基于动力学和扩散分段控制的Mg/H2O反应模型及数值分析

为了数值研究宽广温度范围内Mg/H2O的反应特性,分别建立了考虑部分MgO在液滴表面凝聚的Mg/H2O扩散燃烧模型和基于Arrhenius公式的Mg/H2O反应动力学模型.数值研究了Mg/H2O反应速率在扩散控制和化学动力学控制下随反应条件变化的规律.研究结果表明,Mg液滴扩散燃烧时间计算结果与文献值相符;提高温度和水...     

HF化学激光器光腔流场荧光光谱分析

化学发光方法是HF/DF化学激光器光腔流场参数的重要实验测量方法.观察并记录了在增大H2流量时,电激励HF激光光腔流场可见光荧光的变化现象,对光轴处可见光荧光进行了光谱测量.对激光器光腔内介质成分进行了理论分析,HF高阶泛频谱线计算结果显示第3振动激发态到基频的跃迁谱线处于红外区.通过对荧光实验测量光谱与光腔内介质谱线...     

预处理方法在全速度流场数值模拟中的应用

基于预处理方法,采用有限差分方法,LU-SGS隐式求解了二维可压Navier-Stokes方程,数值模拟了无粘突包、粘性空腔、化学非平衡流场,并与试验结果进行了对比。计算结果表明,所采用的数值模拟方法能够求解低速及亚、跨、超全速度流场和化学非平衡流场,所采用的预处理方法在亚声速范围内保持数值精度的前提下,加速了收敛。     

如何在防化科研试验中加强安全保密工作

针对我院科研试验的特点和要求,分析了安全保密工作的艰巨性和重要性,明确了安全保密总要求,提出了把安全保密工作落到实处的具体措施。     

谈大型石油化工企业火灾灭火指挥要则

大型石油化工企业在生产、储运过程中具有较大的火灾危险性 ,而且一旦发生火灾 ,火情复杂 ,燃烧与爆炸共存 ,易出现立体、大面积、多火点燃烧和复燃、复爆现象 ,灭火难度相当大。在灭火救援中 ,必须快速集中优势兵力和装备 ,实行“两级指挥”下的统一指挥 ,坚持计划指挥与临场指挥相结合 ,发挥固定灭火装置和工程技术人员的作用 ,打好攻防组合战。     

微型软体机器人能源驱动技术研究进展

具有高柔顺性、低能耗、高功率等特点的微型软体机器人在管道检修、战场侦察等复杂环境中具有广阔的应用前景。能源与驱动器决定了微型软体机器人运动方式和运动性能。为使更多研究人员了解现有柔性驱动技术及其能量来源的研究进展,从物理能源驱动、化学能源驱动以及生物混合驱动三方面入手,总结了基于这三种能源的典型驱动方式并分析其优劣。对现有柔性驱动及其能源存在的不足与未来发展进行讨论与总结,可为后续软体机器人柔性驱动技术发展与性能提升提供参考。     

Controlling Novichoks after Salisbury: revising the Chemical Weapons Convention schedules

ABSTRACT

Novichok agents are a class of nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In light of the use of a Novichok agent in Salisbury in March 2018, two sets of proposals to amend Schedule 1 of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have been put forth, one jointly by the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands, and the other by Russia. Both sets of proposals will be discussed and voted upon at the next Conference of States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in November 2019. If either set of proposals is approved, it will be the first time that the list of chemicals subject to verification under the CWC will have been modified. This viewpoint will discuss these proposals, and argue that, if adopted, the joint proposal and the portions of the Russian proposal upon which consensus can be reached would significantly strengthen the CWC by considerably expanding the coverage of its Schedule 1 and bringing Novichok agents firmly within the CWC’s verification system. We also argue that, since the OPCW Technical Secretariat did not deem the fifth group of chemicals proposed by Russia to meet the criteria for inclusion in Schedule 1, Russia should withdraw this part of its proposal from consideration. The proposals have also served an important purpose in clarifying the identity of the chemical agent used in the Salisbury incident, squarely placing it within one of the two families of Novichok agents described by the Russian chemical-weapons scientist and whistleblower Vil Mirzayanov. If either proposal is approved in November, it will be important to conduct a thorough assessment of key precursors for the synthesis of Novichok agents and assess the need to amend CWC schedules and national and multinational export-control lists accordingly.     

Chemical-weapon use in Syria: atrocities,attribution, and accountability

ABSTRACT

International efforts to hold the government of President Bashar al-Assad accountable for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War have entered a new phase. For the first time, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization responsible for implementing the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, has been empowered to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which was formed to conduct the OPCW’s new attribution mission, has announced its intention to investigate and identify the perpetrators of nine chemical attacks in Syria, including the April 7, 2018, attack in Douma. This article reviews recent efforts to attribute chemical attacks in Syria, describes what we know about the nine incidents to be investigated, summarizes what is known about the Syrian government officials, military commanders, and chemical-warfare scientists suspected of being responsible for these attacks, discusses what to expect during the next phase of the attribution process, and offers insights into how the international community can move beyond attribution to accountability. Accountability is necessary to provide justice for victims and to prevent future incidents by demonstrating that perpetrators of chemical attacks will be identified and punished.