加快推动国防科技和武器装备军民融合发展

国防科技和武器装备领域是军民融合发展的重点,也是衡量军民融合发展水平的重要标志。加快国防科技和武器装备军民融合发展,是保军强军的重要支撑,更关乎国家安全和发展一系列重大问题,必须从战略高度深刻领会其全局意义,以清醒头脑研判国防科技和武器装备军民融合发展形势,用务实举措推动国防科技和武器装备军民融合创新发展。     

从大国博弈视角解读与应对第三次抵消战略

在常规军力优势相对衰落、经费预算日益缩紧的背景下,美军为维持其军事霸权,提出了旨在实现兵力全球自由投送的第三次抵消战略(Third Offset Strategy)。通过梳理抵消战略的现实背景、历史沿革和战略目的,我们发现如果把第三次抵消战略简单视作美军的军事技术发展战略甚至军事战略,就会陷入片面而幼稚的认识误区。除了防范潜在的技术诱骗和技术突袭,更应该从大国博弈的战略视角出发,全面审视和应对第三次抵消战略对我国的挑战。美军实现国家利益的需求导向、自我变革的决心勇气和创新能力、科技兴军的先进理念和以军为主的军民融合成功经验值得借鉴。要以我为主参与制定未来战争的\"游戏规则\",做到\"你打你的,我打我的\";要深入研究美军作战体系和美国国家战略的薄弱环节,有针对性地\"攻其所必救\",从而化解重大安全挑战,争得新的战略机遇期。     

Making sense of the Southern African Development Community

SADC has a poor record in advancing peace and security in Southern Africa. Many identify poor policy frameworks and weak technical capacities as the major obstacles. Laurie Nathan goes beyond these easy explanations in his important new book on SADC. Absence of common democratic values and reluctance to surrender state sovereignty are key factors preventing SADC from making progress according to this book. This article argues that Nathan overstates the case and that there are real prospects and potentials for making further progress in regional cooperation. The lessons from the history of European integration also points to the important role of regional leadership. South Africa, in coalition with other likeminded countries, may still be in a position to move the SADC project forward.     

The Problem of Weak Nuclear States

Governments are increasingly recognizing the problem posed by internally weak nuclear-capable states. The problem, however, is under-theorized. This article brings together literature on sovereignty and international order, the nonproliferation regime, and weak states, and introduces new concepts to provide a more structured understanding of this problem. Insight comes from focusing attention on the function and governance of two nuclear estates (termed the production and operational estates), and on their resilience to decay and disorder occurring within the state and society. Drawing on empirical observation, the authors suggest a typology of weakness in nuclear states, involving state fragmentation typified by the former Soviet Union, the “hard weak state” typified by North Korea, and the internally conflicted state typified by Pakistan. Although these types give rise to distinctive difficulties, their alleviation depends heavily on the maintenance of internal authority within the state and estates, the presence or absence of cooperative relations, and the international regulatory framework's vitality.     

Dynamic institutionalization: the foundations of Japan’s radioactive problem

Many have suggested that the true purpose behind Japan’s development of a closed nuclear-fuel cycle is to maintain the technical potential to develop nuclear weapons. However, closer examination of the development of Japan’s nuclear industry shows that, although Japan possesses advanced nuclear technologies, there has been no deliberate strategy to create a nuclear-weapon option. There is no “nuclear hedge.” To illustrate this point, this article presents a framework called “dynamic institutionalization” to explain the origins of Japan’s nuclear policies and the different sets of institutionalized pressures and constraints that have perpetuated these policies over time. Japan’s continued development of closed fuel-cycle technologies is primarily driven by domestic politics and the lack of a permanent spent-fuel management solution. On the other hand, Japan’s institutionalized nuclear forbearance is driven by the calculation that, as long as US extended deterrence remains credible, Japan’s security is best guaranteed through reliance on the US nuclear umbrella. By analytically untangling the policy of closed fuel-cycle development from the rationale for nuclear forbearance, this article provides a more nuanced view of the relationships between the domestic and international variables shaping Japan’s nuclear policies.