Fixed‐interval joint‐replenishment policies for distribution systems with multiple retailers and stochastic demand

We consider a distribution system consisting of a central warehouse and a group of retailers facing independent stochastic demand. The retailers replenish from the warehouse, and the warehouse from an outside supplier with ample supply. Time is continuous. Most previous studies on inventory control policies for this system have considered stock‐based batch‐ordering policies. We develop a time‐based joint‐replenishment policy in this study. Let the warehouse set up a basic replenishment interval. The retailers are replenished through the warehouse in intervals that are integer multiples of the basic replenishment interval. No inventory is carried at the warehouse. We provide an exact evaluation of the long‐term average system costs under the assumption that stock can be balanced among the retailers. The structural properties of the inventory system are characterized. We show that, although it is well known that stock‐based inventory control policies dominate time‐based inventory control policies at a single facility, this dominance does not hold for distribution systems with multiple retailers and stochastic demand. This is because the latter can provide a more efficient mechanism to streamline inventory flow and pool retailer demand, even though the former may be able to use more updated stock information to optimize system performance. The findings of the study provide insights about the key factors that drive the performance of a multiechelon inventory control system. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 637–651, 2013     

Military Spending and Economic Growth in the Middle East Countries: Bootstrap Panel Causality Test

This study revisits the causal relationship between military spending and economic growth in 10 Middle East countries via a panel causality analysis that accounts for cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneity across countries. Our results indicate unidirectional causality from military spending to growth for Turkey; one-way causality from economic growth to military spending for Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Syria; bidirectional causality for Israel; and no causality in either direction for Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The empirical evidence does not provide consistent results regarding the causal relationship between defense expenditure and economic growth in these countries.     

The defence firm of the future

This paper offers the personal view of a senior executive in the Defence Procurement Agency about the future requirements of the defence industry’s principal UK customer. The focus here is on trying to identify the type of corporate behaviour and range of skill sets that the UK Government will need from defence suppliers, both primes and supply chain companies in the future. The concluding message from this ‘Customer View’ is that there is likely to be a continuing market for the company that specializes in delivering defence capability. It will be a company that will be looking for a long‐term relationship, with a specialist knowledge of its various national customers and a willingness to work openly and closely with them. It will be agile in its ability to bring together diverse technologies, to package them as a system and to deliver them either as hardware or as a service. Such suppliers will also need to innovate and to adapt at least as rapidly as the threats that they seek to counter.     

MODELLING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENSE SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH FOR THE FIJI ISLANDS

The goal of this paper is to examine the nexus between GDP and military expenditure. We model this relationship within a multivariate framework by including exports in the model. We use the recently developed bounds testing approach to cointegration and find that there is a long run relationship among the variables when GDP is the endogenous variable. Normalizing on GDP and using four different estimators, we find that in the long run both military expenditure and exports have a positive impact on GDP. Finally, using the Granger causality test, we find that there is evidence for military expenditure Granger causing exports and exports Granger causing GDP, implying that military expenditure indirectly Granger causes GDP in the short run. In the long run, we find that both military expenditure and exports Granger cause GDP for Fiji. Our findings are consistent with the Keynesian school of thought, leading us to derive some policy implications.     

Defense Expenditure and Income Inequality: Evidence on Co-integration and Causality for China

There are conflicting views as to the relationship between a nation’s defense expenditure (DE) and its population’s income inequality (INEQ). DE, always an important part of government budget, can easily crowd out transfer payments, necessary to improve INEQ; however, these payments may also create a demand that may raise the income levels of the lower income earners. Consequently, the relationship between DE and INEQ is an important question. This paper examines the relationship between DE and INEQ in China for the period of 1989–2012. Utilizing basic cointegration and causality tests, our objective is to add to the literature by providing evidence that China’s DE, in fact, do have an impact on INEQ.     

The causal nexus between military spending and unemployment in the G7: a bootstrap panel causality test

We revisit the causal relationship between military spending and unemployment in the G7 countries applying a bootstrap panel causality analysis that accounts for both cross-sectional dependence and for heterogeneity across countries. Using per capita real GDP as a controlled variable, we found a unidirectional causality running from military spending to unemployment for Canada, Japan, and the US, one-way causality running from unemployment to military spending for France and Germany, and bidirectional causality for Italy and the UK. The empirical evidence does not seem to provide consistent results regarding the causal relationship between military spending and unemployment in G7 countries.     

A 17th-century Pikeman's Armour from Antwerp

Abstract

A recent re-examination of the arms and armour collection at the British Museum has led to the identification of a 17th-century pikeman's armour clearly associated with the city of Antwerp in modern Belgium, the only example of its kind. The three pieces: a pot, breastplate and backplate, are part of a collection bequeathed to the museum by William Burges in 1881. All three pieces can be dated to circa 1635 and are stamped with the arms of Antwerp, a stylised depiction of Antwerp castle between two hands derived from the blazon of the Margrave of Antwerp. The armour is indistinguishable from contemporary Dutch production and it is unclear whether it was made in Antwerp or whether the addition of the arms simply suggests a use in the city.     

JXTA网络短链路由改进算法

JXTA为构建对等网络提供了标准化计算平台,制定一些协议和服务专门解决构建P2P网络所遇见的问题.为了改进JXTA路由查询效率低下问题,提出一种路由短链改进算法.在端点路由协议的基础上,根据小世界短链现象采用物理邻居策略将网络划分簇,簇内采用Pastry算法,簇间运用freePastry算法进行资源搜索,使长跳路由减少短链路由增加.通过仿真实验说明,算法可有效增加检索效率,减少节点间的通讯时延.     

Should firms conceal information when dealing with common suppliers?

A firm making quantity decision under uncertainty loses profit if its private information is leaked to competitors. Outsourcing increases this risk as a third party supplier may leak information for its own benefit. The firm may choose to conceal information from the competitors by entering in a confidentiality agreement with the supplier. This, however, diminishes the firm's ability to dampen competition by signaling a higher quantity commitment. We examine this trade‐off in a stylized supply chain in which two firms, endowed with private demand information, order sequentially from a common supplier, and engage in differentiated quantity competition. In our model, the supplier can set different wholesale prices for firms, and the second‐mover firm could be better informed. Contrary to what is expected, information concealment is not always beneficial to the first mover. We characterize conditions under which the first mover firm will not prefer concealing information. We show that this depends on the relative informativeness of the second mover and is moderated by competition intensity. We examine the supplier's incentive in participating in information concealment, and develop a contract that enables it for wider set of parameter values. We extend our analysis to examine firms' incentive to improve information. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:1–15, 2015     

装备项目型供应链风险控制策略

项目型供应链管理模式能有效实现装备研制过程中行为主体间的优势互补和资源的优化配置,利于供应链整体效益的提高,但各种不确定性因素会导致主体间风险传递行为的发生。为提供风险控制有效对策,通过考虑节点位置重要度和属性重要度,构建了项目型供应链节点重要度评估模型;通过衡量行为主体风险识别和风险控制的努力程度,给出了行为主体抗风险努力程度的评价方法,最后提出了一种基于节点重要度和抗风险努力程度的项目型供应链利益分配策略,该策略能有效促使行为主体主动进行风险识别和风险控制,是一种"风险共担、利益共享"的项目型供应链合作博弈策略。