某型锅炉蒸发管束选材方案的探讨

通过对КВΓ－７６型锅炉蒸发管束强度计算的分析验算,发现原设计在某些参数的选取上存在明显的误差,导致选材要求过高．经过论证,得出可用普通碳素钢管替代低合金钢管的结论．     

相变材料下滑过程的接触熔化分析

本文对相变材料在斜面下滑过程中的接触熔化进行了分析。通过理论分析,求得料面保持恒温或变温对相变材料加热并使之匀速下滑时,相变材料的熔化速度、时间及固体瞬时高度。所得结果包含了前人的工作。     

130mm加农炮剩余寿命的一种预测模型

本文根据火炮寿命试验数据,利用给出的模拟曲线的误差调整控制方法,建立了以炮膛定点径向磨损量预测初速变化量和剩余寿命的数学模型。     

复杂系统的结构演变

考虑复杂性的一个侧面,从最简单的非线性方程出发,探讨战斗格局的结构演变和国防经费的良性循环,并通过这两个实例,揭示控制参数临界点的研究和度的把握,具有很大的理论意义和广泛的应用前景。     

抗超高速撞击多层结构复合材料研究

本文介绍了抗超高速撞击多层结构复合材料的设计、制备和实验,并对结果进行了讨论,实验证明,以SiC陶瓷基复合材料为防护层、以空心微珠或多孔变密度复合材料为缓冲层、以编织物复合材料为结构层的多层结构复合材料,具有面密度低、抗撞击速度范围宽、抗撞击性能好的特点。     

单片机控制的指挥仪航路产生系统

本文首先介绍单片机控制的指挥仪航路产生系统的原理及组成,重点讨论了目标现在点坐标由数字量到指挥仪所需要的模拟信号的转换方法,最后对该系统的误差结果进行了分析。     

‘Innovate or die’: Organizational culture and the origins of maneuver warfare in the United States Marine Corps

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, this article contributes to the understanding of the origins of maneuver warfare as the capstone doctrine of the Marine Corps. It does so by identifying a second source that fostered change in the Marine Corps – one in addition to disquiet about the conduct of the war in Vietnam – which stemmed from the challenges posed by the United States' post-Vietnam strategic and military reorientation. And second, this article examines the influence of organizational culture, or identity, on innovation in the Marine Corps. A critical strand in the growing literature on military innovation focuses on organizational culture and how it influences the behavior and responses of particular military organizations. This article contributes to this literature by analyzing the influence of the organizational culture of the Marine Corps in shaping what was deemed an appropriate response to the challenges it confronted in the 1970s.     

A Novel Framework for Safeguarding Naval Nuclear Material

ABSTRACT

The present international standard allows non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to forego safeguards when nuclear material is used in a “non-proscribed military activity,” though no criteria have been established to determine when NNWS can remove naval nuclear material from safeguards. Though at present, only nuclear-armed states possess nuclear submarines, the global nuclear naval landscape may soon change with the advancement of Brazil's fledgling program and the possible precedent it would set for other NNWS. A framework is needed to shore up nuclear security and prevent nuclear material diversion from the nuclear naval sector. Proposed and existing nonproliferation frameworks, including a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and commitments through the nuclear security summits, are insufficient to close this loophole. A Naval Use Safeguards Agreement (NUSA), modeled after the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would provide a framework to remove the opacity surrounding nuclear material in the naval sector. Designed for NNWS and encouraged as confidence-building measures for nuclear weapon states, NUSA would explicitly outline those stages in the naval nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are to be applied and in what context. This viewpoint also further provides direction for targeted research and development in technical naval nuclear safeguards solutions.     

FACILITATING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: Verified Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks and Production

Unprecedented interest in seeking progress toward nuclear disarmament exists today; even some nuclear weapon states are looking for new ways to strengthen this process. National declarations of fissile material holdings—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—could play an important role in supporting this effort, facilitating not only transparency but also the irreversibility of the process. This article discusses what kind of content such declarations could have in order to be meaningful and effective, the sequence of data on fissile material holdings that states might release, and some of the challenges to be expected in reconstructing historic fissile material production; it also summarizes current attitudes of weapon states toward making such declarations. Initial declarations can be valuable as confidence-building measures, but better and more background data are necessary if declarations are to serve as the groundwork for deeper cuts in the nuclear arsenals. A robust verification approach would ultimately require inspectors to have access to fissile material production and storage sites. The methods and tools of nuclear forensic analysis—in this context also dubbed nuclear archaeology—would be a key element of this process. This article discusses the capabilities and limitations of potential approaches to verifying declarations of historic production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium; it also identifies and discusses opportunities for further research and development.     

STRATEGY FOR A NEW NUCLEAR AGE

Current U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, force structure, and doctrine contribute to the threat of nuclear terrorism in several ways. First, the U.S. nuclear stockpile presents opportunities for nuclear terrorists to seize the materials they need. Second, U.S. nuclear forces remain a key justification for Russia's maintenance of similar nuclear forces that are less well protected. Third, America's continued embrace of nuclear weapons encourages and legitimizes other states to seek nuclear weapons that they will have difficulty securing from terrorists. The national security interests of the United States would be better served by a strategy to shrink the global footprint of nuclear weapons and provide the highest possible levels of security for the most minimal possible deterrent forces. Given the inability to secure nuclear weapons and materials perfectly or to eliminate terrorism in the foreseeable future, reducing the global inventory of nuclear weapons and materials is the most reliable way to reduce the chances of nuclear terrorism.