感器网络通过多点数据融合及任务指派的方法加强传感器网络在监视和跟踪空中目标、地面活动目标、以及特殊目标(如联合战区防空反导、目标战损估计)中的应用。提出了传感器网络应该解决的几个具体问题;包括节点选择与优化部署方面的组建原则、任务指派方面的注意事项、资源管理的目标要求、异构资源信息共享的四种解决方法、以及网络安全(关于网络本身的健壮性以及数据的安全性)等方面的问题和解决方法。     

一种防空导弹无线分布式信息共享系统

以PCI04嵌入式工控机为核心设计主控单元,以嵌入式单片机为核心设计从属单元,并应用GPS OEM接收板、AMAI)4550无线通信模块等,构建无线主从分布式信息共享系统.在该系统的支持下,大型防空导弹武器系统和若十便携式防空导弹间可以进行信息共享和交互,集成为一个以大型防空导弹武器系统为中心的防空作战体系,通过优势互补和邯同作战,能够实现作战效能的倍增.     

The incentive effect of acceptance sampling plans in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This article studies a firm that procures a product from a supplier. The quality of each product unit is measured by a continuous variable that follows a normal distribution and is correlated within a batch. The firm conducts an inspection and pays the supplier only if the product batch passes the inspection. The inspection not only serves the purpose of preventing a bad batch from reaching customers but also offers the supplier an incentive to improve product quality. The firm determines the acceptance sampling plan, and the supplier determines the quality effort level in either a simultaneous game or a Stackelberg leadership game, in which both parties share inspection cost and recall loss caused by low product quality. In the simultaneous game, we identify the Nash equilibrium form, provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and find parameter settings under which the decentralized and centralized supply chains achieve the same outcome. By numerical experiments, we show that the firm's acceptance sampling plan and the supplier's quality effort level are sensitive to both the recall loss sharing ratio and the game format (i.e., the precommitment assumption of the inspection policy). © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Pool it,share it,or lose it: an economical view on pooling and sharing of European military capabilities

In a general and economical view, this article analyzes methods and mechanisms for the pooling and sharing of military forces and weapons inside the European Union (EU) in times of scarcity. Pooling and sharing could improve the EU military capabilities significantly if differences in location factors were taken into account and all states would focus on their respective strengths. More competition and less concentration are the keys to ensuring guaranteed access to military assets. Pooling and sharing are likely to be successful only if large states enhance their emphasis on collective defense by mutual aid and self-help, and reduce particularistic and parochial interests of local gain. The realm of personnel has the most potential for improvement but any change is likely to generate policy implications.     

UK firms’ experience and perceptions of defence offsets: Survey results 1

Offsets are a growing feature of international trade in defence equipment. This article assesses the economics of offsets and outlines UK offsets policy. There is a lack of empirical work in the field and the article presents the results of a survey of UK firms’ experience of their involvement in offsets against UK imports of defence equipment. There is also a case study of the AWACS offset programme and an evaluation of policy implications.     

基于秘密共享的卫星网络组密钥管理方案

针对卫星网络组密钥管理的重要性,提出了一个可认证的基于门限秘密共享的组密钥管理方案．结合卫星网络的动态拓扑结构特点,将地面站作为组成员的身份注册中心,以实现对组成员的身份认证,确保节点的合法性．为了提高组密钥的生成效率,选取≠一1颗可见时间长的卫星构建组密钥份额分发中心,降低了组密钥联合生成过程中的通信量．组密钥协商无需安全信道,节省了系统资源．安全性及性能分析表明,该方案不仅具有较强的安全性,而且还具有计算和通信量小的优点．参数分析表明,门限值k与组密钥更新周期T是影响方案安全性的2个重要因子．     

Should firms conceal information when dealing with common suppliers?

A firm making quantity decision under uncertainty loses profit if its private information is leaked to competitors. Outsourcing increases this risk as a third party supplier may leak information for its own benefit. The firm may choose to conceal information from the competitors by entering in a confidentiality agreement with the supplier. This, however, diminishes the firm's ability to dampen competition by signaling a higher quantity commitment. We examine this trade‐off in a stylized supply chain in which two firms, endowed with private demand information, order sequentially from a common supplier, and engage in differentiated quantity competition. In our model, the supplier can set different wholesale prices for firms, and the second‐mover firm could be better informed. Contrary to what is expected, information concealment is not always beneficial to the first mover. We characterize conditions under which the first mover firm will not prefer concealing information. We show that this depends on the relative informativeness of the second mover and is moderated by competition intensity. We examine the supplier's incentive in participating in information concealment, and develop a contract that enables it for wider set of parameter values. We extend our analysis to examine firms' incentive to improve information. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:1–15, 2015     

应急器材柔性采购定价建模与求解

由于当前应急器材储备依然存在“多储”或“少储”风险,为提高储备效益,以企业经济效益与军队采购成本为优化目标,提出了应急器材柔性采购策略。通过建立企业储备策略与军队采购定价最优化模型,求解得到了在不同战争爆发概率及器材现货市场价格区间等外部环境因素下的军队最佳柔性定价及对应的企业最优储备策略,并通过实例分析验证了得出的决策结论。结果表明,最优策略的实施将有利于军队与企业共担应急器材数量储备风险。     

航天测控软件共用技术研究与实现

软件共用是航天测控软件的发展趋势,分析了航天测控软件共用的可行性,并选取火箭遥测软件作为原型验证系统,提出了解决方案和设计方法,采用ICE中间件和构件技术实现了该原型验证系统,经测试验证,分布式部署的原型验证软件各项指标满足测控任务软件的技术要求,对航天测控软件共用研究具有重要的借鉴和指导意义。     

具有适应值预测机制的遗传算法

针对适应值计算费时的优化问题,提出一种具有适应值预测机制的遗传算法:为了有效控制预测适应值的准确度和预测频率,建立了一个基于可信度概念的适应值预测模型,引入可信度流失机制以减少预测误差的传播和累积,引入冗余个体剔除机制以减少计算消耗。利用3个基准函数对算法进行收敛性和有效性的测试,测试结果表明算法对于3个测试函数均能获得满意的最优解,并且都能减少60%以上的真实适应值计算次数。