中国超算技术赶超发展模式探析

超级计算是解决国家安全、经济建设、科学进步、社会发展和国防建设等领域重大挑战性问题的重要手段,是各国科技发展中必争的战略制高点。通过调查和实证,重点分析了中国超算技术追赶中政府的引导作用和企业作为市场主体的作用。面向领域的战略需求,在财政能力非常有限的情况下,政府通过长期资助,形成厚实的知识和人才队伍积累;面向科技创新,政府主导全国的集群创新实现中国超算登顶,并建设国家超算基础设施;面向全面发展,积极发展超算应用,并按照企业是市场主体的原则,通过企业参与超算竞争研制,实现技术溢出和市场突破。超算技术发展模式可以为其他高技术领域发展提供借鉴经验。     

Study on energy release characteristics of reactive material casings under explosive loading

Reactive Materials (RMs), a new material with structural and energy release characteristics under shock-induced chemical reactions, are promising in extensive applications in national defense and military fields. They can increase the lethality of warheads due to their dual functionality. This paper focuses on the energy release characteristics of RM casings prepared by alloy melting and casting process under explosive loading. Explosion experiments of RM and conventional 2A12 aluminum alloy casings were conducted in free field to capture the explosive fireballs, temperature distribution, peak overpressure of the air shock wave and the fracture morphology of fragments of reactive material (RM) warhead casings by using high-speed camera, infrared thermal imager temperature and peak overpressure testing and scanning electron microscope. Results showed that an increase of both the fireball temperature and air shock wave were observed in all RM casings compared to conventional 2A12 aluminum ally casings. The RM casings can improve the peak overpressure of the air shock wave under explosion loading, though the results are different with different charge ratios. According to the energy release characteristics of the RM, increasing the thickness of RM casings will increase the peak overpressure of the near-field air shock wave, while reducing the thickness will increase the peak overpressure of the far-field air shock wave.     

过程方法在防化科研质量管理系统中的应用

介绍了根据国军标要求建立的科研质量管理系统．运用“过程方法”,对现行科研体制下的科研进程进行了识别,并提出了具体的控制要求。     

“课后记”点滴谈

“课后记”是常规教学中的重要一环,它对探索教学规律,提高教学艺术,积累教学经验,提高教学质量,都有积极的作用。本文就“课后记”的好处、内容及写“课后记”时应注意的问题进行了探讨。     

The comparison of military budgets of the eastern and central European countries

The evolutions of military expenditures in Eastern and Central European countries are difficult to estimate and to compare, due to the lack of available data for these states. Some results of the extent of cuts in defence spending since 1990 are interesting to interpret, but it is difficult for econometricians to use these figures even carefully. The structures of national military expenditure have been modified to the detriment of arms equipment. Thus, the disarmament process needs a special analysis of the arms industry.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE WORLD DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND US MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL ON THE ISRAELI DEFENSE INDUSTRY: A DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS MODEL

This paper models the interactions between the defense industry market structure and the defense needs of Israel, the USA and Western Europe, which produce several heterogeneous defense goods. The model specifies that the defense industries of the US and Europe are ‘large’ while that of Israel is ‘small’. The US military aid to Israel is also an integral part of the model. The results show that net defense costs of Israel are minimal when the number of its defense firms is one. The model predicts that an increase in US military aid reduces Israel’s government expenditure, its defense industry’s profits and its net defense costs.     

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: TRENDS IN COST AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR UK AEROSPACE

This paper, intended to stimulate debate, suggests that we are at a turning point in the history of the UK military aerospace industry. It argues that there is urgent need for a fresh vision as to how the UK military aerospace industry can both prosper and make its maximum contribution to the defence of Britain. Further, the resulting plans and policies must emphasise the robustness of defence capabilities in a future in which the only thing we can be certain is that it will be very different from the present – especially whenever defence most matters.     

OPTING OUT OF THE IRON TRIANGLE

Between the 1960s and the 1990s, the US chemical industry went from lobbying against the Geneva Protocol and promoting increased funding for chemical warfare to refusing to produce binary chemical weapons and assisting with the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—even though the treaty included provisions that could be costly to industry. What happened in those thirty years to make the US chemical industry reverse its position on chemical weapons? This article argues these changes were largely caused by the chemical industry's desire to reform the negative public image it had acquired due to its involvement in the Agent Orange scandal and other high-profile incidents during the 1970s and 1980s. The chemical industry's assistance with CWC negotiations may be explained after an examination of the US public policy literature, which argues that industry will support apparently costly regulations if doing so helps it repair a damaged public image and ensures greater profits in the long run.     

Deterrence in the Gulf War

A recently published collection of captured Iraqi records offers an opportunity to better understand Saddam Hussein's perception of US and Israeli deterrence signals, affording innovative insights into the reasons behind Iraq's restraint from using weapons of mass destruction against Israeli targets during the 1991 Gulf War. This article tests a wide range of suggested hypotheses, and suggests that US and Israeli deterrence played only a minimal role in dissuading Iraqi use of WMD. The article concludes with some thoughts on the practical implications, particularly on the effectiveness of a “no-first-use” nuclear policy.     

Country survey IX: Spain

From the early 1980s Spain embarked on a wide‐ranging process of military reform, from organisational changes to defence industrial policies. Investment in military equipment was set to grow, policies were drawn up to foster the domestic defence industrial base, defence R&D rocketed, and Spain joined a myriad of international arms development programmes. Yet, by 1991 the process of reform had run out of steam. Expenditure planning proved unreliable, and firms suffered from sharp cutbacks in procurement expenditure. The model of defence industrial growth sketched in the mid‐1980s had floundered. The Spanish case provides an example of how the quest to maximise defence procurement from domestic sources can fall victim to industrial and budgetary constraints. Spanish defence producers are now becoming increasingly intertwined with foreign defence companies.