网络中心联合潜艇与远程导弹突袭航母战法*

运用潜艇和远程导弹联合作战形成的信息与火力联合打击优势来开发突袭航母战斗群的战法是联合作战研究中尚未解决的关键问题之一,根据信息作战、网络中心战和海上游击战原理,分别利用潜艇获取目标位置信息优势和远程导弹对目标打击火力优势,通过海上游击战战法,运用在以卫星为平台的网络中心环境中形成的信息与火力联合打击能力,实施对航母战斗群的突袭,对一个典型实例的初步试验及分析结果表明:与潜艇侦察目标能力有关的正确发现目标概率和评估远程导弹打击目标效果概率以及与远程导弹打击能力有关的命中目标概率对信息与火力联合打击能力的影响分别为20.79%、22.57%和20.20%%,是成功突袭航母战斗群的最重要的因素,而网络中心联合潜艇与远程导弹突袭航母则是充分发挥潜艇和远程导弹综合优势的科学战法。     

基于影响图方法的信息战模型

基于信息战内涵,分析了信息因素和兵力因素在信息战过程中相互作用的关系,根据影响图建模理论,建立了信息战模型,得到了兵力与信息耦合作用的微分方程,说明了制信息权在信息战中的决定性作用,为定量研究信息战的兵力和信息要素提供了理论依据。最后通过对模型的分析和简化,导出了我们熟悉的情报战模型和兰彻斯特方程第二线性律,体现了模型的合理性,但是在实际应用时仍需结合具体问题对模型进一步规范和完善,才能得出科学合理而有价值的结论。     

Hybrid War and Its Countermeasures: A Critique of the Literature

This article examines critically the literature of hybrid war and evaluates the countermeasures often proposed. It explains the concept of hybrid warfare and its varied interpretations, illustrating how it is a manifestation of current anxieties in armed conflict. The selection of the literature is based on works that are referenced, that offer a scientific approach, and which review either the phenomenon of hybrid warfare or its countermeasures empirically. Unscientific works have been omitted. The analysis of the literature presented here shows that the antidotes to ‘hybridity’ lie not in the operational or tactical sphere but in strategic and political domains.     

Think again – supplying war: reappraising military logistics and its centrality to strategy and war

This article argues that logistics constrains strategic opportunity while itself being heavily circumscribed by strategic and operational planning. With the academic literature all but ignoring the centrality of logistics to strategy and war, this article argues for a reappraisal of the critical role of military logistics, and posits that the study and conduct of war and strategy are incomplete at best or false at worst when they ignore this crucial component of the art of war. The article conceptualises the logistics–strategy nexus in a novel way, explores its contemporary manifestation in an age of uncertainty, and applies it to a detailed case study of UK operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.     

认知电子战综述

认知电子战通常被定义为以具备认知性能的电子战装备为基础,注重自主交互式的电磁环境学习能力与动态智能化的对抗任务处理能力的电子战形态。自其被首次提出以来,以其感知准、推理强、决策快的优势备受国内外研究学者广泛关注。随着人工智能新理念、新技术、新应用的不断涌现,认知电子战步入崭新的发展阶段。为捕捉其未来发展方向,从人工智能角度出发,总结并丰富了认知电子战概念内涵,梳理认知电子战的发展脉络及外国典型项目,搭建认知电子战系统框架及架构,从感知、判断、决策等方面对认知听电子战关键技术进行了全面系统综述,并总结了认知电子战面临的挑战和发展趋势。     

Nuclear deterrence and cyber warfare: coexistence or competition?

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities.     

对岸电子进攻中航母阵位确定方法?

针对航母编队对岸电子进攻作战提出了一种航母编队阵位确定的方法。基于航母编队在对岸电子进攻中的任务,提出了航母编队与岸边距离的基本要求,建立了航母编队与岸边距离的数学模型,仿真计算了模型中各个参数对航母编队与岸边距离的影响。这些模型可用于航母编队在对岸电子进攻中确定航母的阵位,满足航母编队作战使用的需要。     

The insurgency of the Vendée

The insurrection in the Vendée combined open warfare with the methods of petite guerre, ambushing French republican soldiers and cutting their supply lines to Paris. These tactics, when combined with the hatreds generated by a civil war, go far to explain to the cruelty of the conflict in the west and the depth of the hatreds it engendered. In republican eyes the use of guerrilla tactics was unjust and illegitimate, and they denounced their adversaries as common criminals and brigands, portraying them as backward, superstitious, even as subhuman, and in the process justified the savage repression they unleashed against them.     

Initiating insurgencies abroad: French plans to ‘chouannise’ Britain and Ireland, 1793–1798

Secret French plans to launch guerrilla-style raids on the British Isles devised in the spring of 1796 were referred to as ‘chouanneries’. The name and concept behind these small-war operations were modelled on the irregular tactics used by the Chouan rebels in the Vendée, which the French state army had brutally quashed, but some wished to transfer into their institutional practice. Part of France's ongoing military strategy in the war against Britain, which included fomenting insurrection in Ireland, these irregular operations were to be manned partially by pardoned deserters and released convicts and prisoners of war. Of these, only Tate's brief invasion of Wales in 1797 was realised, but the surviving plans provide insightful historical lessons into an Anglophobic mindset shared by a small network of practitioners and policy deciders on the effectiveness of such shock and awe tactics. Largely motivated by the desire to take revenge for Britain's support of counter-revolutionaries in the Vendée, these plans could more aptly be referred to as counter-‘chouanneries’.     

The evolution of Hezbollah's strategy and military performance, 1982–2006

This article fills a gap in the research on Hezbollah by evaluating their military performance from their formation in 1982 and up till the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war. This study tests the theses that Hezbollah had developed a very strong tactical proficiency in the late 1990s and that there are more similarities in their strategy and tactics during the 2006 war and the 1982–2000 insurgency in Southern Lebanon than previously assumed. Another central theme of this article is how Hezbollah has been constantly adapting and evolving for the duration of its existence.