Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons

India’s nuclear doctrine and posture has traditionally been shaped by minimum deterrence logic. This logic includes assumptions that possession of only a small retaliatory nuclear force generates sufficient deterrent effect against adversaries, and accordingly that development of limited nuclear warfighting concepts and platforms are unnecessary for national security. The recent emergence of Pakistan’s Nasr tactical nuclear missile platform has generated pressures on Indian minimum deterrence. This article analyzes Indian official and strategic elite responses to the Nasr challenge, including policy recommendations and attendant implications. It argues that India should continue to adhere to minimum deterrence, which serves as the most appropriate concept for Indian nuclear policy and best supports broader foreign and security policy objectives. However, the form through which Indian minimum deterrence is delivered must be rethought in light of this new stage of regional nuclear competition.     

推进国防动员军民融合深度发展的对策思考

军民融合式发展是实现富国与强军相统一的必由之路,也是增强国防动员潜力、提高国防动员能力的有效途径。在新的形势下推进国防动员建设,必须进一步强化军民融合观念,完善军民融合机制,提高军民融合层次,增强军民融合实效,努力促进动员潜力随经济实力同步增长、动员能力随需求拓展不断提升,实现经济效益、社会效益与国防效益有机统一。     

当前火灾调查区域协作机制的思考

从新时期火灾调查工作的实际出发,阐述了火灾调查区域协作机制的含义、构成及范畴,在此基础上,分析了火灾调查区域协作机制应用中可能出现的问题和难点,提出了规范和加强火灾调查区域协作机制的具体建议。     

舰艇编队协同反导队形配置优化研究

随着舰艇编队网络中心作战模式的产生与发展,其队形配置问题必须重新给予考虑。首先介绍了网络化反导作战系统的远程数据作战能力;其后,从指挥通信、火力掩护和一次耦合杀伤区3个方面给出舰舰间距的约束条件,以远程数据作战条件下编队舰空导弹杀伤区增量最大为优化目标,建立编队舰舰间距优化模型,并在此基础上结合电子干扰的要求,给出了编队队列角的最优范围解算方法;最后,在一定的战场假设下,通过示例的方式对模型的有效性与适应性进行了验证。     

Strategic outsourcing under technology spillovers

We study a supply chain in which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM) compete in the finished goods market. The OEM can decide whether to outsource the intermediate good, a critical component for producing the finished good, from the CM or make in‐house production. Technology transition improves the CM's production efficiency, and it can take two different forms: a direct technology transfer from the OEM to the CM or technology spillovers through outsourcing from the OEM to the CM. We document the possibility of strategic outsourcing, that is, the CM supplies the intermediate good to the OEM when she is less efficient than the OEM's in‐house production. We find that technology spillovers can strengthen the incentive for strategic outsourcing. Furthermore, compared with direct technology transfers, outsourcing coupled with technology spillovers may generate more technology transition. Outsourcing is a particularly appropriate channel for implicit collusion when the OEM is not very efficient with the production of the intermediate good. Our results suggest that ex post competition on the finished goods can create room for ex ante collaboration and provide some implications on the OEM's outsourcing strategies when facing a competitive CM.© 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 501–514, 2014     

The African Peace and Security Architecture and its partners

This article presents survey data on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It focuses explicitly on two aspects: the internal constitution and achievements of the APSA; and coordination and cooperation with external actors, such as Regional Economic Communities, the United Nations and the European Union. The survey, conducted between October 2011 and December 2012, targeted 198 security experts in international organisations, think tanks, academia and non-governmental organisations. It reveals the APSA's current stage of development, achievements and challenges.     

Regional integration and nuclear energy in Africa

African states are hampered by unreliable electric energy that has not complemented economic development efforts. Recently, several African states announced plans to pursue nuclear energy in the future. However, several challenges remain for these states, notably insecurity and financial deficiencies. This paper proposes the use of regional integration arrangements to address these challenges faced by African states, as a way of complementing other efforts enabling African states to obtain nuclear energy. The existence of these arrangements and their institutional mechanisms can enable African states to enhance security and cost-effectively develop nuclear power infrastructure.     

Demobilisation,disarmament and reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The numbers game

Abstract

The creation of the Africa Command (AFRICOM) has reflected the growth in the strategic importance of Africa in US foreign policy since the end of the 1990s. One of the objectives of this new geographical military command is to forge closer links between foreign, security and development policies. However, this approach met with a number of difficulties associated with the challenge of ‘inter-agency cooperation’ among rather disparate actors from foreign affairs, defence and development. In addition, the establishment of AFRICOM has met with fierce criticism in the US and elsewhere – especially in Africa – culminating in the charge that the US foreign and development policies in Africa are being militarised. Although AFRICOM has a number of interesting features, this paper shows that it has reacted to these criticisms by realigning itself more closely with the traditional model of a military command, at the expense of the innovative interagency elements.     

NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH

The funding of international nuclear risk mitigation is ad hoc, voluntary, and unpredictable, offering no transparent explanation of who is financially responsible for the task or why. Among many non-nuclear-armed states, this exacerbates a sense of injustice surrounding what they see as a discriminatory nuclear regime. The resulting erosion of the regime's legitimacy undermines support for efforts to prevent nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism. This article proposes a transparent, equitable “nuclear-user-pays” system as a logical means of reversing this trend. This system envisions states contributing financially to international efforts to mitigate nuclear risks at a level relative to the degree of nuclear risks created by each state. “National nuclear risk factors” would be calculated by tabulating the risks associated with each state's civilian and military nuclear activities, as well as advanced dual-use and nuclear-capable missile activities, multiplying the severity of each risk by the probability of it occurring, and combining these results. A nuclear-user-pays model would create financial incentives for national and corporate nuclear risk mitigation, boost legitimacy and support for nuclear control efforts among non-nuclear-armed states, assist in preventing nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism, and advance nuclear disarmament by helping progressively devalue nuclear weapons.     

SPARRING ON THE SUBCONTINENT

South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime, by Mario Esteban Carranza. Ashgate, 2009. 208 pages, $99.95.