空战视景仿真系统通用框架研究

依据一个空战视景仿真系统的开发,系统分析了视景仿真系统的一般性规律和其管理框架。通过分析空战视景仿真系统的硬件、软件结构,着重提炼出不同的视景仿真系统的共性与特殊性。在软件设计过程中,对数据处理、实体管理和事件响应的设计,重视了设计模式的应用,将仿真系统的通用性、可拓展性与软件工程理论相结合,构建了一个可通用的,具有拓展性的视景仿真软件平台。视景仿真系统通用框架的研究,为设计更加灵活,更加适用的视景系统提供了理论基础;对于以后的视景仿真系统的设计,具有一定的参考价值。     

Technical note: Reexamination of all‐or‐none inspection policies in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This note studies the optimal inspection policies in a supply chain in which a manufacturer purchases components from a supplier but has no direct control of component quality. The manufacturer uses an inspection policy and a damage cost sharing contract to encourage the supplier to improve the component quality. We find that all‐or‐none inspection policies are optimal for the manufacturer if the supplier's share of the damage cost is larger than a threshold; otherwise, the manufacturer should inspect a fraction of a batch. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Scheduling and due‐date quotation in a make‐to‐order supply chain

We consider a manufacturer, served by a single supplier, who has to quote due dates to arriving customers in a make‐to‐order production environment. The manufacturer is penalized for long lead times and for missing due dates. To meet due dates, the manufacturer has to obtain components from a supplier. We model this manufacturer and supplier as a two‐machine flow shop, consider several variations of this problem, and design effective due‐date quotation and scheduling algorithms for centralized and decentralized versions of the model. We perform extensive computational testing to assess the effectiveness of our algorithms and to compare the centralized and decentralized models to quantify the value of centralized control in a make‐to‐order supply chain. Since complete information exchange and centralized control is not always practical or cost‐effective, we explore the value of partial information exchange for this system. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts

When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Inducing coordination in supply chains through linear reward schemes

Decentralized decision‐making in supply chain management is quite common, and often inevitable, due to the magnitude of the chain, its geographical dispersion, and the number of agents that play a role in it. But, decentralized decision‐making is known to result in inefficient Nash equilibrium outcomes, and optimal outcomes that maximize the sum of the utilities of all agents need not be Nash equilibria. In this paper we demonstrate through several examples of supply chain models how linear reward/penalty schemes can be implemented so that a given optimal solution becomes a Nash equilibrium. The examples represent both vertical and horizontal coordination issues. The techniques we employ build on a general framework for the use of linear reward/penalty schemes to induce stability in given optimal solutions and should be useful to other multi‐agent operations management settings. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

基于供应链管理的战时装备供应保障业务流程重组

从战时装备供应链管理的要素和相互关系出发,结合我军实际,提出了基于供应链的战时装备供应保障业务流程重组过程,并对相关方法进行了讨论,旨在使战时所需装备以可预见的方式快速、安全、准确地送抵到作战部队。     

Defense–Growth Causality: Considerations of Regime-Switching and Time- and Country-Varying Effects

This paper develops a panel smooth transition vector autoregressive model to investigate the economic growth–defense causality. This model simultaneously resolves the estimation problems of endogeneity, heterogeneity, and nonlinearity. Empirical results support that the causality is bidirectional, nonlinear, time- and country-varying. Economic growth has a negative impact on military spending and vice versa. The larger the HDI, the smaller the negative causality. Evidently, the increase in the level of country development can reduce the negative impact of military outlays on economic growth. Reducing the ratio of military spending to GDP is beneficial for countries with low HDI scores; however, moderately increasing the share of military expenditure is favorable for countries with extremely high HDI scores. Policy authority needs to set optimal education, health, and economic development shares of GDP for purchasing a maximum economic growth rate.     

Markovian models of three‐on‐one combat involving a hidden defender

In this paper, Markovian models of three‐on‐one stochastic firefights between ground‐based weapon systems are developed. These models address a common scenario of interest to the military, but one which has been much neglected in analytic combat models, that of combat between a hidden defender and an exposed attacking force. Each combatant must detect an opponent before commencing their firing cycle, a task which is considerably more difficult for the attacker. In the models developed here, the defender detects the exposed attacking group after an exponentially distributed time interval, while each attacker has a fixed probability of detecting the defender via the flash signature produced after each shot fired by him. The utility of the approach is demonstrated by investigating what impact the introduction of a coordinated gun‐laying system for the attacking force might have, a system made possible by battlefield digitization. The method used here allows models to be developed incrementally. This and other advantages of the Markovian approach are discussed. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 627–646, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10041     

The transshipment fund mechanism: Coordinating the decentralized multilocation transshipment problem

The multilocation replenishment and transshipment problem is concerned with several retailers facing random demand for the same item at distinct markets, that may use transshipments to eliminate excess inventory/shortages after demand realization. When the system is decentralized so that each retailer operates to maximize their own profit, there are incentive problems that prevent coordination. These problems arise even with two retailers who may pay each other for transshipped units. We propose a new mechanism based on a transshipment fund, which is the first to coordinate the system, in a fully noncooperative setting, for all instances of two retailers as well as all instances of any number of retailers. Moreover, our mechanism strongly coordinates the system, i.e., achieves coordination as the unique equilibrium. The computation and information requirements of this mechanism are realistic and relatively modest. We also present necessary and sufficient conditions for coordination and prove they are always satisfied with our mechanism. Numerical examples illustrate some of the properties underlying this mechanism for two retailers. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010