基于RUP的航空兵作战C4ISR体系结构研究

本文分析了C4ISR系统的建模特点,对当前主流体系结构模型开发方法进行了比较,提出了运用Rational统一过程（RUP）开发DoDAF体系结构视图产品,并分析了其可行性。结合航空兵作战的特点,采用Rational ROSE建模工具开发了的相关视图产品,描述了航空兵作战过程,证明了RUP对体系结构的开发有着良好的支持作用。     

航空燃料冰点快速测定方法

冰点是表征航空燃料低温使用性能的重要指标。常规冰点测定方法操作步骤复杂,测定时间长,影响航空燃料质量检测效率。基于光散射原理,将温度传感和光电检测技术应用于航空燃料冰点测定,利用燃料结晶对光散射和透射的影响,实现航空燃料冰点快速测定。该方法操作简单快速,检测1个油样用时少于15 min,大幅提高了冰点检测效率;试样体积仅需2 mL,有利于试验环境保护;测定结果重复性好,与标准方法 GB/T2430—2008具有良好的相关性。     

基于作业成本原理的飞行训练保障费用模型

飞行训练保障费用是飞机使用保障费用中的重要组成部分,也是使用保障费用估算的重点和难点。结合目前航空兵部队实际工作情况,首先利用作业成本法的基本原理,对航空兵部队飞行保障阶段的作业进行划分,得出成本库及成本动因。其次针对军机飞行保障阶段的多种作业,建立基于作业成本法的飞行训练保障费用模型。最后通过算例说明其比其他估算方法所具备的优势。     

基于能力的远程航空通信用频需求获取策略

提出一种基于能力的远程航空通信用频需求获取策略。分析了远程航空通信用频需求获取的基本思路。在此基础上,将远程航空通信用频需求自顶而下划分为任务需求、能力需求、效果需求3个层级,通过对层级进行定义和关系分析,给出基于能力的远程航空通信用频需求获取框架,最后对需求获取准则进行定义,得出一套较为科学有效的远程航空通信用频需求获取流程。     

民法学本科教学改革探索

随着法学教育的深入和社会经济的不断发展,传统的民法学教学模式已不能满足社会对法学毕业生能力的要求。本文列举了当前民法教学中存在的问题,并对问题出现的原因进行分析,在此基础上提出本科教学改革的建议。如应当针对本科生编写统一的、以通说理论为内容的民法系列教材,开设有关社会、经济的其他课程以辅助学生理解民法现象和民法制度,加强实务教学,提高学生的法律思维能力和解决争议问题的能力,探索建立与实务部门的协同育人模式等。     

航空兵封锁敌机场的模拟

描述了航空兵在想定条件下封锁的过程,分析了机场跑道等目标特点,在此基础上构建了航空兵封锁机场的仿真模型,对突破敌方防空拦截编队、地面防空兵力的模拟和轰炸目标的过程进行了模拟,最后对封锁机场的效果进行了统计。     

Friend or foe? The Cyprus Police Force and the EOKA insurgency

This article examines the ambiguous role played by the Cyprus Police Force during the Greek Cypriot insurgency against Britain between 1955 and 1959. A multiethnic force policing a multiethnic society, the CPF struggled to fulfill its duties. Greek Cypriot officers became ineffective as sympathy for, or fear of insurgents undermined their ability to function. Some collaborated, others resigned. Those who stayed became targets of their own people. Turkish Cypriot officers, recruited in greater numbers to compensate for a reduction in Greek Cypriot officers, worked to enforce the law, but exacerbated intercommunal relations in doing so. In spite of the peculiar conditions present in Cyprus, the case has valuable implications for contemporary policymakers on the vulnerabilities inherent in the use of local police forces to restore law and order in ethnically divided societies.     

To Be or Not To Be: The Development of Soviet Deck Aviation

Few issues were as contentious in the development of the Soviet Navy as the role of aircraft carriers and sea-based aviation. Despite the continued insistence by the highest naval authorities and scientific experts that surface combatants simply could not be protected in the open ocean without the support of ship-borne aviation, Soviet leaders – for a variety of reasons – resisted aircraft carrier development until the final decades of the Cold War. In examining one of the most defining and telling asymmetries of the Cold War at sea, the author argues that while the USSR was economically and technologically capable of building aircraft carriers of any class, bureaucratic infighting, misperceptions of cost and practicality, and the inherent flaws of a totalitarian system ultimately created an impossible gap in capabilities between the two sides. The priorities and direction of Soviet weapons and defense technology development during the Cold War was largely a factor of the military-political situation taking shape at home, and in the world. As a rule, the navy was assigned missions that corresponded to its capabilities at a given point in time, rather than the other way around. Often, the navy lacked the material resources needed to implement its core mission. The availability of these resources, in turn, depended on the country's economic situation, its scientific potential, the technological state of its industry, as well as the subjective influence of political and military leaders on the priorities of technological development. The impact of the country's socioeconomic imperatives was undoubtedly also felt in the sluggish pace of development of ship-borne aviation and aircraft carriers in the USSR.     

PARLIAMENT AND DEFENCE OVERSIGHT

Abstract

A tremendous amount of important work has been done recently on operationalising the protection of civilians as a military task. The bulk of the discussion has focused on how militaries should respond to direct attacks on civilians. This is an important issue, but thinking about civilian protection should also include a serious examination of the ways in which the approach of military organisations to the problem of ‘spoiler’ groups can affect the level and dynamics of attacks on civilians – importantly, where armed groups are interested in violent control of civilian populations, attempts to ‘dislodge’ them from areas of control may substantially increase the level of violence against civilians (beyond the dangers to be expected from being near areas where active fighting is taking place). In 2009, the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) supported the Congolese military in operations to dismantle the Hutu-dominated FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) militia group, at massive human cost. Critics have primarily focused on MONUC's failure to protect civilians from direct attack, consonant with the general discourse on tactics for civilian protection. These criticisms are valid, but in this paper I argue that two crucial additional considerations should be kept in mind: the way that military operations can affect violence against civilians, and the way that moralising the approach to armed groups, even those which have committed serious abuses, can limit military and political options – potentially in ways that increase civilian risk in the name of protecting them.     

Country survey IV: Pakistan

This paper examines the role of the military in Pakistan, particularly in regard to civil‐military relations and defence industrialisation. Pakistan's military expenditure is relatively high, but apart from investment multipliers, little of this spending filters through to the civil sector. Pakistan's defence‐industrial strategy centres on rebuild and Chinese technological collaboration. However, while this ‘capital‐saving’ approach has merit, the strategy has thus far failed to stimulate broader civil development linkages. A conclusion of this paper is that Pakistan is failing to maximise the strategic dual‐use benefits of integrating civil‐military activity.