气态煤油超声速燃烧简化化学反应模型

为探究超燃冲压发动机燃烧室中煤油燃料燃烧的化学动力学过程,综合采用敏感性分析方法与路径分析方法,针对RP-3航空煤油三组分替代燃料的详细反应模型进行简化,建立一种适用于超声速燃烧流场数值模拟的新型26组分89反应简化燃烧反应模型。采用该简化燃烧模型对RP-3航空煤油替代燃料的点火、燃烧特性进行数值模拟,并与详细反应模型结果和试验数据进行对比校验。此外,将该简化燃烧模型与超声速燃烧流场计算方法相结合,数值分析了典型超燃冲压发动机燃烧室流场内化学动力学特性。研究结果表明：新型简化燃烧反应模型在不影响数值模拟精度的前提下,有效减少了反应组分与反应方程个数,提高了超声速复杂燃烧流场的数值模拟效率,并且能够准确获得烯烃、炔烃等重要中间燃烧产物以及小分子活性基团的空间分布规律,给出更全面的流场信息。     

反应性树脂体系化学增黏和物理减黏机制的分离

采用等温差示扫描量热(DSC)法,研究了CTD-128环氧树脂与GA-327(DDM改性芳胺)的固化度-时间变化关系;采用AR2000EX型旋转流变仪,测试了上述体系的等温黏度-时间关系.比较等温条件下的固化度-时间关系和黏度-时间关系,建立了等温条件下的黏度-固化度的等时对应关系,结果表明在纯化学增黏机制影响下,树脂体系的黏度随固化度增加先缓慢增加,当固化度增大到一定程度后黏度快速增加.将等温条件下的黏度-固化度关系进行变换,得到恒定固化度下的黏度-温度关系,揭示了在物理减黏机制影响下,树脂体系黏度随温度的增加而降低,并且黏度降低幅度随固化度的增加而增大.两种黏度影响机制分离的实现,为反应性树脂体系实时黏度的准确预测提供了技术支持.     

HF化学激光器光腔流场荧光光谱分析

化学发光方法是HF/DF化学激光器光腔流场参数的重要实验测量方法.观察并记录了在增大H2流量时,电激励HF激光光腔流场可见光荧光的变化现象,对光轴处可见光荧光进行了光谱测量.对激光器光腔内介质成分进行了理论分析,HF高阶泛频谱线计算结果显示第3振动激发态到基频的跃迁谱线处于红外区.通过对荧光实验测量光谱与光腔内介质谱线...     

高焓CO2气流壁面两步催化机制对非平衡气动加热影响的数值模拟

针对高超声速火星进入飞行遇到的壁面CO_2催化机制特殊且对气动加热影响复杂的问题,基于化学反应系统的三维可压缩流动求解器,建立壁面吸附、Eley-Rideal结合速率受控的壁面CO_2两步催化模型。基于70°球锥布局的高焓风洞实验,进行考虑壁面催化效应的高超声速非平衡气动加热数值模拟,开展考虑CO+O_((s))和O+CO_((s))两类CO_2两步催化路径对非平衡气动加热的影响研究。研究表明,壁面O_2和CO_2结合并存且存在相互竞争关系,催化加热量随催化效率增大而单调增加。数值计算建立了催化路径与非平衡加热水平的定量关联,研究发现CO_2两类催化路径权重与加热量存在非单调关联,特定权重下两种路径联合作用的热流高于单个催化结果。相关研究对碳氧气体主导的壁面催化机理和火星进入气动加热的精细化预测有重要的理论指导意义。     

主稀释剂He预热对燃烧驱动DF激光器输出性能的影响分析

针对燃烧驱动连续波DF激光器,对仅预热主稀释剂He的情况下激光器的输出性能进行了理论分析和仿真研究,并与燃料常温条件的结果进行了对比分析。对于燃料体系为(H_2+NF_3+He)+D_2和(C_2H_4+NF_3+He)+D_2的DF激光器,在燃烧室产生的F原子流量不变的条件下,当主He预热至(1100 K,1300 K)时,激光器比功率较常温条件下分别约提高了(21%,24%)和(46%,56%),同时燃烧室所需的燃料消耗分别约减少了(25. 5%,29%)和(32%,36%)。在工程应用方面,主He可成功预热至800℃(1100 K)。因此,主He预热是有效且可行的燃料预热方案,有利于改善激光器的输出性能,为激光器的高效率和紧凑化发展进程提供新的技术路线。     

Controlling Novichoks after Salisbury: revising the Chemical Weapons Convention schedules

ABSTRACT

Novichok agents are a class of nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In light of the use of a Novichok agent in Salisbury in March 2018, two sets of proposals to amend Schedule 1 of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have been put forth, one jointly by the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands, and the other by Russia. Both sets of proposals will be discussed and voted upon at the next Conference of States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in November 2019. If either set of proposals is approved, it will be the first time that the list of chemicals subject to verification under the CWC will have been modified. This viewpoint will discuss these proposals, and argue that, if adopted, the joint proposal and the portions of the Russian proposal upon which consensus can be reached would significantly strengthen the CWC by considerably expanding the coverage of its Schedule 1 and bringing Novichok agents firmly within the CWC’s verification system. We also argue that, since the OPCW Technical Secretariat did not deem the fifth group of chemicals proposed by Russia to meet the criteria for inclusion in Schedule 1, Russia should withdraw this part of its proposal from consideration. The proposals have also served an important purpose in clarifying the identity of the chemical agent used in the Salisbury incident, squarely placing it within one of the two families of Novichok agents described by the Russian chemical-weapons scientist and whistleblower Vil Mirzayanov. If either proposal is approved in November, it will be important to conduct a thorough assessment of key precursors for the synthesis of Novichok agents and assess the need to amend CWC schedules and national and multinational export-control lists accordingly.     

Chemical-weapon use in Syria: atrocities,attribution, and accountability

ABSTRACT

International efforts to hold the government of President Bashar al-Assad accountable for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War have entered a new phase. For the first time, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization responsible for implementing the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, has been empowered to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which was formed to conduct the OPCW’s new attribution mission, has announced its intention to investigate and identify the perpetrators of nine chemical attacks in Syria, including the April 7, 2018, attack in Douma. This article reviews recent efforts to attribute chemical attacks in Syria, describes what we know about the nine incidents to be investigated, summarizes what is known about the Syrian government officials, military commanders, and chemical-warfare scientists suspected of being responsible for these attacks, discusses what to expect during the next phase of the attribution process, and offers insights into how the international community can move beyond attribution to accountability. Accountability is necessary to provide justice for victims and to prevent future incidents by demonstrating that perpetrators of chemical attacks will be identified and punished.