军事欺骗战法分析的数学方法-应用*

针对军事欺骗战法定量分析困难的问题,采用基于贝叶斯统计推断和博弈均衡分析的数学方法,在理论上为解决此难题提供了一种可行的方法.该方法首先定义基本概率矩阵,然后根据贝叶斯原理为交战双方构造用于统计推断的主观概率矩阵,并在由两个主观概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链与实施军事欺骗机会之间建立对应关系,再将此关系推广到基本概率矩阵,即是否存在实施军事欺骗的机会将由基本概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链决定.对理论成果的初步应用表明:通过分析由战场情报信息构成的基本概率矩阵的偏序链,可以科学地运用军事欺骗和反军事欺骗战法.     

改进博弈论的舰载无人机编队协同对海突击目标分配

目标分配问题是UAV自主控制的重要问题。针对舰载无人机编队协同对海突击目标分配问题,首先建立了基于离散动态贝叶斯网络的目标价值评估模型,在此基础上构建了舰载无人机编队的益损值矩阵,设计了舰载无人机编队协同对海突击目标分配的决策函数,提出了一种基于改进博弈论的目标分配方法,为4种不同约束条件下的目标分配问题分别设计了算法。最后对所建立的目标价值评估模型和改进博弈论的目标分配算法进行了实例仿真,仿真结果表明了模型和算法的可行性和有效性。     

Right Intention and the Ends of War

The jus ad bellum criterion of right intention (CRI) is a central guiding principle of just war theory. It asserts that a country’s resort to war is just only if that country resorts to war for the right reasons. However, there is significant confusion, and little consensus, about how to specify the CRI. We seek to clear up this confusion by evaluating several distinct ways of understanding the criterion. On one understanding, a state’s resort to war is just only if it plans to adhere to the principles of just war while achieving its just cause. We argue that the first understanding makes the CRI superfluous, because it can be subsumed under the probability of success criterion. On a second understanding, a resort to war is just only if a state’s motives, which explain its resort to war, are of the right kind. We argue that this second understanding of the CRI makes it a significant further obstacle to justifying war. However, this second understanding faces a possible infinite regress problem, which, left unresolved, leaves us without a plausible interpretation of the CRI. This constitutes a significant and novel reason for leaving the CRI out of the international law of armed conflict (LOAC).     

Rethinking Military Virtue Ethics in an Age of Unmanned Weapons

Although most styles of military ethics are hybrids that draw on multiple ethical theories, they are usually based primarily on the model of Aristotelian virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is well-suited for regulating the conduct of soldiers who have to make quick decisions on the battlefield, but its applicability to military personnel is threatened by the growing use of unmanned weapon systems. These weapons disrupt virtue ethics’ institutional and cultural basis by changing what it means to display virtue and transforming the roles soldiers perform and the nature of the military profession itself. I argue that in light of these challenges to virtue ethics, at least as it is traditionally understood within the armed forces, soldiers operating unmanned weapons require a more heavily rule-based approach to military ethics.     

基于ANP和云模型的军事通信系统效能评估

将网络层次分析法(ANP)和云重心评判法相结合应用于军事通信系统的效能评估中,并指出有无卫星支援下军事通信系统的效能对比。首先,针对军事通信系统的特点,构建通信系统评估的指标体系,建立ANP模型;其次,根据通信系统各指标之间的关联性,采用网络层次分析法构造极限超矩阵来确定指标的权重,并与AHP确定的指标权重相比较,指出ANP提高了指标权重的科学性;最后,利用云模型处理定性指标和定量指标之间的转换,给出有卫星支援下的军事通信系统效能的提升度,并与模糊综合评判法相比较,结果证明了网络层次分析法和云重心评价法相结合在军事通信系统效能评估中的可行性和科学性。     

基于贝叶斯反馈云模型的空中目标威胁评估

在现代战争中,空袭与防空作战仍将是主要作战方式之一。对防空方而言,及早发现空袭目标、准确判断空袭意图,是合理分配火力、最大限度发挥自身抗击能力的基本前提。综合考虑了攻防双方及作战环境等因素的影响,建立空中目标威胁评估指标体系。采用云模型理论较好地处理了空袭的模糊性和随机性,通过贝叶斯反馈对专家主观认识差异进行修正,使专家意见更加统一,使威胁评估结果更为简洁合理,便于指挥员快速准确作出决策。     

坦克搭乘输送平台海上射击目标决策方法

通过粗糙集方法分析影响坦克对岸滩目标射击效果的各种因素,建立坦克搭乘输送平台海上射击的知识表达系统,将射击效果作为决策属性,将已有数据或作战经验作为条件属性,依粗糙集理论方法挖掘射击决策规则,最后约简得到一些简单的射击决策规则,为单坦克射击决策提供依据。     

Ordering and controlling the dimensions of strategy

Colin Gray’s dimensions of strategy, built upon the earlier work of Clausewitz and Howard, has theoretical, practical, and pedagogic value for the Strategic Studies community. This paper further develops the theory, arguing that the dimensions can be controlled or managed to improve strategic performance. The dimensions are divided into two categories: “internal” and “external” to the process of strategy. The paper describes the dynamic process by which the internal dimensions, which can be controlled, are used to exert influence over the external dimensions that are beyond the control of the strategist. It is argued that six dimensions hold the key to strategic success: politics and the five dimensions concerned with warfighting. This conclusion validates the Clausewitzian paradigm with its emphasis on policy and battle.     

Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016