Size Still Matters: Explaining Sri Lanka’s Counterinsurgency Victory over the Tamil Tigers

The military effectiveness literature has largely dismissed the role of material preponderance in favor of strategic interaction theories. The study of counterinsurgency, in which incumbent victory is increasingly rare despite material superiority, has also turned to other strategic dynamics explanations like force employment, leadership, and insurgent/adversary attributes. Challenging these two trends, this paper contends that even in cases of counterinsurgency, material preponderance remains an essential—and at times the most important—factor in explaining battlefield outcomes and effectiveness. To test this, the paper turns to the case of the Sri Lankan state’s fight against the Tamil Tiger insurgency, a conflict which offers rich variation over time across six periods and over 25 years. Drawing on evidence from historical and journalistic accounts, interviews, memoirs, and field research, the paper demonstrates that material preponderance accounts for variation in military effectiveness and campaign outcomes (including military victory in the final campaign) better than strategic explanations. Additionally, a new quantitative data-set assembled on annual loss-exchange ratios demonstrates the superiority of materialist explanations above those of skill, human capital, and regime type.     

装备战损量的兰彻斯特方程预计方法

针对装备战损量预计这一未来作战装备保障必须解决的核心问题,运用兰彻斯特方程探讨解决途径。从分析影响装备战损的因素出发,综合讨论目前预计装备战损量的方法,提出基于指数多元兰彻斯特方程的装备战损量预计模型和模型中毁伤能力系数的确定方法,得到了装备战损量的兰彻斯特方程预计方法,并举例验证。该方法将经验计算与模拟计算相结合,用较简单的确定性解析方程描述所考虑因素对装备战损量的客观约束关系,较好地满足了未来信息化条件下作战装备战损量预计的需要。     

基于复杂网络的作战描述模型研究

针对传统作战模型重点关注兵力的毁伤,不能充分地反映信息时代作战的特点,提出了一个基于复杂网络的作战描述模型,把作战单元抽象成节点,把各单元之间的相互作用抽象成有向边,将战场描述为一个由传感器、决策器、影响器、目标四类节点组成的有向网络图。定义了网络模型的若干特征参数,把作战环看成是反映作战能力的指标,并区别分析了标准作战环和广义作战环,能更好地反映信息时代作战的特点。最后实例研究了传统作战条件下决策器连通程度的变化给作战能力带来的影响。     

The Afghan model in northern Iraq

In Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, as the Coalition's heavy forces fought in the South, in the North a handful of special operations forces, working with Kurdish rebels, clashed with the Iraqi army along the Green Line. In operations reminiscent of those used a year earlier to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lightly armed and heavily outnumbered Coalition forces called in air strikes to defeat Iraq's regular and Republican Guard army divisions. This article tells the story of these operations and discusses some of their implications for future US military policy. The success of the Afghan model in Iraq goes a long way toward demonstrating the efficacy of new air-heavy tactics and shows the strategic value of using light indigenous allies to replace heavy US land forces in both conventional combat and occupation operations.     

Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War

Recent tensions between Russia and the United States have sparked debate over the value of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). One controversy surrounds the extent to which NATO raises the risk of war through entrapment—a concept that scholars invoke to describe how states might drag their allies into undesirable military conflicts. Yet scholars have advanced different, even conflicting arguments about how entrapment risks arise. I offer a typology that distinguishes between the mechanisms through which entrapment risks allegedly emerge on the basis of their institutional, systemic, reputational, and transnational ideological sources. I use the 2008 Russo-Georgian War to illustrate how the purported mechanisms of entrapment fare in elucidating that conflict. In analyzing why entrapment risks emerge, and thinking counterfactually about The 2008 War, I argue that scholars need to disentangle the various mechanisms that drive both alliance formation and war to make sure that entrapment risks do indeed exist.     

The subversion of the Bulgarian defence system – the Russian way

Russia has long been pursuing an intended and calculated policy of keeping enough influence in Bulgaria in order to have control over national decisions. Together with the economic, energy, political and information tools used by Russia in its hybrid war against Bulgaria and in its bid to achieve an enduring “state capture,” defence is also a distinct target of Russian subversion now. A list of noticeable subversive actions with tangible effects can be summarised, ranging from fuelling division and manipulating public opinion, preventing the strengthening of the NATO position in the Black Sea, sabotaging defence reform to various options of subverting the modernisation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and seeking new ways to keep legacy Soviet military equipment in operation as long as possible. This issue must be urgently addressed both nationally and in NATO.     

分兵集火、凡船皆战——浅析美军“分布式杀伤”概念

通过梳理美军\"分布式杀伤\"概念的提出背景、提出过程、内涵意义,阐述了\"分布式杀伤\"的三条制胜之道,即符合海战客观环境、符合科技进步方向、符合战争演变趋势。此外,文章还分析了\"分布式杀伤\"实际执行过程中的几大难点和缺陷,包括指挥控制问题、舰船能力问题、成本和后勤补给问题、防御有效性问题。     

Beyond balancing? Intrastate conflict and US grand strategy

Grand strategic theorists share an historical emphasis on interstate conflict, yet in contrast to the more frequent intrastate conflicts, these represent only 7 of the some 273 US military deployments since 1900. We argue that these intrastate conflicts limit the utility of regional balances of power in mitigating forms of conflict that the US may consider inimical to its national security interests. When considering potential changes to US force posture and grand strategy, American coercive statecraft should be theorised along a broader strategic continuum encompassing the full range of conflict.