Decentralising authoritarianism? The international intervention,the new ‘revolutionaries’ and the involution of Post-Qadhafi Libya

In 2011, Libya became the only country of the Arab Uprisings where NATO and the Arab League intervened militarily, ostensibly to protect the civilian population, but in reality in support of the opposition National Transitional Council. This article argues that, since 2011, Libya has transitioned from Qadhafi’s centralised authoritarianism to a new decentralised authoritarianism where multiple centres of power coexist and sometimes overlap, while leaving room only for formal democratic institutions. This is the result of decisions taken by the ‘revolutionaries’ after the overthrow of the dictator, and a consequence of long-standing features of the Libyan state and society.     

Conflict and fiscal capacity

We examine the role of war in retarding state fiscal capacity in developing countries, measured by tax revenue ratios to GDP. We build a simple theoretical model of a factionalized state, where patronage substitutes for common interest public goods, along with violent contestation over a rent or prize. Our dynamic panel empirical analysis applied to 79 developing countries, during 1980–2010, indicates that war, especially civil war, retards fiscal capacity, along with imperfect democracy, political repression, poor governance, and dependence on oil and macroeconomic mismanagement. High intensity conflict is particularly destructive of state capacity. In countries experiencing low intensity wars, other institutional factors may matter more than war. The diminution of fiscal capacity due to war appears less pronounced after the end of the cold war.     

海军兵棋演习系统研究

兵棋演习系统是我军未来开展模拟训练的重要手段,针对国内外对兵棋推演系统现状及技术发展趋势进行研究,提出海军兵棋演习系统的发展方向和设计方法,并结合海军兵棋推演的研究内容重点,给出作战规则建模、指挥关系建模等主要关键技术的解决方法,为我国海军未来兵棋推演系统设计、研究和发展提供技术支撑。     

多智能体信息一致性在机器人编队控制中的应用

对固定拓扑结构下多智能体有向网络一致性问题进行了研究,提出了一类协调控制器并证明了使多智能体网络在固定拓扑结构下取得全局渐进一致的充要条件,考虑到智能体之间通讯过程中存在的时延问题,给出了最大固定延时时间的紧凑上界,取得了满意效果,最后将信息一致性思想应用于多机器人的编队控制。结果表明,基于信息一致性的方法可成功应用于机器人编队控制。     

面向战争设计工程的作战信息建模方法

首先对战争设计工程研究问题的思路进行了分析,给出了问题中存在的作战信息的结构.按照作战信息的结构,从实体、关系、任务、过程、交互5个方面,给出了作战信息的结构化、形式化建模的规范,主要为异质领域专家在理解问题、认识问题、表达解决思路中提供一定程度上的帮助,提高了战争设计工程的研究效率.     

基于云模型的导弹信息作战指挥效能评估

针对导弹信息作战指挥效能评估中既包含定量指标,又包含定性指标,而对这些指标进行科学合理地统一评价尚存在很多困难的问题,运用云模型对其进行了研究。分析了导弹信息作战指挥能力的指标体系,介绍了云模型的相关理论,并给出了运用云模型进行效能评估的详细算法,利用云发生器得到了最终的评估结果。最后给出了一个评估实例,结果证明该方法有效可行,能很好地解决效能评估中定性语言到定量值之间的转化问题。     

Civil–military relations and organisational preferences regarding the use of the military in Chinese foreign policy: insights from the debate on MOOTW

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the positions of the Chinese civilian leaders and military elites on Military Operations Other Than War in order to shed light on their preferences about the use of the armed forces in foreign policy between the late 1990s and the early 2010s. Over time, a significant divergence developed between civilians and soldiers until 2011, when the Libyan crisis happened. The study also prompts important considerations about our understanding of civil–military relations in China and future role of the People’s Liberation Army as a tool of statecraft in foreign policy.     

Legitimate Authority as a Jus Ad Bellum Condition: Defense of a Procedural Requirement in Just War Theory

ABSTRACT

Today, it is widely held that while authorization may be helpful in assuring that the other jus ad bellum criteria are met, legitimate authority is not itself a condition for just recourse to war. Or, if it is necessary, it is said to be a trivial requirement, as mobilization for war requires some political authorization. Those who would retain the legitimacy requirement have differing views about who the proper authority is. I argue that, reasonably understood, legitimate authorization is necessary for jus ad bellum. Considerations of agency and consent in force combine with the social contract to commit us to deferring to recognized authorities. These obligations are strengthened by the epistemic reliability and pragmatic value conferred by governing institutions and procedures limiting recourse to war. These same rationales imply that the U.N. Security Council should regulate the international use of force. I qualify that if higher authorities fail to act, other subsidiary authorities may then authorize force. However, the move to each subsequent level of authorization must be justified. Understood in this way, the requirement that wars not be fought without legitimate authorization is a non-trivial, necessary procedural jus ad bellum condition.     

The Changing Nature of Legitimate Authority in the Just War Tradition

ABSTRACT

The legitimate authority principle has become reduced to the issue of state authority. In its current formulation, the state has the sole authority to wage war, and because non-state actors, by their very definition, cannot satisfy this principle, their use of force is inherently unethical. This does not reflect the reality that non-state actors are increasingly engaging in the use of force, sometimes legitimately. As a result, the legitimate authority principle can and should look beyond the state. This article navigates a terrain in which non-state actors engage in the use of force, and in which revisionist just war thinking proposes that the concept of legitimate authority is irrelevant to thinking about the ethics of war. It proposes a principled approach to the inclusion of some non-state actors under the rubric of legitimate authority. This approach draws upon the historical development of the legitimate authority principle and incorporates the factors important to early writers on the subject.     

Modern liberal wars,illiberal allies,and peace as the failure of policy

ABSTRACT

The post-Cold War period nearly up to the present has been characterised as the age of liberal wars, yet key facets of the liberal guidance of war remain under appreciated. This article seeks to address this wider gap with regard to the particular concern of war termination and the fulfilment or failure of policy. First, it develops characterisations of liberal wars based on the existing literature, identifying three broad types through consideration of context—defensive versus offensive—and of political and strategic agency, particularly regarding the motives for and intents of action. Three types of liberal wars result: defensive liberal wars, offensive liberal wars with humanitarian motive and geopolitical intent, and offensive liberal wars with geopolitical motive and humanitarian intent. The article then presents one exemplary case for each liberal war with an emphasis on how liberal strategy required an illiberal ally and that ally's effect on the subsequent peace.