Strategic dynamic sourcing from competing suppliers with transferable capacity investment

We study the supplier relationship choice for a buyer that invests in transferable capacity operated by a supplier. With a long‐term relationship, the buyer commits to source from a supplier over a long period of time. With a short‐term relationship, the buyer leaves open the option of switching to a new supplier in the future. The buyer has incomplete information about a supplies efficiency, and thus uses auctions to select suppliers and determine the contracts. In addition, the buyer faces uncertain demand for the product. A long‐term relationship may be beneficial for the buyer because it motivates more aggressive bidding at the beginning, resulting a lower initial price. A short‐term relationship may be advantageous because it allows switching, with capacity transfer at some cost, to a more efficient supplier in the future. We find that there exists a critical level of the switching cost above which a long‐term relationship is better for the buyer than a short‐term relationship. In addition, this critical switching cost decreases with demand uncertainty, implying a long‐term relationship is more favorable for a buyer facing volatile demand. Finally, we find that in a long‐term relationship, capacity can be either higher or lower than in a short‐term relationship. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

An integrated electric power supply chain and fuel market network framework: Theoretical modeling with empirical analysis for New England

In this article, we develop a novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the economic network transactions in energy supply markets and the physical network transmission constraints in the electric power network. The theoretical derivation and analysis are done using the theory of variational inequalities. We then apply the model to a specific case, the New England electric power supply chain, consisting of six states, five fuel types, 82 power generators, with a total of 573 generating units, and 10 demand market regions. The empirical case study demonstrates that the regional electric power prices simulated by our model match the actual electricity prices in New England very well. We also compute the electric power prices and the spark spread, an important measure of the power plant profitability, under natural gas and oil price variations. The empirical examples illustrate that in New England, the market/grid‐level fuel competition has become the major factor that affects the influence of the oil price on the natural gas price. Finally, we utilize the model to quantitatively investigate how changes in the demand for electricity influence the electric power and the fuel markets from a regional perspective. The theoretical model can be applied to other regions and multiple electricity markets under deregulation to quantify the interactions in electric power/energy supply chains and their effects on flows and prices. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

助推滑翔飞行器复合控制系统线性化小偏差运动方程推导与控制系统设计

助推滑翔技术是制导武器实现增加射程、提高机动突防能力的关键技术之一,对飞行器姿态控制有较高的要求,需要设计复合控制方式的姿态控制系统.针对采用空气舵与燃气舵联动控制的飞行器,建立了动力学模型,详细推导了完整的三通道线性化小偏差运动方程,结合典型弹道数据给出了动力系数图像,分析了助推滑翔弹道各飞行段中飞行器的稳定性,在此基础上选取再入段低空飞行特征点进行了姿控系统设计,仿真结果验证了线性化小偏差运动方程的正确性和控制系统的有效性,为进行此类飞行器的稳定性分析与姿态控制系统设计提供了有益的参考.     

基于混合优化的前馈—反馈复合控制器最优设计

为了解决传统PID控制器在电动舵机系统设计中难以满足控制要求的问题,首先设计了一种规范化前馈-反馈控制系统,然后利用混沌优化算法和共轭梯度方法相结合的混合优化算法对前馈-反馈控制器参数进行了优化.仿真结果表明:基于混合优化算法的前馈-反馈控制器具有很好的动态和静态性能,增强了系统的稳定性和鲁棒性,降低了学习参数选择的盲目性和对经验的高度依赖性.     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

区块链在分队战术协同中的应用构想

从战术分队角度出发,探讨了区块链技术在作战实体之间的信息交互及智能协同方面的应用设想,分析了战术分队信息交互的相关技术及面临的挑战,阐述了区块链在未来战术分队指挥体系构建中的发展构想。     

坦克火控系统自动跟踪功能关键技术

结合现代军事发展,分析了现代坦克火控系统发展自动跟踪技术的必要性;根据我军现装备的坦克火控系统所具有的自动跟踪功能,分析了自动跟踪的相关技术,电视跟踪技术的原理,图像匹配法的涵义;系统介绍了电视跟踪中图像匹配法识别和跟踪目标,介绍了目标自动跟踪系统对目标识别和判定的一种具体方法.     

车辆悬挂系统的主动优化控制器设计及仿真

基于特征结构配置参数化结果,提出了车辆悬挂系统的主动优化控制器设计方法。该方法直接基于车辆悬挂系统的参数矩阵,便于工程应用。车辆悬挂系统的仿真实例表明所提主动优化控制器设计方法简单且有效。