Disruption‐management strategies for short life‐cycle products

Supplier diversification, contingent sourcing, and demand switching (whereby a firm shifts customers to a different product if their preferred product is unavailable), are key building blocks of a disruption‐management strategy for firms that sell multiple products over a single season. In this article, we evaluate 12 possible disruption‐management strategies (combinations of the basic building‐block tactics) in the context of a two‐product newsvendor. We investigate the influence of nine attributes of the firm, its supplier(s), and its products on the firs preference for the various strategies. These attributes include supplier reliability, supplier failure correlation, payment responsibility in the event of a supply failure, product contribution margin, product substitutability, demand uncertainties and correlation, and the decision makes risk aversion. Our results show that contingent sourcing is preferred to supplier diversification as the supply risk (failure probability) increases, but diversification is preferred to contingent sourcing as the demand risk (demand uncertainty) increases. We find that demand switching is not effective at managing supply risk if the products are sourced from the same set of suppliers. Demand switching is effective at managing demand risk and so can be preferred to the other tactics if supply risk is low. Risk aversion makes contingent sourcing preferable over a wider set of supply and demand‐risk combinations. We also find a two‐tactic strategy provides almost the same benefit as a three‐tactic strategy for most reasonable supply and demand‐risk combinations. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

基于GO法的军事供应链可靠性分析

军事供应链管理要获得高效率和效益,最基础的必须是有高可靠性作保证。结合GO法——一种系统可靠性分析方法和军事供应链自身的特点,阐明了将GO法应用于军事供应链可靠性分析中的可行性。通过构建军事供应链结构模型,运用GO法原理,分析出军事供应链系统中的信号流和操作符,将军事供应链系统结构图转化为GO图,通过GO运算,求出各信号流的等效故障率,进而求出军事供应链中各节点的等效可靠度,对供应链网络结构模型的可靠性问题进行定量分析,并通过实例对该方法的应用进行了具体说明。结果表明：GO法不仅能够计算出整个军事供应链的可靠性,还可以清楚地得到各环节的可靠性,从而可以追溯出影响军事供应链系统整体可靠性的瓶颈,为制定相关的可靠性管理措施提供科学依据。     

Inventory transshipment game with limited supply: Trap or treat

Inventory transshipment is generally shown to be beneficial to retailers by matching their excess demand with surplus inventory. We investigate an inventory transshipment game with two newsvendor-type retailers under limited total supply and check whether the retailers are better off than the case without transshipment. We derive the ordering strategies for the retailers and show that unlike the unlimited supply case, a pure Nash equilibrium only exists under certain conditions. Furthermore, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that inventory transshipment may not always benefit both retailers. Although one of the retailers is guaranteed to be better off, the other could be worse off. The decision criteria are then provided for the retailers to determine if they will benefit from the exercise of inventory transshipment. Numerical study indicates that the carefully chosen transshipment prices play an important role in keeping inventory transshipment beneficial to both retailers. Subsequently, a coordinating mechanism is designed for the retailers to negotiate transshipment prices that maximize the total profit of the two retailers while keeping each of them in a beneficial position.     

Defense–Growth Causality: Considerations of Regime-Switching and Time- and Country-Varying Effects

This paper develops a panel smooth transition vector autoregressive model to investigate the economic growth–defense causality. This model simultaneously resolves the estimation problems of endogeneity, heterogeneity, and nonlinearity. Empirical results support that the causality is bidirectional, nonlinear, time- and country-varying. Economic growth has a negative impact on military spending and vice versa. The larger the HDI, the smaller the negative causality. Evidently, the increase in the level of country development can reduce the negative impact of military outlays on economic growth. Reducing the ratio of military spending to GDP is beneficial for countries with low HDI scores; however, moderately increasing the share of military expenditure is favorable for countries with extremely high HDI scores. Policy authority needs to set optimal education, health, and economic development shares of GDP for purchasing a maximum economic growth rate.     

Causal analysis of Australian economic growth and military expenditure: A note

Chowdhury (1991) applied Granger causality methods to military expenditure and economic growth series in 55 developing countries. This note applies a similar approach to Australia and finds no causal relationship between military expenditure and growth in either direction.     

Economic Performance And Terrorist Activity In Latin America

We investigate the link between economic performance and terrorism for 18 Latin American countries from 1970 to 2007, taking into account the potentially complex nature of this link. Panel causality analysis findings indicate that during this period, terrorism had no causal effect on economic growth. By contrast, we find that growth reduced terrorism in the less developed but not in the higher developed Latin American economies. We argue that group-specific differences (linked to patterns of economic development) govern this causal heterogeneity. From a series of negative binomial regressions we gain additional support for our findings, while also identifying further determinants of terrorism.     

Military Expenditure,Endogeneity and Economic Growth

Abstract

While not always a concern for the general economic growth literature, the debate over the effects of military spending on growth continues to develop, with no consensus, but a deepening understanding of the limitations of previous work. One important issue that has not been adequately dealt with is the endogeneity of military spending in the growth equation, mainly because of the difficulty of finding any variables that would make adequate instruments. This paper considers this issue, using an endogenous growth model estimated on a large sample of 109 non-high-income countries for the period 1998–2012. The empirical analysis is framed within an instrumental variable setting that exploits the increase in military spending that occurs when unrest in a country escalates to turmoil. The estimation results show that endogeneity arising from reverse causality is a crucial issue, with the instrumental variable estimates providing a larger significant negative effect of military spending on growth than OLS would. This result is found to be robust to different sources of heterogeneity and different time periods.     

Outbound supply chain network design with mode selection and lead time considerations

We present a large‐scale network design model for the outbound supply chain of an automotive company that considers transportation mode selection (road vs. rail) and explicitly models the relationship between lead times and the volume of flow through the nodes of the network. We formulate the problem as a nonlinear zero‐one integer program, reformulate it to obtain a linear integer model, and develop a Lagrangian heuristic for its solution that gives near‐optimal results in reasonable time. We also present scenario analyses that examine the behavior of the supply chain under different parameter settings and the performance of the solution procedures under different experimental conditions. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

基于险度函数的装备供应链库存风险损失度量

目前,对供应链库存风险损失的定量研究比较少,而定量研究中鲜有对风险偏好变化问题的研究,因此首先分析了各种风险度量方法,通过比较采用了险度函数作为对装备供应链风险损失的度量方法;然后,结合装备供应链实际,提出了定常风险偏好特性险度函数和可变风险偏好特性险度函数的适用范围,以及装备供应链库存风险损失度量的损失水平值,并给出了装备供应链库存风险损失度量函数;最后,通过算例进行了验证.实验结果表明:行为人的不同风险偏好特性会对同一事态产生不同的预判,进而可能影响对风险的决策,这是符合客观现实的.     

Strategic obfuscation of production capacities

Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014