基于RBF神经网络的军事物流设施规模预测

确定合理的军事物流设施规模对于成功实施军事后勤保障十分重要。提出了基于RBF神经网络的军事物流设施规模预测模型的建模方法,该方法旨在确定军事物流设施规模与其影响因素之间的非线性关系;采用算例说明了基于RBF神经网络的军事物流设施规模预测的具体做法,对军事物流设施规模的确定具有指导意义。     

预应力作用超磁致伸缩材料磁滞回线的温度敏感性分析

超磁致伸缩材料Terfenol-D具有应力温度敏感特性。通过循环油浴加热的实验方法,测量超磁致伸缩材料在力热磁耦合下的磁滞回线,发现预应力的增加有效降低了温度对材料低磁场性能的影响,材料显示了良好的低磁场温度稳定性能。试件在高预应力120 MPa、磁场强度300 kA/m的条件,磁化强度出现先增大后减小的现象,磁化衰减幅度得到减弱。     

预警机伴随支援下的飞机整体作战能力评估

为定量研究预警机伴随支援下的飞机整体作战能力,把预警机和战斗机看作一个整体,建立层次分析模型;充分考虑预警机对战斗机作战的影响,提出综合对数法飞机整体作战能力评估模型.针对在预警机伴随支援下飞机作战参数发生的变化,合理求解模型.通过算例得出预警机提升作战能力的定量结果,证明了综合对数法评估模型较好地完成了预警机伴随支援下的飞机整体作战能力评估.     

基于UML的装甲装备主动式保障系统建模研究

摘要：为将主动式保障先进理念应用于装甲装备保障过程,采用UML系统建模理论和方法,在分析装甲装备保障主要业务内容的基础上,通过系统需求分析建模和系统分析与设计建模,构建装甲装备主动式保障系统用例模型、对象类静态模型、动态交互模型和状态模型,以及体系结构模型,明确装甲装备主动式保障系统的结构功能与运行流程,为系统仿真与评估、演示验证等后续研究奠定基础．     

海上远程精确打击体系作战能力评估指标空间建模方法研究

现代战争的信息化程度、复杂性和不确定性不断提高,对海上远程精确打击（LPSS）体系作战能力的评估提出了更高的要求．要想准确评估系统的作战能力,建立合理的LPSS体系作战能力评估指标体系非常关键．然而影响LPSS体系作战能力的指标繁多,指标间存在冗余和相关性,不同层次指标间还存在交叉性,直接采用这些指标会增加后续评估的时空复杂度．在创建LPSS体系作战能力评估指标体系的基础上,对评估指标空间的建模方法进行研究,创建了可供评估的数据样本空间,为后续对底层指标集合进行约简、降维处理奠定了基础．     

飞航式助飞鱼雷指令修正时机仿真

为解决飞航式助飞鱼雷指令修正时机的选择问题,介绍了其对潜攻击过程及射击方法,分析了选择指令修正时机应考虑的主要因素,建立了飞航式助飞鱼雷作战仿真模型。通过仿真计算得到了指令修正时机的确定原则。提高了飞航式助飞鱼雷的攻潜能力,为制定与优化指令修正方案提供了理论依据。     

转管炮降低机心组导轨摩擦力研究

为了使转管炮机心组消耗的驱动功率最小,对机心组速度、主滚轮相对机体位置、机心体左右导轨及倾角关系等对驱动功率的影响进行研究。表明最好选用机心组凸轮加速度最小,主滚轮相对机体质心位置等于零,最好用无横向位移以及有夹角的关系最好。优化结果表明:9 000 rpm的射速,驱动功率由机心组加速度变化引起140kw下降到31 kw,降到不足于原设计曲线的22%;射速为3 300 rpm的主滚轮压力峰值参数化峰值1 086.5 N,升高到10 000 rpm的峰值9 779.3 N。无横向以及有夹角降低压力有横向以及无夹角90.9%。     

网络空间联合反恐作战信息共享能力分析与评估?

在网络空间联合反恐作战信息共享能力构成框架的基础上,分析了信息共享能力生成的相关要素及其内部关系,并利用信息熵理论建立了信息共享的时效熵、质量熵、成本熵模型。通过对传统树形链状和新型网状循环两种信息共享模式进行仿真分析,为不断提高信息共享能力进行了有益探索。     

Northern Ireland and minimum force: the refutation of a concept?

The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces.     

The ‘first’ surge: the repulse of the Easter Invasion in South Vietnam, 1972 – implications for Iraq and Afghanistan

In a military intervention, do surges work? I compare the failed ‘surge’ in Vietnam, the repulse of the Easter Invasion in 1972, as a means of assessing the more ambiguous surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. I identify four features of a surge for this analysis: the military dimensions and strategy of the surging forces, the military capabilities of the host forces, the political vitality and will of the host country, and the political commitment in the domestic politics of the intervener. I find that the last feature is the most critical; and, in all three surges, the American political commitment was lacking.