舰艇协同作战导弹防御模型研究

舰艇协同作战是未来战争的主要作战形式,导弹防御是其主要的作战职责.运用信息论的方法对舰艇协同作战中敌方导弹发射策略的不确定性进行建模,运用可靠性理论对协作效果进行建模,并引进知识的概念作为其度量,同时用边的函数对网络复杂性进行建模,综合这两种因素在以最大化防御时间为总的决策目标,以己方导弹储备和敌方来袭速率为决策因素对导弹防御作出辅助决策.     

基于随机Petri网的综合航电系统建模及分析

提出了一种利用随机Petri网对综合航电系统进行建模和性能分析的方法.首先,建立了综合航电系统数据总线传输系统的随机Petri网系统模型,通过系统模型进行综合航电系统的性能分析;其次,给出了航空电子综合系统数据总线传输基于固定主控端周期指令的总线性能分析结果;最后,通过两种分析结果的比较,得出了基于随机Petri网对航空电子综合系统数据总线传输建模分析是可行的结论.     

集合线对对数周期偶极子天线的影响

主要研究了对数周期偶极子天线.基于Pocklington积分方程和全域基函数,采用矩量法结合网络理论建立了天线算法模型;使用该模型计算了在天线阵和集合线共同作用下天线的辐射方向图,得出了集合线在不同频段上对天线辐射性能的影响,并通过截短延长线长度改善了天线低频段的辐射特性,增强了天线轴向方向性.     

整环上不定方程组的通解公式及其应用

借助Z上矩阵A∈Mm×n(Z)的标准形式D=VAU=diag(d1,d2,…,dq,0,…,0),得到了整环上不定方程组AX=B的通解公式以及矩阵初等变换法.     

面向决策的一体化建模方法及其在兵力筹划中的应用

在对军事决策问题的主要特点进行分析的基础上,提出从军事概念模型到数学模型再到定性推理模型的一体化建模思想.以空军航空兵遂行直接航空火力支援任务为想定背景,根据EATI模板,利用基于UML的Rose工具依次对想定任务的实体、任务、交互等进行分析;对于兵力筹划中的结构化问题建立了机会约束多目标规划数学模型;对于非结构化问题则构造了推理机,推理机体现了定量与定性相结合的决策分析思想.最后,以一个实例验证文章思路的可行性.     

On the normality and abnormality of offsets obligations

Defence offsets have often been described as government‐to‐business compensation arrangements or contracts involving “reciprocity beyond that associated with normal market exchange”. This paper argues that it is irrelevant and misleading to use this notion as a criterion for defining offsets.

The paper also explores the apparent inconsistency between the maximising efficiency in defence procurement and the application of offsets requirements. It is shown that defence offsets are a subset of all the price‐quality‐quantity trade‐offs which in general characterise negotiations surrounding complex transactions.

It is argued that although reciprocal or offsetting arrangements are a normal aspect of commercial transacting, the operation of certain offsets schemes namely mandatory offsets obligations, may inhibit the buyer's flexibility in negotiating deals and result in inefficient procurement. This leads us to ask why these offsets schemes have persisted for so long.     

NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship,Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy

In nuclear nonproliferation negotiations, many governments pursue multiple objectives, and changes in policy can occur rapidly—and often unexpectedly. For these reasons, understanding nonproliferation requires empathy and imagination rather than just historical fact. This article considers one teaching tool to encourage such insight—simulations—and demonstrates how teaching and scholarship can interact to improve our understanding of the complex decisions and negotiations involved in nuclear nonproliferation. The article consists of five parts: first, it explains the benefits of simulations as both a policy development tool in Washington and as a teaching tool in universities; second, it describes the pedagogical strategy of the Stanford University simulation program; third, it shows how the simulations have identified and highlighted theoretical and substantive insights that are often neglected in scholarly studies of nonproliferation; and fourth, it describes how students are tested to enhance the learning experience from the simulation. Fifth and finally, the article provides concluding observations about how using simulations in the classroom can help scholars develop insights that improve their understanding of real-world nuclear negotiation dynamics and outcomes.     

INTEGRATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES TO ENABLE SIGNIFICANT STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS

In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that could make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.     

PREVENTING DIRTY BOMBS

Radioactive sealed sources have a long history and a much wider worldwide distribution than do weapons-usable fissile materials. This article compares the mechanisms for controlling radioactive sources with those of weapons-usable materials and makes the case for improved policy making on the safe and secure management of radioactive sources (often referred to simply as “sources”). Such sources have been widely distributed with commercial and government support to nearly every country, yet there are no legally binding, international agreements or regulations to control any aspect of their life cycle. This is problematic because some sources that are disused, abandoned, or otherwise fall out of regulatory control could be used in the form of a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or dirty bomb). An RDD could pose significant economic and psychological impacts with the potential for detrimental effects on public health. The lack of international measures to control sources is troubling for several reasons: creating an RDD is much easier than fashioning a nuclear weapon from scratch or from stolen fissile materials; given the many incidents involving diversion from regulatory control and the misuse of sources, an RDD attack would be one of the more likely scenarios; materials security for sources is generally weak and inconsistent; it is nearly impossible to determine the total amount of sources manufactured and distributed; used sources are frequently found uncontrolled and transiting borders, and penalties are light at best; the market-based supply and demand of sources facilitates their rapid and loosely regulated distribution; and the “peaceful uses” aspect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons along with norms that began developing around the time of Atoms for Peace have promoted the nearly unchecked global distribution of sources. Several immediate and long-term actions are suggested to reduce the threat posed by radiological sources.     

ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS IN AFRICA AND THE BAN ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

A truly universal ban on anti-personnel mines cannot be realized without engagement of armed non-state actors and armed groups operating outside state control, including rebels and national liberation movements. Events after 9/11 have complicated engagement with organizations that can be classified as ‘terrorists’. Yet, the use of anti-personnel landmines itself can be viewed as an act of terrorism and African leaders have, on various occasions, classified the use of landmines and the presence of unexploded ordnance as engendering insecurity and a serious impediment to development. The success of a total ban ultimately depends upon ensuring that armed non-state actors act in accordance with international humanitarian law. The Geneva Call Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action (DoC) might be described as an alternative instrument to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and can serve an important and impartial channel of communication with non-state actors. Already 18 armed groups in Africa have signed the Geneva Call DoC.