新疆高校新闻专业人才培养现状、问题与对策

作为区域内新闻专业人才培养的主要阵地,新疆高校在新闻专业人才培养上起步较晚。但随着新疆区域内新闻专业人才需求的逐步扩大以及国家政策的扶持,这种状况在上世纪八十年代后得以改观。上世纪九十年代末以来,新疆部分高校相继开办了新闻专业,使新闻专业人才培养阵地迅速扩张。短期内的迅速扩张,随之也带来了诸多问题。客观理性分析产生这些问题的原因并及时寻找解决问题的对策,对提高新疆高校新闻专业人才培养质量,为区域经济发展提供人才支撑有重要意义。     

新疆高校毕业生留疆就业对新疆稳定和发展中的作用

改革开放二十多年来,新疆在各方面取得了长足的进步,但总体上还远远落后于东部发达地区,究其原因,人才匮乏是其中重要的影响性因素之一。地处西北边疆地区的新疆,要解决人才匮乏问题,除制定优惠政策引进内地高水平人才以外,还要鼓励新疆高校培养的内地毕业生留疆就业。新疆高校内地生源留疆就业,对新疆的稳定与发展都具有重要意义。     

一类非正态误差下的AR模型定阶研究

对一类非正态误差的AR模型,在待定阶数P的情况下,给出误差项中未知实函数依概率有界的定理,可把非正态误差转化为正态情况。最后运用正态误差下AR模型的方法确定阶数和参数,并给出一个算例。     

岗位评价技术在公安边防部队干部量化考评中的应用初探

岗位评价是人力资源管理中的重点技术之一,是解决组织内岗位间相对公平性的重要工具。采用工作要素评分法,对边防检查站中层领导岗位进行了岗位评价实例操作,确定了岗位能级系数,推导出绩效考评综合评价计算公式,为岗位评价技术在边防部队干部量化考评中的应用提供了参考依据。     

高校科技人才培养环境设计的原则

高校科技人才现状不容乐观,优化高校科技人才培养环境应遵循三个基本原则:平等竞争激励原则、团体文化原则和能级原则.     

吐鲁番屏式壁画所见唐人的精神生活

吐鲁番阿斯塔那三座唐墓中发现了三幅屏式壁画,其构图模拟了唐人生活中习用的六扇屏风式样,由此可以探究那个时代生活于西州(今吐鲁番)的唐人的精神追求.     

一种改进方位向非线性CS大斜视角SAR成像算法

大斜视角SAR成像时存在严重的距离走动现象,慢时域的距离走动校正在解决这一问题同时导致了聚焦深度问题.分析了二维频域解耦合后残余相位误差以及时域走动校正后的多普勒调频率误差,提出一种改进的方位向非线性CS算法,校正了三次以上距离迁徙带来的相位误差,同时采用改进非线性CS扰动方程补偿了随方位偏移量线性变化的调频率误差.仿真结果表明,改进算法的大斜视角大场景成像性能优于传统的高分辨大斜视角成像算法.     

Casualty Rates of US Military Personnel During the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

Abstract

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, which ended in August 2010, nearly 3500 hostile deaths occurred among US military personnel and 32,000 more were wounded in action (WIA). More than 1800 hostile deaths occurred during Operation Enduring Freedom (in and around Afghanistan) through 2014 and about 20,000 were WIA. A larger proportion of wounded personnel survived in Iraq and Afghanistan than during the Vietnam War, but the increased survival rates were not as high as some studies have asserted. The survival rates were 90.2% in Iraq and 91.6% in Afghanistan, compared with 86.5% in Vietnam. The casualty rates varied between the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and before, during, and after the respective surges. Amputation rates are difficult to measure consistently, but I estimate that 2.6% of all WIA and 9.0% of medically evacuated WIA from the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters combined resulted in the major loss of a limb. Elevated non-hostile death rates (including deaths due to accidents, illnesses, homicides, or suicides) resulted in about 220 more deaths in Iraq and about 200 more deaths in Afghanistan than would have been expected in peacetime among populations of the size deployed to those two conflicts.     

A Good Ally - Norway and International Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 2001-2014

The article examines the findings of the Commission of Inquiry established by the Norwegian government in 2014 to evaluate all aspects of Norway’s civilian and military contribution to the international operation in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Concerned with the wider implications of the Commission’s findings, it focuses on two issues in particular: (1) Norway’s relations with the US, a close and long-standing strategic ally whose resources, capabilities and dominance of decision-making dwarfed that of all other coalition partners in Afghanistan; and (2) Norway’s record in the province of Faryab, where, from 2005 to 2012, a Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team was charged with bringing security, good governance and development to the province. How Norway prioritised and managed relations with the US highlights and helps to problematise the challenges – political, practical and moral – facing small and medium-sized powers operating in a coalition alongside the US. Norwegian efforts in Faryab are revealing of the dilemmas and contradictions that plagued and, ultimately, fatally undermined the international intervention as a whole. As such, Norway’s experience provides a microcosm through which the inherent limitations of the attempt to transfer the structures of modern statehood and Western democracy to Afghanistan can be better understood.     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.